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Abstract
This inquiry presents a theoretical toolkit on the topic of organizational knowl-
edge. It provides concepts (1) to describe knowledge in organizations, and (2) 
to prescribe the general conditions for successful organizational knowledge 
creation. It is rooted in philosophical-epistemological reflections on the nature 
of knowledge and addressed to researchers and practitioners both-alike. 
! (1) A theory of organizational knowledge is outlined which provides 
concepts to understand nature, relevance, application, and creation of knowl-
edge in organizations. Departing from a philosophical grounding, knowledge is 
located within „distinction-making“  on the three levels of „representation“, 
„meaning“, and „action“. Additionally, the two general types of „propositional 
knowledge“  (e.g. rules, or routines) and „narrative knowledge“  (e.g. stories, or 
best practices) are presented. Knowledge creation is summarized as open-ended 
process („becoming“) which results in temporarily stable outcomes („being“). 
! (2) Supplementary, a normative theory of „organizational epistemology“  
is developed. Driven by epistemological reflections, a view is presented which 
acknowledges the crucial difference between beliefs and knowledge, between 
mere organizational distinctions and successful organizational knowledge; a 
difference which has widely been neglected by organizational studies so far. 
Drawing from a „social epistemology“  the three guidelines „enabling“, „con-
straining“, and „reflecting“  are discussed and shifted to organizations. Those 
guidelines call for an open and reflective space of knowledge creation, aligned 
with goals and structures of the organization. 
! Both (1) and (2) are demonstrated along numerous examples, connected 
to field-studies, and applied to one main use-case at the company „Seven-
Eleven Japan“.
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Preface
What is in it for researchers? 
This inquiry aims at providing social scientists with theoretical concepts for 
their empirical work within the domain of organizations in general as well as 
organizational knowledge in particular. The developed concepts in part I („or-
ganizational knowledge“) may be used to interpret and frame empirical results 
of field studies (e.g. results from interviews, field notes, participatory observa-
tions, or artifact analysis). As part I also defines different types and forms of 
organizational knowledge, it may also guide the construction of research ques-
tions and hypotheses.
More practical oriented researchers may draw from the epistemological 
criteria of organizational knowledge developed in part III („organizational epis-
temology“). Research which is focused on the evaluation of effectiveness and 
quality of knowledge creation within a specific organization, is provided with 
general criteria for successful knowledge creation. These criteria can be com-
pared with the actual situation, and eventually guide recommendations for 
adaption and (re-)design of the organizational knowledge (creation) environ-
ment.   
What is in it for practitioners? 
This inquiry is also directed towards practitioners dealing with knowledge 
management (systems), organizational learning processes, or management in 
general. The developed framework of organizational knowledge (part I) should 
enable the „  reflective practitioner“  to step back and to get a general view on the 
relation between organizing and knowledge. It should allow to identify and to 
classify core processes of the organization as knowledge creation and knowl-
edge application activities. Furthermore, it should allow to understand chal-
lenges within the organization as epistemic challenges. This could help to de-
velop alternative views and to trigger new solutions.
Similar to the practical oriented researcher, part III may provide the prac-
titioner with a general framework on which (re-)design and restructuring meas-
7
ures can be based on. This inquiry is clearly an academic work combining theo-
retical notions from various sources of organizational studies and philosophy. 
But it is especially the incorporation of philosophical epistemology which 
brings in a normative stance, i.e. epistemological criteria of knowledge creation 
(vs. mere epistemic attributes of organizations). Consequently, such epistemo-
logical criteria could support responsible actors in their activities to generate 
spaces of knowledge creation, both on micro- and macro-levels of the organiza-
tion. 
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Overview and structure of the inquiry
Part I - Organizational Knowledge      
Chapter 1 will examine the deeper source of organizing. Put simply, the idea is 
that to „organize“  is one mode in which humans deal with their world. And hu-
mans do not simply face a pre-given world of readymade, external objects. 
They rather face an open and manifold flux of impressions, a „manifoldness“ 
which has to be „synthesized“  (Kant, 1781/2003). Humans, as „thrown beings“ 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962), are obliged to participate in the permanent and never-
ending „domestication of being“  (Sloterdijk, 2001). Now, organizing can also 
be understood as a mode of human world-construction: similar to the individual 
construction of reality, organizing temporarily stabilizes the streaming of expe-
rience. To organize is the attempt to bring order to chaos, to make sense of 
complex circumstances, and to enable collective action. We will trace the disci-
pline of organizational studies and present supplementing modes of how or-
ganizations structure their world. Here, we will discuss organizing as „rational-
istic“  vs. „socialized“  concepts. Using „rationalistic concepts“  organizations 
construct themselves as formal institutions by hierarchy, roles, rules 
(Schreyögg, 2008, p. 11), bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), or „scientific manage-
ment“  (F. W. Taylor, 1998 [1911]). Using „socialized concepts“  organizations 
construct themselves as social practices by informal structures (Schreyögg, 
2008, p. 47), communities (Brown & Duguid, 1991), culture (Dietrich, 2001; 
Schein, 1992; Smircich, 1983), or narratives (Orr, 1996). 
Chapter 2 tries to define knowledge as the driving force behind those or-
ganizational concepts. First, we will develop a view which sees knowledge as 
something which generally constitutes the „epistemological dimension of a so-
cial field“  because it enables actors to make distinctions in order to understand 
their world and to act in it (Bourdieu, 1986; Giddens, 2008). Second, we will 
apply this „strong sense of knowledge“  to organizations and outline different 
levels on which organizational knowledge enables organizational distinction-
making. Knowledge is then seen not as mere resource of the organization, but 
as fundamental process which is recurrently created and applied by organiza-
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tional actors. The latter create organizational distinctions on three levels, i.e. as 
representations (the syntactic dimension), meaning (the semantic dimension), 
and as relation to action (the pragmatic dimension). These three levels of 
distinction-making will be derived from a connection of the knowledge man-
agement triad „data-information-knowledge“  (Boisot, 1995; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Probst, Raub, & Romhardt, 2002) with semiotics (Morris, 
1946; Peirce, 1913; Saussure, 1959). 
Chapter 3 will supplement those three levels of organizational distinction-
making with two types of organizational knowledge mirroring the two para-
digms of „rationalized“  and „socialized“  concepts: (a) „propositional knowl-
edge“  like formal rules, roles, and routines; and (b) „narrative knowledge“  like 
stories, anecdotes, best-, or worst-practices (Tsoukas, 2005c). Chapter 3 will 
also focus on definitions and examples of these two types of knowledge as well 
as on its application to organizational practice.
Chapter 4 will emphasize the creation of organizational knowledge. Crea-
tion will be understood as a process which is crucial when organizations have to 
adapt to their changing (internal and external) environment. This happens when 
existing (propositional or narrative) knowledge is not sufficient, i.e. when the 
organization encounters problems which cannot be solved with the currently 
available stock of knowledge. Such „perturbations“  trigger the creation of new 
solutions (Patriotta, 2003, p. 183) and adapt rationalized and/or socialized 
knowledge to the new situation. We will interpret such knowledge creation 
processes as learning processes within „single“  and „double“  loops (Argyris, 
1976, 1977; Argyris & Schön, 1978). Furthermore, knowledge-creation will be 
described as embedded in complex „actor-networks“  (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1983, 2007; Law, 1992). By analyzing specific field studies from the automo-
tive industry (Patriotta, 2003) we will reveal knowledge creation as an open and 
controversial process („becoming“) which results in temporarily stable out-
comes („being“) like, e.g. instructional blueprints (propositional knowledge) or 
guiding stories (narrative knowledge).
Chapter 5 will summarize one important outcome of the previous chap-
ters, i.e. the existence of a general epistemic gap between organizational knowl-
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edge on one side and organizational practice on the other. There is a tension 
between knowledge (e.g. a rule) and the concrete practice (e.g. the specific 
situation in which a rule is applied). How knowledge is applied (chapter 3) to 
practice, e.g. how a rule is executed, is open to various factors which cannot be 
predicted or determined. Also the creation of knowledge (chapter 4) is open-
ended: there is no compulsory path from a situation in practice (e.g. a problem) 
to a specific set of knowledge (e.g. a solution, like a new rule). Organizational 
knowledge as distinctions (at the levels of representation, meaning, and action) 
is not 1:1 interlocked with concrete organizational practice. The result of 
knowledge creation is not simply the objectively best practical solution of a 
problem in practice, but is open to contingency and plurality. How the final 
shape of the blueprint looks like, or how a story becomes „noteworthy“ within 
the organization, is no mechanical selection process but a translation within 
complex actor-networks (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1983, 2007; Law, 1992; Patri-
otta, 2003). Knowledge creation is embedded in a social environment with het-
erogenous actors and contextualized background assumptions. Therefore, just 
as the application of knowledge to practice is not fully determined by the 
knowledge‘s content (chapter 3), the creation of knowledge is not fully deter-
mined by practice (chapter 4). Facing this „underdetermination problem“, many 
authors tend to abandon epistemic normativity and to focus on the empirical 
description of knowledge-creation. Knowledge then is, for instance, anything 
that has action-related effects in organizations. But this understanding neglects 
a central feature of knowledge. A feature which has been discussed in western 
epistemology since Plato, and proposes to take a normative view on knowledge. 
A view which has widely been ignored by organizational studies and knowl-
edge management literature (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 2005). A view which 
understands knowledge as more than something that is created, applied, or 
transformed; which understands knowledge not only as a process or content, 
but as a claim: knowledge inherently claims to be valid (Adams, 2004, p. 228; 
Habermas, 1984; Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 83), it claims to be true vs. 
false, it claims to correspond to reality vs. being an illusion, it claims to be 
knowledge vs. mere belief. This hypothesis is backed by daily experience: to 
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believe something (often) is something different from knowing it. Thus, our 
inquiry will turn its focus to the question if there are criteria which allow to dis-
tinguish between knowledge and belief; and further, how these criteria may 
guide organizational knowledge creation. This search is also relevant for organ-
izational scholars and practitioners who are interested in what makes good, or 
appropriate knowledge, what makes the difference between „high“  and „low-
quality“  knowledge (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 94). Hence, we will be in-
terested not only in epistemic attributes of knowledge (the „descriptive view“  / 
„theory of organizational knowledge“, part I) but also in epistemological crite-
ria of successful knowledge creation (the „normative view“ / „organizational 
epistemology“, part III). But before developing epistemological guidelines for 
organizations, part II will present an appropriate understanding of „epistemol-
ogy“. 
Part II - Epistemology
Chapter 6 will begin the search for such criteria by consulting traditional epis-
temology, a branch of philosophy which started with Plato (Plato / Cooper, 
2001, Theaetetus 201, Meno 298). This „rationalistic epistemology“  tries to 
provide rational and universal criteria to determine with certainty under which 
circumstances a belief is knowledge, or not (Steup, 2005). In short, it states that 
a belief has to be true and justified (Sosa, Kim, & McGrath, 2000). Our discus-
sion will show that a final definition of universal criteria of knowledge is prob-
lematic because knowledge always refers to an unequivocal meaning. Thus, no 
matter how detailed a justification turns a knowledge claim to be „true“, the 
claim itself always remains potentially unstable. That is because knowledge al-
ways - to a certain extent - is a generalization subsuming particularities: similar 
to organizational knowledge, also knowledge in general is related to a poten-
tially open-ended plurality of its subsumed particulars (like e.g. in the famous 
knowledge claim that „all swans are white“ 2). Knowledge as generalized con-
cept always transcends - and is underdetermined by - its particulars. This is why 
all knowledge is open to „falsification“, and why no list of universal-rational 
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2 (Popper, 1959)
criteria of knowledge can be complete (Zagzebski, 1994). Here we encountered 
a logical gap between justification and truth which marks a characteristic of any 
knowledge claim. There alway remains a gap between a knowledge claim and 
its intended meaning, i.e. its particularities. For scientific content this means 
that rules of logic, rational reasoning, or its correspondence with reality, are not 
alone able to determine the distinction between (scientific) knowledge and non-
knowledge (Duhem, 1954; Longino, 1990; 2002, p. 124ff.). To conclude, 
though rationalistic epistemology is normative, it fails in providing distinctive 
criteria because its idea of knowledge and truth is too rigid and bound to the 
misconception of a universalistic, unequivocal 1:1 correspondence with an ob-
jective world. 
Therefore, chapter 7 we will introduce an normative, epistemological ap-
proach which operates with an open and social constructivist concept of knowl-
edge. First, we will discuss an analogy to map making which shows that the 
guidelines for creating a good map cannot be driven by universal criteria - like 
accuracy, coherence, or empirical correspondence - alone, but ought to be de-
pendent on aims, purposes, and standards of the respective community which is 
going to use the map. The conclusion will be that criteria for successful (scien-
tific) knowledge creation are not a priori given but depend on aims and stan-
dards endorsed by the respective (scientific) community (Longino, 2002, p. 
116). From this social epistemological point of view, not universal criteria of 
knowledge are central, but rather criteria governing the social context of knowl-
edge creation. We will discuss such criteria provided by the social epistemo-
logical theory of Helen Longino (Longino, 2002). Those criteria demand (a) an 
enabling, open critical discourse which is characterized by the existence of 
venues of criticism, the active uptake of criticism, transparency, intellectual 
equality, potential plurality of contributions, and so forth. Furthermore, (b) not 
any content by definition becomes knowledge, i.e. knowledge creation ought to 
be constrained and aligned with aims and standards of the respective commu-
nity. Finally (c) those aims and standards have to be open to critical reflection 
since there have to be room for fundamental change, paradigm shifts, and 
„revolutions“ of a scientific (or organizational) knowledge creation community.
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Part III - Organizational Epistemology
Chapter 8 will recapitulate the progress made so far and outline the general 
character of the normative spin of our inquiry: an organizational epistemology 
aims at defining the general parameters of the social environment of successful 
knowledge creation in organizations. This acknowledges the epistemic gap, plu-
rality of knowledge, and incongruence of knowledge and practice. But it also 
acknowledges that „knowledge“  is a distinct notion which is different from ac-
cidental content or mere belief. Therefore, an organizational epistemology pro-
poses epistemological criteria and guidelines which ought to frame and con-
strain the social interaction in which knowledge is created. Those criteria are 
taken from the outlined social epistemology from chapter 7.  
Hence, chapter 9 will shift the discussed critical guidelines of enabling, 
constraining, and reflecting to the field of organizations. This will result in a set 
of guidelines directed towards successful knowledge creation in organizations. 
According to this applied social epistemology, organizations ought to (a) pro-
vide spaces which enable individual and collective actors to formulate new 
knowledge, or to adapt (i.e. to „criticize“) existing knowledge; spaces which 
open organizational discourse towards a plurality of views and contributions, 
„inclusion“, and „multi-perspectivity“; (b) spaces which allow critical discur-
sive interaction, connecting it with organizational goals and structures; spaces 
which make organizational goals and values accessible via „transparent stan-
dards“, but which (c) also - on a reflective meta-level - allows critical recon-
struction of those very goals and values. 
Chapter 10 will use those epistemological criteria as evaluative templates 
in order to analyze a use-case taken from the convenience retailer „Seven-
Eleven Japan“  (Nonaka, Toyama, & Hirata, 2008, p. 138ff.) where we will take 
a closer look at the „items-management process“  (the determination which 
goods are ordered at which time to which store). Using terminology and con-
cepts of the theory of „organizational knowledge“  from part I we will first in-
terpret that „items-management process“  as a knowledge creation process. Sec-
ond, we will supplement this descriptive interpretation by the „organizational 
epistemological“  approach from part III, and evaluate if and how Seven-Eleven 
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Japan designs its items-management environment towards a successful knowl-
edge creation environment. To do so we will use our epistemological guidelines 
enabling, constraining, and reflecting. This will result in both an evaluation of 
the status-quo as well as in suggestions for improvements. To conclude, our in-
quiry will not only outline a theoretical toolkit but also give an example on how 
to apply it to a real world organization.
Chapter 11 summarizes our inquiry and recapitulates its main concepts, 
closing with suggestions for further research.
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Part I - ORGANIZATIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE
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Chapter 1: Organization as conceptual distinction
The management guru Peter Drucker famously remarked that the perfect proto-
type of an organization is the classical symphony orchestra (Drucker, 1993, p. 
85). The latter is a complex social field which consists of different actors with 
different backgrounds and specialized skills (figure 1.1). But the tuba alone 
does not produce the music. It is the organized activity of all musicians that al-
lows the symphony to be performed. And that is what makes the magic of or-
ganizations: they connect heterogeneous elements and actors to an, at least tem-
porary, order. 
But how do they do that? What are the main mechanisms, methods and 
principles that enable organizing? A first answer may be that organizations are 
held together and guided by common goals. Hence, the individual members of 
an orchestra are bound together because they share common goals, a joint pur-
pose to which every single musician has to be committed to3. In our inquiry we 
will explore many different ordering principles which constitute organized set-
tings and which we will call „concepts“. Such concepts can be organizational 
goals.
But examining an orchestra also reveals a variety of other concepts by 
which the separated actions of the musicians are collectively structured. For in-
stance, every musician plays individually but they all use the same musical 
score which is guiding their activities. Furthermore, the orchestra is not simply 
an accidental accumulation of people but structured and differentiated by vari-
ous functions and roles: one group plays the flute, another one the violin, and so 
on. Moreover, these various distinctions are again ordered and integrated; in 
this case through hierarchy: there is a conductor, a lead violin, first violins, sec-
ond violins, and so forth. 
But the success of an orchestra does not only depend on such rational 
structures like formal roles, rules, or hierarchies; the orchestra is a social field, 
not a machine. Hence, social structures are significant factors as well: for ex-
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3 Such a goal which aligns individual activities can be e.g. to perform a given symphony as good 
as possible. Of course, problems arise already here:  What is the criterion of „good“? Are all indi-
viduals  really motivated by one official goal? We will discuss the complexity of goals in chapter 
1.1. !
ample, how the musicians identify themselves with the orchestra; in which at-
mosphere rehearsals are carried out; who speaks with whom when problems 
occur; or how the director is able to motivate the musicians.
Figure 1.1: Prototype of the organization: the symphony orchestra ("Meriiam-Webster Visual 
Dictionary: Symphony Orchestra," 2010)
Similar to the symphony orchestra, any organized context is shaped by goals 
(chapter 1.1) and specific processes of structuring (chapter 1.2). This seems to 
unite such different organizational fields like private firms, public institutions, 
ministries, parties, churches, universities, and so forth. Therefore, we will trace 
the literature of organizational studies4 and try to systematically outline differ-
ent proposed characteristics of organizations as „organizational concepts“. Then 
we will switch to a more reflective level. In chapter 1.3 we will interpret organ-
izational concepts as modes of world-construction, i.e. as devices with which 
humans make sense of their complex environment. This philosophical reflection 
upon the origin of organizing will highlight today’s important role of organiza-
tions. They are not only observable things in the world; they are vehicles for 
humans to construct their world as well as their actions. Organizing is one way 
of how we deal with our existential situation, i.e. how we make sense of the 
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4 „Organizational Studies“  will mark the scientific approach to organizations. This interdisciplinary 
discipline is sometimes also referred to as „organizational theory“  (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006) or 
„studies of organizational behavior“ (Buchanan & Huczynski, 1997; Robbins & Judge, 2010). 
radical openness and the contingent character of the world we are „thrown“ 
into.
1.1 Organizational goals
What is an organization? Some authors would describe an organization as a so-
cial field in which activities of actors are geared towards specific purposes and 
aims, giving its collective action a direction5. In both, academic and non-
academic discussions, this leads to definitions which explain organizations as a 
„group of people intentionally organized to accomplish an overall, common goal or set 
of goals“ (McNamara, 2010)
Of course, such a definition contains self-referential problems, for instance, an 
organization being explained as something that is organized. However, such a 
definition legitimately highlights the importance of goals. Organizations are not 
simply a group of persons who are accidentally bound together - like, for in-
stance, standing in a queue in front of a cash dispenser (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 8) - 
but rather constitute a social collective committed to a common goal that is pur-
sued in an institutionalized way. In brief: „organizations are goal-oriented insti-
tutions"6 (Drucker, 1993, p. 83). In chapter 1.2 we will discuss how organiza-
tional action is institutionalized and structured (and hereby resolve the self-
referential term „organized“). But before that we will focus on organizational 
action being directed towards a goal. 
Goals will play a significant role in our inquiry as they will turn out to be 
importantly related to the discussion of organizational knowledge. This is be-
cause knowledge in organizations ultimately is „practical“  knowledge, thus re-
lated to an action context which is - among others - also shaped by purposes 
and goals of human conduct. Our next passages will take a closer look at the 
complexity of organizational goals.
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5 see e.g. (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 4ff.)
6 author’s translation; original citation: „Organisationen sind zweckorientierte Institutionen"
1.1.1 External complexity: the social environment of goals
The idea of an ultimate goal is to formally constitute the purpose of the organi-
zation as guiding principle for decisions and action (Drucker, 1993, p. 83). For 
example, „maximizing profit and sales“  for a bank, or „helping women who are 
suffering from domestic violence“  for a social NGO would be official and le-
gitimate goals for the respective organizations. But are organizations really de-
termined by single goals? Are members of the organization (henceforth organ-
izational actors) carrying out their work because they all are committed to the 
same official organizational goal? Chester Barnard, an early author within the 
field of organizational studies, was puzzled by a similar question (Barnard, 
2002). He tried to explain why and how actors cut back on their direct personal 
needs and subordinate their actions to an external authority like an organization. 
His explanation was that a „zone of indifference“  can be established in which 
members would carry out their tasks and subordinate their activities under the 
directives of the organization (Barnard, 2002). And only in very rare cases this 
subordination can be solely achieved by commitment to organizational goals 
alone. For actors to enter a „zone of indifference“  they need to be compensated 
by „inducements“  like money, pride, status, and so forth. According to Barnard, 
it is theoretically imaginable (and in fact often observable) that such a compen-
sation with material or non-material inducements could substitute the commit-
ment to common goals at all. In other words: the „real“  motivation for actors to 
carry out their work needs not be linked to official goals. The bank clerk, for 
example, may not be motivated by „profit and sales“  of his organization but by 
helping families in need with opportune micro credits; and the lawyer working 
for the social NGO may not be motivated by „helping women suffering from 
domestic violence“  but by bringing home the next paycheck and/or in adding a 
good looking entry into her CV. 
The point made here is that official goals alone are not sufficient when 
exposed to the complex social world of human beings. In contrary, organiza-
tional goals can be excluded from the motivational structure at all. In the most 
extreme case this may reach a level where knowledge of, not to mention identi-
fication with, the organizational goal is simply nonexistent and fully discon-
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nected from the life-world of the actor. This possibility not only raises moral 
issues7 but challenges the functioning of any organization. In contrast to pre-
modern societies, todays pluralistic and heterogeneous societies offer their 
members multiple life-worlds and allow a variety of individual identity creation 
(Bauman, 2001). The distance between individual action and the collective or-
ganizational goal certainly mirrors the socio-historical development: modern 
societies are marked by a „disembeddedness“  of their institutions (like markets 
or organizations) from the „life-world“  of human subjects (Giddens, 1990; K. 
Polanyi, 1957)8. We cannot deepen that discussion here, but it already gives a 
glimpse into the complex external socio-dynamic environment, organization’s 
face. This forces organizations to (re-)establish the identification of organiza-
tional actors with organizational goals. Typical measures are activities like „in-
ternal branding“, the establishment of specific „organizational cultures“  (Smir-
cich, 1983), or „sensemaking“ (Weick, 1995b). 
To conclude, organizational behavior cannot be explained by one-
dimensional goals. This does not mean that the notion of organizational goals is 
unnecessary in order to understand organizations (and organizational knowl-
edge). It means that the idea of goals has to be extended, multiplied, and 
adapted, which leads to the second complexification.
1.1.2 Internal complexity: diversity of goals
The goal of an organization is never a goal but it is sub-structured as a multi-
faceted network of goals and objectives. According to Herbert A. Simon - also 
an early organizational studies author - a closer look at organizational decision-
making reveals „a whole set of constraints“  (H. A. Simon, 1964, p. 20) which 
are involved in social action of organizational actors9. For example, the goal to 
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7 The distance between individual human activity and the final products of that activity, i.e. also of 
the final organizational goals, may lead to total loss of responsibility and accountability (Anders, 
1956). This was observed in fascist production organizations as well as in production processes 
of modern war technology, especially of atomic weapons (Anders, 1983).
8 see also Jürgen Habermas’ distinction between „life-world“ and „system“ (Habermas,  1984, p. 
Vol. 2).
9 In classical management literature, Peter Drucker also highlighted the fact that an organization 
cannot  (and should not) be reduced to one single goal or need (Drucker, 1954, p. 62f.; 1992a,  p. 
299) 
make profit, certainly is a primary and legitimate organizational goal of most 
capitalistic firms. But that does not mean that every actor directly has to follow 
that goal or to identify his/her actions with it: „the goal ascription does not im-
ply that any employee is motivated by the firm’s profit goal, although some may 
be“  (H. A. Simon, 1964, p. 22). The (admittedly essential) goal to make profit 
has not to be part of (or to determine) all other possible goals of an organiza-
tion. We need not to drill down a main goal to all sub-levels. This is because 
„decision-making mechanism is a loosely coupled system in which the profit 
constraint is only one among a number of constraints and enters into most sub-
systems only in indirect ways“  (H. A. Simon, 1964, p. 21). Consider a firm’s 
R&D (research and development) department, whose decisions and activities 
would directly be determined by profit outcomes. Taken literally, this would 
slow down or even obliterate the creation of new knowledge. Without some sort 
of „enabling space“  (Peschl, 2003), which (at least temporarily) relieves the 
R&D department from the main goal of profit making, the emergence of radical 
new innovations would be highly unlikely. 
This generates something we could call the profit-paradox. Such a para-
dox arises when we try to understand action as determined by a straightforward, 
single organizational goal. The paradox then could be defined as follows: if all 
organizational action of an innovation dependent firm is aligned with the singu-
lar goal „profit”, specific parts of the organization which operate less efficient 
under that very goal (e.g. the R&D department) will yield poor results. This, in 
turn, leads to unsuccessful achievement of profit because the firm’s success de-
pends on innovation. This also leads to an unsuccessful achievement of the ob-
jective of profit defined earlier, i.e. to less profit. In short: following a singular 
organizational goal consequently may undermine the achievement of that very 
goal. Theoretically, similar paradoxes can be located with any other goal. For 
example,  „radical innovation“  on all levels would very likely destabilize the 
organization and consequently undermine innovation at all as there would be no 
resources left to exploit innovation10. For practitioners to avoid such paradoxes 
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10 See the related discussion about the tension (and the need for reconciliation) between „explo-
ration“  and „exploitation“ which goes back to Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of economic devel-
opment  (Schumpeter, 1934) and was adapted to the context of organizational learning by James 
March (March, 1991).
and for organizational researchers to understand organizations properly, goals 
have to be modeled as multi-dimensional concepts.
1.1.3 Summary
The organizational theorist Karl Weick once remarked that the only appropriate 
advice we could give to someone struggling with adaption to change is: “Com-
plicate yourself!”  (Weick, 1979, p. 261). Our last two sub-chapters called for a 
similar differentiated understanding of organizational goals which forces or-
ganizations to complexify themselves along with their internal and external 
contingencies. How to challenge this situation seems to be a main issue of stra-
tegic management literature and practice. This is already prevalent in Chester 
Barnard’s classic work on how to trade-off between the „contribution”  of a per-
son carrying out actions on behalf of the organization and the „inducements”  by 
which the person is compensated for that contribution (Barnard, 2002). Conse-
quently, an „efficient“  organization is able to satisfy not only formal goals but 
to incorporate the multiple „motives”  of its actors into a diverse set of organiza-
tional goals. 
A newer and more operationalized version of managing the complexity of 
goals can be found in the „Balanced Scorecard“  model (Kaplan & Norton, 
1992). This widely applied approach links strategy and goal-definition to four 
main contexts whereof „financials”  is only one part. „Internal processes”, „cus-
tomers”  and „learning”  are other contexts relevant to the definition of organiza-
tional goals (figure 1.2). According to this approach, successful organizations 
have to „balance” their various goals with respect to these four contexts.
37
Figure 1.2: Managing the heterogeneity of organizational goals: the „Balanced Scorecard“ 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996)
Note that neither the context of external social complexity (1.1.1) nor the inter-
nal diversity of organizational goals (1.1.2) lead to the conclusion that an or-
ganization cannot be described as being constituted of goals (though it certainly 
is not a sufficient description). The previous thoughts may have complexified 
the concept of goals but without diminishing its relevance. We will leave the 
discussion on organizational goals for now but return to this important concept 
later on in chapter 3. We will then see that in order to understand the meaning 
of organizational knowledge (e.g. the knowledge of routines in order to carry 
out action) actors need to relate their knowledge to goals in order to be able to 
translate knowledge to action. The meaning as well as the expected application 
of organizational knowledge is not manifested in the knowledge content itself 
(e.g. in the written routine) but in its relation to the organizational context. And 
the latter is - besides others - shaped by goals. To have goals is a constituting 
and crucial element, a sine qua non of organizations.
1.2 Organizational structure
1.2.1 Rationalized concepts - Organization as „institution“
The fact that organizations are aligned towards certain ends and are constituted 
by goals is of course only one part of the story. The second main characteristic 
of organizations is that they are structured, i.e. they create sustaining and insti-
tutionalized forms of behavior. Following the path of enlightenment, early or-
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ganizational studies proposed that what makes organizations „organized“  is the 
fact that they rationally structure social fields. According to Max Weber, this is 
accomplished through the rationalization of individual and collective action 
(Weber, 1947). To endure rational decision-making and organizational action 
(„bureaucracy“) individual and collective behavior is formalized and standard-
ized. This makes the heterogeneous social setting of organized contexts predict-
able, goals can be set up and their attainment controlled. The rise of scientific 
rationality and industrialization, the idea that reason is able to control both hu-
man and non-human nature, and the advancements in the division of labor; they 
all lead to an „ideal type“  of the organization as a perfect working „machine“ 
with humans as its „cogwheels“ (Weber, 1946, p. 128). 
According to Frederick W. Taylor („Taylorism“), design and control of 
organizations is accomplished by implementing „scientific management“  (F. W. 
Taylor, 1998 [1911]). Management is „scientific“  if it analyzes work processes 
and drill them down to their most basic elements. These elements are then re-
structured, and put into interrelated activities and hierarchies. To assemble a car 
then has not to rely on few high skilled workers anymore who need to know 
everything about car making and who perform all the production steps. Instead, 
car making relies on the interplay between many (often unskilled) workers who 
serially perform the analyzed basic production steps. To do so, organizations 
have to be built as rationally planned institutions offering formal rules and 
authority under which actors are collectively subordinated. 
Those rationalistic approaches to organizational studies focus on rules, 
roles, routines and command lines as constitutional concepts of the making and 
management of organizations. To organize is to „enact rules“  (Schreyögg, 2008, 
p. 11)11 and to introduce order. To do so, different structuring principles were 
developed. According to rationalistic oriented approaches, organizations have to 
be structured within two different dimensions: (a) horizontally and (b) verti-
cally. Organizations have (a) to be structured horizontally along functions or 
departments, i.e. structured along the concept of differentiation. The origin of 
that idea is the division of labor: activities have to be divided into different 
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11 author’s translation; original citation: „Regelungen schaffen“
fields and functions in order to be carried out efficiently and to allow, for in-
stance, large scale production. According to the „open systems model“  (Hatch 
& Cunliffe, 2006, p. 61f.; Katz & Kahn, 1966), in the beginning organizations 
usually are small, and only barely differentiated in distinct sub-groups. What 
structures action instead, is ad-hoc decisions based on shared common goals. As 
the organization grows it tends to differentiate itself in sections like purchasing, 
production, sales, maintenance departments, and so forth. That „departmentali-
zation“  (Fayol, 1949) stretches the organization in its horizontal structure (see 
figure 1.3). 
But such a differentiation calls for integration. From a rationalistic stand-
point, organizations lose control and structural integrity, if there is no integra-
tion of different parts of the organization. There should not be any „loose“  parts 
that are not connected to (and controlled by) a higher entity. This is where (b) 
the concept of hierarchy comes in. Hierarchy is a concept for structuring or-
ganizations vertically (see figure 1.3). Similar to the old scientific rule that 
complex concepts need to be subsumed (and deduced) by higher-level (more 
general) concepts also organizations have to be structured as pyramids or 
trees12. The French management pioneer Henri Fayol introduced famous con-
cepts like „unity-of-command“  (every actor needs to have exactly one supervi-
sor), the „scalar principle“  (communication and commands are to be carried out 
only from one level of the hierarchy to the next one, and not any further) or the 
question about „span-of-control“  (which discusses how many subordinates 
should ideally be overseen by one manager)13.
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12 Traditional western thinking is based on the form of the „tree“ (Deleuze & Guattari,  1987) - a 
paradigm which also heavily influences organizational studies.
13 (Fayol, 1949; Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006, p. 24f.; Schreyögg, 2008, p. 33ff.)
Figure 1.3: Differentiation and integration as rationalistic organizational concepts 
Rationalistic organizational concepts like formal rules and roles, authority, dif-
ferentiation, and hierarchization converge with the rationalistic view of man-
agement. The latter is seen as an intentional activity which is centered around 
planning, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. Hence, the main task for 
managers is to implement and configure organizational concepts (e.g. to design 
and adjust the structure of rules, hierarchies, departments, etc.) towards the 
achievement of organizational goals. In its most basic model, management is a 
three-step feedback cycle between planning, implementing, and measuring (see 
figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: The basic rationalistic management feedback cycle 
A classical approach oriented on that model can be found, for example, in the 
„POSDCoRB“  model (Gulick & Urwick, 1969) where Luther Gulick and Lyn-
dal Urwick further developed the work of Henri Fayol and introduced a typical 
rationalistic view of the management of organizations (see figure 1.5). Accord-
ing to organizational goals, the manager „plans“, „organizes“, „staffs“, „coordi-
nates“, and so forth. Through reporting mechanisms success can be measured 
and used as input for the following planning. 
differentiation / departemen-
talization
(horizontal structuring)
integration / 
hierarchization
(vertical structuring)
Plan Implement Measure
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Figure 1.5: Gulick & Urwicks „POSDCoRB“ management model
To conclude, rationalistic approaches propose that organizations are created not 
only by setting up goals but also and especially through implementing concepts 
like hierarchy, differentiation, authority, command structures, formal rules, and 
routines. The task of management is then to shape these structuring concepts 
along with organizational goals. 
1.2.2 Socialized concepts - Organization as „practice“
Later developments in organizational studies recognized the shortages of the 
rationalistic paradigm presented in the last chapter. Rationalistic concepts have 
been criticized as being unable to explain the multi-faceted social complexity 
which we observe in real-world organizations (Quinn, 1988). This generated the 
motivation to look for further and alternative organizational concepts beyond 
mere rationalistic patterns. 
Critics against rationalistic concepts question character as well as impor-
tance of rationality. It was, for instance, stated that organizations face indispen-
sable and radical „uncertainty“ which cannot be fully solved by rational plan-
ning and design (Knight, 2006). Coping with high internal and external com-
plexity, organizations observe themselves as being equipped with an only lim-
ited, „bounded“  rationality (H. A. Simon, 1991, 1997). Finally, postmodern ori-
ented approaches question rationality in general and criticize ideas like planning 
and commanding as „rationalistic illusion“ (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 74). 
We do not want to fully abandon traditional concepts presented in the last 
chapter but we will take a look at literature offering alternatives (or better: sup-
plements) to rationalistic approaches. 
Planning
Organizing
Staffing
Directing
Coordinating
Reporting
Budgeting
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Some critics do emphasize the fact that crucial processes in organizations are 
not placed within formal but around informal structures (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 
47). It has been observed that planned and set up formal structures often were 
not the only constitutive elements of organizations. In almost all organized 
fields informal communication and structures evolve and play significant roles 
in daily activities. In most cases, informal structures emerge because of the in-
efficiency, or even the lack of formal structures. One example is communication 
which escapes formal hierarchies: most hierarchies are based on Fayol’s „scalar 
principle“  which states that communication is only allowed from one hierarchy 
level to the next (upper or lower) one (see chapter 1.2.1). In many cases this 
leads to problems because direct communication between two positions, with 
more than one level distance, may be more efficient:  
Figure 1.6: Informal communication
The consequence is that in concrete social settings these inefficient formal rules 
are overruled. Individuals create their own paths of communication in their day-
to-day practice. New social patterns emerge and substitute or extend the offi-
cially set up structures. Informal organizing is observable virtually anywhere 
and can be detected through, for example, using network analysis (figure 1.7). 
They may take over essential functions from dysfunctional formal rules14 as 
well as they may be transformed to formal rules after they have been officially 
accepted as useful. 
formal communication
informal communication
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14  Informal rules may be apprehended as a „corrective“  against „dysfunctional“  formal rules 
(Schreyögg, 2008, p. 13). Formal organizations have lost their „monopoly of  order [Ordnungs-
monopol]“ (Luhmann, 1995, p. 30). 
Figure 1.7: Network analysis of organizational communication structures (Probst, et al., 2002, p. 
78)
Similar to informal rules also formally predefined patterns of behavior and 
problem solving can be supplemented by more social concepts. Rationalistic 
approaches would state that actors pursue their actions according to a given set 
of prescriptive routines which are provided by the organization (e.g. in form of 
written directives or handbooks). But organizational researchers have revealed 
that action in many cases is not only based on routines but also on „narratives“ 
(Tsoukas, 2005a). The social scientist Julian E. Orr carried out famous studies 
observing copy machine technicians in their daily practice (Orr, 1996). As his 
results show, these actors did not solve problems in solely using given instruc-
tions from their handbooks. Although that source of information was very com-
pulsive, technicians oriented their problem solving action in their day-to-day 
activities more on stories and best practices that have been circulating within 
their community (Orr calls such stories „war stories“). Hence, to repair a copier, 
technicians seem to be guided by stories of former similar individual events 
which they apply and adapt to the actual situation. Stories are adapted, applied, 
and retold, thereby condensing to organizational narratives. Narratives are effi-
cient problem solving devices because they do not structure action as a mecha-
nistic execution of abstract „if-then“  routines but as a recontextualization of 
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adaptive stories (operating rather via an „as-if“  logic15). This enables actors to 
react more dynamically to new situations. A narrative is 
„linked to practices, i.e. (to) context-specific, temporally arranged, accounts of events 
and actions. It helps to conserve and mediate individual experiences and can be used as 
background knowledge when experiencing novel situations.“  (Rögnvaldur, 2006, p. 
348). 
We can conclude that the (organizationally defined) activity of repairing faulty 
copiers was not structured by formal routines alone but by concrete narratives 
emerging out of social interaction and (often informal) communication. Today, 
many organizations react to that phenomenon by providing both technical and 
social environments which enable the creation and application of organizational 
narratives. Such measures motivate, for instance, the setup of cross-
organizational „communities-of-practice“  (Brown & Duguid, 1991) or best-
practices-pools16. 
Another paradigm shift was initiated by results of the so called 
„Hawthorne-Experiments“. The Hawthorne studies where conducted in a large 
company in the United States of America in the 1930s. Its initial aim was to 
show correlations between change in the physical structure of the organization 
(external work conditions like e.g. intensity of light) and productivity. But in-
stead of showing lower productivity while worsen work conditions, productiv-
ity increased from day to day. The scientists finally discovered that the fact of 
being part of an important research project raised employee pride and satisfac-
tion. This lead to higher team cohesion and motivation resulting in higher work 
productivity (Gillespie, 1991; Roethlisberger, Dickson, Wright, & Pforzheimer, 
1939). The latter showed that efficient production does not only correlate with 
rationalized structuring but also very significantly with socio-emotional factors 
like social contacts among workers, motivation, pride, employee satisfaction, 
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15 for the important  distinction between organizational knowledge following an if-then logic („pro-
positional knowledge“) and organizational knowledge following an „as-if“  logic („narrative knowl-
edge“) see (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2005) who refer to the theoretical distinction between two „modes 
of thought“  defined by Jerome S. Bruner,  i.e. the „logico-scientific mode“ and the „narrative 
mode“  (Bruner, 1986, 1996). The comparison is also made by Gerardo Patriotta, but in a differ-
ent context (Patriotta, 2003, p. 189).
16 Within large consulting companies like McKinsey & Company or Accenture we find examples 
for best-practices-pools (Probst,  et al., 2002, p. 74). They systematically  store successful project 
experiences and make them worldwide accessible throughout the organization.   
identification with the organization and the products, or relations between su-
pervisors and subordinates. The „human relations movement“  (Mayo, 1933) 
picked up these results and concluded that such „human“  factors (vs. „rational“ 
factors) generate a social environment which fundamentally structures organ-
izational behavior and success17. Other „non-rational“  factors which seem to 
significantly influence structure and behavior in organizations, have been de-
veloped in the discussions about power (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, 2003) or 
emotions (Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Zerbe, 2000; Forgas & George, 2001) in or-
ganizations. 
A further related approach can be found in the wide discussions on organ-
izational culture (Dietrich, 2001; Schein, 1992; Smircich, 1983). Here again, it 
is not the formal structures of rules and hierarchy which order the world of the 
organization but a socio-symbolic culture which enables actors to create mean-
ing and to carry out action. Instead of rules and routines it is concepts like val-
ues, assumptions, and symbolic representations („artifacts“) which shape the 
organization (see figure 1.8).
Figure 1.8: The three layers of organizational culture, according to Edgar H. Schein (Schein, 
1992, figure 9); picture taken from (Onwuchekwa, 2010).  
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17  The „human factor“  was already subject of our discussion in the chapter on organizational 
goals.  In fact,  Chester Barnard’s approach can be counted to that approach of organizational 
theory (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 48).
Ideas about organizational culture are closely related to more constructivist un-
derpinnings which define organizational members not as mere executing agents 
determined by rules and hierarchy but as active actors who base their actions on 
own interpretations of their social world. Actors engage in „sensemaking“ 
(Weick, 1995b) which allows them to label, understand, and interpret the flux 
and complexity of the given world and to carry out action towards the fulfill-
ment of organizational goals (Weick, 1995a, 1995b; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005). 
Compared to the last chapter, the outlined concepts in this chapter focus more 
on social characteristics than on rational control (or „design“). Such „socialized 
concepts“  have added valuable contributions to the understanding of the dy-
namics in organizational contexts. They also shifted the empirical focus of or-
ganizational studies to the micro-foundations of organizational behavior. For 
organizational studies this implies that besides discussing organization charts 
and board directives, organizational researchers now also focus on daily com-
munication and basic interactions, i.e. on the practice of organizations. To grasp 
the ongoing constitution processes of organizations „on the spot“, scientists ap-
ply methods like qualitative interviews and participatory observations. This 
aims at to scientifically observe the place where organizing is actually happen-
ing. Because organizations are social fields, many authors emphasize that re-
search should be directed towards the mundane patterns of everyday organiza-
tional practices which have been neglected by traditional approaches in favor of 
abstract layers of rational structures18.  
1.2.3 Summary
This chapter traced organizational studies in their quest for detecting the fun-
damental characteristics of organizations. We have seen that every approach 
develops concepts which are claimed to be able to make sense of (and explain) 
observed phenomena in organizations. Hence, the basic question of organiza-
tional studies seems to be: what are the core concepts to understand and explain 
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18 see the discussion of the „practice turn“ in (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Savigny, 2000)
organizations? Some rather rationalistic approaches would answer that we have 
to look at its hierarchical structure, formal rules, or management cycles (here, 
organizations are understood as constituted by „rationalized concepts“). Some 
rather socialized approaches would point at its informal, emergent structures, 
daily practices, culture, or power-relations (here, organizations are understood 
as constituted by „socialized concepts“). 
In the next chapter we want to approach these organizational concepts 
from the view of philosophical reflection. We want to show that (and how) 
these „concepts“  are world-structuring principles of organizations. „Rules“  or 
„narratives“  then are not only observational categories of organizational studies 
but performative processes which shape the way of how organized actors inter-
pret, order, and make sense of their world and their action. „Concepts“  are seen 
as fundamental sources and as processes of world-construction by which the 
organization and its social field come into existence. This aspect of organiza-
tional concepts will be philosophically grounded in the next chapter. Organizing 
will then be seen as one way of how humans deal with their existential condi-
tion. This condition (the „condito humana“) will be outlined as a situation in 
which humans face reality not as a preexisting and given world but as radical 
openness, as chaotic flux of heterogeneous elements. This forces us to perma-
nently design ourselves (as well as our environment) to actively make sense to 
the world and to creatively shape our action. The organization will be presented 
as one mode in which all this is happening. 
1.3 A philosophical view: organizing as open-ended mode of 
world-construction
This chapter tries to reflect upon the fundamental source of organizing. We will 
introduce a view which places organizations not as mere objects in the world 
but as active constructers of the world. As such, organizations - via their pre-
sented concepts presented in chapter 1.2 - are ways of ordering, constructing 
and making sense of the open-ended flux of reality. But if we want to under-
stand both why and how this is the case we need to take a step back. We will 
need to take a preliminary look at basic questions of the human condition, sub-
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jectivity, and the methods of world-construction. Only after that we will be able 
to explain the role of organizations and its relevance to human existence today. 
Only after that we will be able to formulate the fundamental origin and function 
of „organizing“.  
1.3.1 „Copernican Revolution“ and methods of world-construction
In the history of ideas it was at the end of the 17th century when Immanuel 
Kant proposed a revolutionary form of epistemology which decisively changed 
our thinking about reality and its relation to human subjectivity (Kant, 1781/
2003). Kant stated that philosophers for sure have asked interesting questions 
about the nature of things, the world, god, the (eternal) soul, or freedom. And 
also science, with its diverse disciplines, has gathered a huge amount of knowl-
edge about the world. But what are the preconditions for the philosopher’s and 
scientist’s access to the world? A grounding reflection should take a look not 
only at the objects which we talk about but also at the talking itself. Instead of 
focusing on the nature of things Kant suggests to focus on the „condition of 
possibility“  of things. While philosophers up to that time were mainly con-
cerned with the objects themselves Kant’s idea was to take a look at the subjec-
tive activities and concepts which make objectivity possible. How come things 
to become things for us? 
Kants position says that we, as subjects, intentionally direct our attention 
to the world; but that world is not simply „given“. Human perception does not 
face a world which „contains“  readymade, external objects. In contrary, Kant 
states that human perception initially faces a chaotic world of „manifoldness“ 
which does not contain distinct elements at all. Passively taken, all we „receive“ 
from the world is an unordered flux of chaos which has to be arranged, struc-
tured, organized, and made sense of. But that sense does not come from the 
world (from the object); it comes from the subject (making the object possible 
in the first place). This is the crucial turn in Kant’s argument. Namely that only 
in actively applying concepts like, for example, space, time, or causality human 
minds are able to make sense of the world. Through such concepts the sur-
rounding flux of complexity is „synthesized“  resulting in the construction of 
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objectivity and making possible the supposedly „given“  world. Objectivity is 
then nothing else than an effect of active subjective construction processes. 
Whenever we describe an object or situation we have already applied concepts 
(„categories“) with which we had constructed that very object or situation. 
Take, for example, the observation of a glass bottle which falls from a table 
bursting into thousands of pieces. In our daily understanding we mostly attrib-
ute all these details about the situation to external objects and relations in the 
world: to hit on the ground is the cause for the bottle to burst. But critically ana-
lyzed, this view is not correct. Observing the situation of a bursting bottle, we 
have already „a priori“  structured the objects within the frames of space and 
time: both bottle and table do have certain dimensions and relations to each 
other in space; furthermore, to imagine something to „burst“, time has to be in-
volved as shaping precondition to allow transitions (from the glass bottle being 
whole to being burst into thousands of pieces). Moreover, causality has to be in 
place in order to explain that there actually is a connection between the falling, 
the hitting on the ground, and the bursting. David Hume, contemporary to Kant, 
used similar examples (Hume, 1748/1999, p. 4.10) to conclude that causality 
cannot be found in the content of perception itself. Strictly speaking, all we can 
„see“  while a bottle hits the ground, is a sequence of impressions but no internal 
causal necessity between one impression and the next one. For Hume therefore, 
causality was more or less an illusion. Kant agreed that causality is not part of 
the world as such but refuted Hume’s sacrifice of causality at all (Pierris, 2008). 
There „are“  causal relations but only because humans structure events as causal 
events. Humans do actively apply the concept of causality to the situation. The 
question if there „is“  causality as such in the external world, lies beyond the 
capacity of human understanding. There is in general no way of having direct 
access to the world as such. The  question what a „thing-in-itself [Ding-An-
Sich]“ 19 is, generally remains unanswerable. 
That the source of meaning of objects is not a manifestation of the world 
but of the subject marks a turning point in history of (western) thinking. This 
„copernican revolution“, how Kant himself labeled his contribution (Kant, 
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19  This is also why core philosophical questions about world,  god,  and freedom cannot be an-
swered within Kant’s framework, at least not in the traditional way. 
1781/2003, preface to the 2nd edition), dramatically shaped our understanding 
of humans („subjectivity“) and their world („objectivity“). By switching the 
focus from the structure of the world to the structure of the construction of the 
world, it became clear that the objective world, subjective perception, and ac-
tion depend on permanent construction processes. These processes are guided 
by concepts which allow us to make distinctions in order to make sense of the 
world. For example, the concept of „time“  allows to distinguish between before 
and after, the concept of „space“  between here and there, or the concept of „re-
flection“  between myself and the world. To structure the world by concepts is to 
make distinctions (e.g. within a spatio-temporal order). And distinction-making 
is to synthesize the given „manifoldness“, which is to make the world.
Figure 1.9: Simplified and adapted illustration of Kants epistemology 
Kant understood concepts („categories“) as ordering principles. They put the 
radical openness of the observed environment in order by subsuming all the 
heterogeneous particulars of perception under categories. For example, the em-
pirical concept tree tries to define the main characteristics of all the different 
trees we may or may not observe. Hereby, the perceived world is full of differ-
ent trees, including an open amount of kinds I have not seen yet and probably 
never will see. Note that this does not imply that concepts are fixed whereby the 
heterogenous environment is open-ended. Open-endedness is also an attribute 
of concepts themselves. Concepts are provisional; they are open to change and 
permanent modification. Hence, if I was to encounter new plants which would 
„synthesis“
Concepts
(„Categories“)
Chaotic flux of 
environment 
(„Manifoldness of intuition“)
object
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be very similar to trees I would probably modify my concept of trees instead of 
foreclosing those new plants from being trees. Kant reminds us that radical 
openness is not only limited to our world but consequently also to the concepts 
we use to order our world. Our world constructions are inherently unstable and 
contingent. This gets more obvious if we focus on concepts within the social 
context. Take, for instance, the concept of „family“  and its redefinitions in the 
last 200 years. What defines a family is open to permanent change and redefini-
tions; it is a flexible concept.
For Kant himself, open-endedness of concepts also plays an important 
role in the social context, namely within his moral philosophy. There he demon-
strates the impossibility of a rock-solid foundation of morality, if this founda-
tion is to be based on some concepts of human nature (Kant, 1785/2005). The 
question how to act morally cannot be a priori grounded, for instance, in a con-
cept of „happiness“  (as it was done by most classical philosophers). The reason 
is that it is impossible to synthesize and generalize „happiness“  simply because 
concepts cannot fully subsume heterogeneous particulars under a final structure. 
There cannot be a finalized definition of the concept of „happiness“  because 
concepts are bound to permanent redefinition and change: „the concept of hap-
piness is so indefinite that, although each person wishes to attain it, he can 
never give a definite and self-consistent account of what it is“  (Kant, 1785/
2005, p. 21). Of course, one could try to define, for instance, „wealth“, „knowl-
edge“, or „a long life“  as desirable aims towards reaching happiness. But who 
says that these aims are agreed upon by all human beings? Today we would ar-
gue that the differences between societies, cultures, or social classes make it 
impossible to define a universal concept of happiness. We would say that the 
pluralistic character of the social makes a final closure of the concept of happi-
ness not imaginable. Kant argues even more radically; for him it is logically 
impossible to permanently fix the meaning of „happiness“:
„Now it is impossible (...) to form a definite and detailed concept of what he (the person, 
KS) really wants here on this earth. Consider some of the things people say they aim for. 
Wealth: but in willing to be wealthy a person may bring down on himself much anxiety, 
envy, and intrigues. Great knowledge and insight: but that may merely sharpen his eye 
for the dreadfulness of evils that he can’t avoid though he doesn’t now see them; or it 
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may show him needs that he doesn’t know he has, and that add to the burden his desires 
already place on him. Long life: but who can guarantee him that it wouldn’t be a long 
misery?“ (Kant, 1785/2005, p. 21f.)
Wealth, knowledge, or a long life may be stipulated as core human aims and 
values. But ultimately, the concept of happiness cannot be finally closed. Just as 
above with the „tree“  or with „family“, here „happiness“  is a provisional and 
open concept. And this is true for all concepts with which we describe the world 
as well as for concepts on which we base our actions. The impossibility of per-
manent epistemological closure makes concepts temporarily stable and poten-
tially open-ended. Trying to generate closed concepts is subject to permanent 
failure (Seirafi, 2010). That will become important when discussing organiza-
tional concepts. Both rationalistic (rules, roles, etc.), as well as socialized (cul-
ture, narratives, etc.) concepts are potentially open-ended and subject to perma-
nent change. Seen that way, organizations (as well as organizational studies) are 
not solely about stability, predictability, and order, but also and especially about 
instability, noise, and uncertainty (Tsoukas, 2005b).
Of course, Kant’s approach carries some problematic aspects. His suggested 
general concepts (like space, time, causality, etc.) are limited and somewhat too 
rigid. They are heavily influenced by the rationalistic, mechanistic, and deter-
ministic understanding of the physics of the emerging era of enlightenment20. 
Therefore Kant did not take account of other fundamental concepts of sense- 
and distinction-making like, for instance, language. It was the achievements of 
later development of the „linguistic turn“  which added the important concept of 
language (and all its details and consequences) to the discussion (Lafont, 1999, 
p. 5ff.). Nonetheless, Kants basic approach remains in place also within the phi-
losophy of language, namely that concepts allow distinction- and world-making 
as well as that concepts constrain the possible shape of meaning: „The limits of 
my language mean the limits of my world.“ (Wittgenstein, 1955/1999, 5.6). 
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20 something that  became highly problematic because Kants used concepts, e.g. those of space 
and time,  are not as universal as they seem. They are much more rooted in the cosmological 
world view of Isaac Newton. Unsurprisingly, problems arose when Kant’s concepts were con-
fronted with theory of relativity (Reichenbach, 1965), let alone quantum physics. The problem 
here is that Kant refused to admit open-endedness also to his universal concepts like time and 
space. An understanding of knowledge creation as a dynamic and flexible progress is (especially 
in the sciences) hardly compatible with Kants view (Popper, 1993, p. 93f.).  
We should also take into consideration that Kants position is not what we would 
call „constructionism“  or „radical constructionism“  today21: (1) For Kant, ulti-
mately there remains an objective and pre-given world („things-in-themselves“) 
though not accessible for human beings (Prauss, 1974). (2) Furthermore, objec-
tivity as an intersubjective, unequivocal sphere remains, because concepts used 
in the „synthesis“  are stipulated to be universal („transcendental“) and the same 
for all subjects, i.e. for all human beings. Kants position is based on a deeply 
universalistic stance. This is a critical objection which has been made by 
authors as different as Theodor W. Adorno22 or Karl Popper (Popper, 1993, p. 
93ff.; 2002, chapter 7). Later critics stated that other, more contextualized, con-
cepts of world-making like cultural or historical preconditions were also central 
to human world construction, thus allowing variability between different cul-
tures and social fields (Cassirer, 1953).
Despite these legitimate critics, Kant’s point is crucial and it seems to be 
very implausible to fall back behind its basic meaning. For us, the fundamental 
insight will be that it is senseless to talk about a „thing-in-itself“  as an object 
without any relation to a subject (or an observer). That the origin of the world is 
not simply out there, but lies in our world-construction. 
In the next section we will keep following that thought and connect it 
with other philosophical paradigms as well as with the topic of organizations.   
1.3.2 „Conditio Humana“ as the origin of world-construction
Let us try to uncover the origin of Kant’s proposed world-construction. For 
sure, it is human subjectivity. But how is the human subject situated and which 
conditions make world-construction necessary? The answer is implicit in Kant’s 
theoretical and epistemological ideas but was developed more clearly by later 
existentialists, phenomenological, and „radical constructivist“ thinkers. 
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21  „(Radical) Constructionism“  is an interdisciplinary approach (Glasersfeld, 1995; Maturana & 
Varela, 1980;  Varela, 1991) which goes beyond Kants early reflections. For a short overview see 
(Fischer & Peschl, 1996).
22 see e.g. Theodor W. Adorno’s objection that Kant’s  categories form a „block“  against dynamic 
world-construction (Adorno, 1970, p. 378ff.). 
Humans are not simply born into a „world“  that determines thinking and acting. 
We are born into an „environment“  (Uexküll, 1909) which is open to interpreta-
tion and which we have to make sense of in order to be able to live and to per-
form actions. The German terms illuminate this aspect even more: world vs. 
environment are translations of „Welt“  vs. „Umwelt“. We as humans do not 
face a world („Welt“) but a world around us („Umwelt“). The essential distinc-
tion lies in the prefix „um“  which labels the world as something that is around 
us as something which receives meaning and factuality only in relation to the 
subject23. 
From an existentialist viewpoint, humans, unlike animals, not simply are 
themselves; they have to become themselves24. Of course, humans do exist: 
they are („being“). But what they are is neither given nor permanently stable. 
What they are, is a result or an effect of permanent construction processes („be-
coming“)25. These construction processes aim at stabilizing life, sense and ac-
tion. But that process is potentially never-ending as there is (again unlike to 
animals) no pre-determined way in how to live, to interpret the world, or to act. 
According to existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, this is true because 
humans are locked into the situation of „being-there [Dasein]“  (Heidegger, 
1927/1962): we are „thrown [geworfen]“  into existence without any concrete 
essence or pre-destiny. This generates a pressing necessity to shape and con-
stantly reshape ourselves. As humans we discover ourselves facing a fundamen-
tal openness (and senselessness) of our initially given world. And it is up to us 
to cope with that openness and to make sense as well as to stabilize our existen-
tial position. 
From an anthropologist viewpoint this openness can be characterized as 
„unsettled instinct [Instiktunsicherheit]“  (Hartung, 2008; Plessner, 1928), i.e. 
55
23  Emerging in early 20th century biology (Uexküll,  1909), this general idea was theoretically 
elaborated as „radical constructivism“  (Glasersfeld, 1995;  Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, 
1991) and as „philosophical anthropology“ (Plessner, 1928, 1976). 
24  From Heraclitus to Hegel the dialectic interplay between being and becoming has been em-
phasized by many western thinkers, let alone the whole eastern tradition.
25 In (post)modernity this seems more evident than ever as, e.g. identities, work-definitions, life-
style,  knowledge,  etc.  are reshaped and multiplied in an unprecedentedly rapid way (Bauman, 
2001; Welsch, 2002, p. 189ff.).
humans cannot rely on their pure instincts to survive26. Human beings are not 
simply part of a „species“  following prescribed pathways. Quite the opposite, 
humans have no choice than to be involved in the permanent process of becom-
ing and change. This marks a series of paradoxical aspects of the conditio hu-
mana. Freedom, for example, is not a nice attribute of life but an unavoidable 
pressure to make decisions: we have no choice than to have a choice. This is 
also the reason why humans are not only capable but compelled to construct 
their world, their subjective and objective reality. This begins with our under-
standing of the world, as we have seen with Kant. His work showed that 
knowledge is not a mirror of the world but that it originates from the actively 
engaged subject; creating knowledge is a process of distinction-making.
But just as the observed world, also human action faces radical openness and 
starts with chaos. Robert Cooper and John Law (in their attempt to understand 
the dynamics of organizing) called the fundamental starting point of action 
„happening“: 
„In its most callow sense action is a happening; before anything else— before meaning, 
significance, before it's fitted into any schema—it simply happens... The happening is 
‘nothing’—or rather no thing, no object, no form—because it doesn't possess any mean-
ing, it is equivocal and symmetrical; it's not yet properly articulated, ordered, organized, 
not yet been converted into a product or effect. In other words, the happening is a het-
erogeneous process that has no before or after, no start or finish, no cause or effect: it 
always remains ‘unfinished’.“ (Cooper & Law, 1995a, p. 241f.)
It is easy to see the tight connections between „action as happening“  and our 
definition of the conditio humana. But we here also already see that humans do 
not only have to make distinctions in their minds. They do not only construct 
internal and solipsistic concepts. They also generate material objectifications, 
and collective fields of action. Being „artificial in their nature“ 27 (Plessner, 
1928), humans do not only build cognitive but also material artifacts; not only 
internal but also external distinctions. Finding themselves in radical openness, 
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26 There is almost no other life-form being that  weak, „unready“, and dependent upon others in 
its first years of existence, like human beings.   
27 author’s translation; original citation: „von Natur aus künstlich“
humans have been permanently involved in the „domestication of being“ 28 
(Sloterdijk, 2001). From pre-historical early stages on, humanity was marked 
not by adaption to nature but by the creation of self-made environments. We 
build our own „greenhouses“ 29 (Sloterdijk, 1998) as we, for instance, collec-
tively form social groups, build communities, create habitations, send men on 
the moon, invent rules of living together, design gigantic cities, systems of jus-
tice and technological wonders, inaugurate huge symbolic systems like art, re-
ligion, or science. Note that such external constructions of world include the 
design of human behavior and even human nature itself. We train our bodies 
(e.g. to „stay in shape“), structure the way we behave (e.g. to know what to do 
when the city light turns green), domesticate cultural skills (e.g. to be able to 
write with a pen), and so forth. The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk correctly con-
cludes that today’s tentative endpoint of that self-structuring is genetic engi-
neering (Sloterdijk, 1999).
Coping with their existential condition, human beings construct their 
world as well as themselves. In drawing both internal and external distinctions 
we try to bring order and structure to the initially chaotic flux of our environ-
ment. To organize is one way in doing so. It is a way to shape, structure, and 
construct human environment. Hereby, organizations offer („rationalistic“  and 
„socialized“) concepts like rules, hierarchy, culture, or narratives which make 
internal and external distinction-making possible. Our next sub-chapter will 
discuss how such distinction-making allows to temporarily stabilize collective 
meaning and action within organizational contexts. 
1.3.3 Organizing as a mode of world-construction
How are organized fields related to the conditio humana? And how do „organi-
zational concepts“  as presented in chapter 1.2 enable actors to cope with that 
condition? How are organizational concepts able to construct distinctions as 
well as to temporarily bring order to the radical openness of the world? 
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28 author’s translation; original citation: „Domesitkation des Seins“
29 author’s translation; original citation: „Treibhäuser“
To deal with these questions, we will take a look at a use-case from the world of 
hospital care30. a nurse in a hospital deals with highly complex and multifaceted 
circumstances which would allow many different interpretations as well as 
many different possible actions. What she does to cope with that openness is 
that she creates meaning. By bringing „meaning into existence“ she tries to an-
swer the question „what’s the story here?“  (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 410). When 
entering a room for inspecting a patient she „notices“, „brackets“  and „labels“ 
the objects and people in the world around her, constructs relations between 
them, as well as she selects specific actions from an endless pool of imaginable 
actions. She puts chaotic, heterogeneous, and equivocal „circumstances“  into a 
more or less ordered „situation“  (J. R. Taylor & Van Every, 2000, p. 275; 
Weick, et al., 2005, p. 409). She does so by constructing meaning and „making 
sense“:  
„Sensemaking starts with chaos. This nurse encounters ,a million things that go on‘ 31 
and the ongoing potential for ,clusters of things that go wrong‘—part of an almost infi-
nite stream of events and inputs that surround any organizational actor.“  (Weick, et al., 
2005, p. 411)
To determine these circumstances as a factual situation with reasonable inter-
pretations and courses of action, the nurse has to perform active construction 
work. The situation is not „given“  to her, but the effect and the result of the ap-
plication of concepts to a chaotic environment. With Kant we could say that she 
has to „synthesize“  the „manifold of the given sensuous intuition“. It is her ac-
tively turned attention to specific aspects of the complex circumstances which 
makes the situation. It is this attention which allows her to name, label and give 
meaning to things in the world. According to organizational theorist Robert 
Chia, organizing starts with
„an undifferentiated flux of fleeting sense-impressions and it is out of this brute aborigi-
nal flux of lived experience that attention carves out and conception names“  (Chia, 2000, 
p. 517)
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30 The use-case is taken from (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 410ff.).
31 Citations within this citation are related to transcriptions of qualitative interviews with the nurse 
(Weick, et al., 2005).
This is exactly what Karl Weick and others emphasize by stating that „people 
organize to make sense of equivocal inputs and enact this sense back into the 
world to make that world more orderly“  (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 414). Of course, 
this is not simply happening inside an individually isolated subject. There is no 
purely „private“  sensemaking in organized contexts. In the presented use-case, 
for instance, it happened that the nurse communicated her (correct) assessment 
of the situation to other actors. But these actors were not the right addressees 
within the prescribed communication flow of the hospital. The effect was that 
„the individual sensemaking (had) little influence on the organizing of care 
around (the) patient“  (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 413). Only after she had followed 
the correct organizational pathways of communication her sensemaking had 
significant (and the desired) consequences within the organization. After that 
experience she had learned to take specific rules, roles, and communication hi-
erarchy into consideration. She had learned to integrate her individual construc-
tion of situations (and actions) into the collective concepts of the organization. 
Also on a more general level it is easy to see that individual sensemaking 
is heavily influenced by the organized context. As the nurse, for example, enters 
the room she examines the patient, not the flowers on the desk (although she 
may be interested specifically in flowers as she may cultivate a garden at home). 
She focuses on essential things instead of on the non-essential ones. And she 
does so because in that particular situation she is the nurse and the person in the 
bed the patient. Her action and distinction-making is based on roles. Further-
more, she has to provide her supervisor (the physician) with information before 
the next medical round (and it would be quite disturbing if she reports about the 
condition of flowers instead about the condition of the patient). This is because 
she takes rules and hierarchal communication into consideration. We can sum-
marize that her world-construction is significantly shaped by „rationalized or-
ganizational concepts“  (chapter 1.2.1) like roles (nurse, patient), rules (the obli-
gation of reporting) and hierarchy (the obligation to report to a specific supervi-
sor). The construction (or „synthesizing“) of the situation is guided by these 
concepts provided by the organizational context. 
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But complying with these „official“  concepts is not enough to explain what is 
going on in the organization of this hospital. For instance, think about how our 
nurse communicates with others. To know which words and expressions to use 
with which persons (roles) is essential for her daily activities. But how to talk to 
somebody depends very much on the organizational culture. This seems of ex-
traordinary importance, especially in the field of nursing where multiple com-
munication channels are evident: e.g the way of speaking with patients varies 
tremendously from that of speaking with physicians (Benner, 1994). One situa-
tion in the use-case demonstrates how communication culture effects action 
(Weick, et al., 2005, p. 413). In that situation the nurse tried to tell the physician 
what was going on with a newborn who required immediate treatment. The 
doctor did not recognize the urgency of the situation until another (more experi-
enced) nurse „translated“  the story of our nurse. The more experienced nurse 
did so by comparing the actual situation with a similar case from the past. This 
case was a well known story in the hospital. With this narrative as ordering 
concept, the doctor was able to re-construct the situation correctly and to initi-
ate the next steps of treatment (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 413). This was only pos-
sible because communication and action were based on a specific narrative that 
offered a way of making distinctions and ordering the heterogeneous elements 
of the circumstance. As such, the narrative is an organizational concept, too; but 
rather a „socialized“ than a „rationalized“ one (see chapter 1.2.2).
To conclude, organizing is one way of structuring and canalizing the open-
ended flux of human existence. In our short use-case we have seen an example 
of how organizational actors order the chaotic environment and construct un-
derstanding of their world as well as their action: 
„Organization is an attempt to order the intrinsic flux of human action, to channel it to-
ward certain ends, to give it a particular shape, through generalizing and institutionaliz-
ing particular meanings and rules“ (Chia & Tsoukas, 2002, p. 570)
By looking at the nurse use-case we were able to see that concepts both from 
„rationalistic“  (rules, roles, hierarchy) as well as „socialized“  (culture, narra-
tives) approaches play important functions in the construction of both world 
and action. 
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1.3.4 Summary
As Jean Paul Sartre puts it, human beings are „condemned to be free“  (Sartre, 
1948). Other existentialists like Heidegger or anthropologists like Plessner 
showed us that this is grounded in the radical openness of human existence 
which forces to make distinctions and to create meaning. This radical openness 
drives us to become active design engineers of ourselves, our world, and our 
actions. As „thrown beings“  (Heidegger, 1927/1962) we are obliged to partici-
pate in the permanent and never-ending „domestication of being“  (Sloterdijk, 
2001). Already Kant showed that objectivity is not given but depends on how 
the openness we encounter is handled, i.e. which concepts we use - and how we 
use them - to „synthesize“  the given „manifoldness“. Knowledge about the ob-
jective world is only available via such construction processes (Kant, 1781/
2003). 
Similarly, the organizational theorist Karl Weick claims that the core of 
organizing lies in „sensemaking“  (Weick, 1995a, 1995b). The construction 
process of sensemaking begins with „chaos“, i.e. with an „infinite stream of 
events and inputs that surround any organizational actor“  (Weick, et al., 2005, 
p. 411). Then actual sensemaking sets in as „labeling and categorizing to stabi-
lize the streaming of experience“ (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 411).
To cope with radical openness is not only the case for individual organiza-
tional actors but also for the organization as a whole. Organizations act in an 
environment which is characterized by radical uncertainty and complexity 
(Tsoukas, 2005b). They cope both with a hypercomplex external context 
(changing markets, political constraints, social culture, or emerging technolo-
gies) as well as with internal complexity (heterogeneous individual and collec-
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tive human actors). This situation forces them to develop mechanisms („con-
cepts“) to reduce uncertainty and to bring order to the chaos of the world32. 
Kant proposes different concepts that construct order: universal ones like time, 
space, causality, but also empirical ones like trees, families, or happiness. We 
suggested that organizations are being constructed by different organizational 
concepts. These concepts not only shape the organization; they first of all bring 
organizing and the organization into existence. Aims, visions, rules, roles, 
norms, narratives, or culture are not pinned to the naked puppy we call organi-
zation but are concepts applied, incorporated, (re-)created, and managed by ac-
tors who enact, pattern, and structure organizational practice. The repeated ap-
plication of organizational rules, the adaption of behavior to organizational 
norms, the uptake and retelling of organizational stories, the exercise of and 
subjection to organizational power. They all enact institutions and practices. 
The effect of these construction activities is a temporarily stable structure which 
we call organization. Hence, an organization is the result of actors permanently 
constructing and applying organizational concepts.     
It was the purpose of this chapter to formulate the origin of organizations. Such 
a foundation was traced back to the general human condition which is marked 
by radical openness, heterogeneity, and chaotic flux; a condition which inaugu-
rates our basic activities, i.e. creating meaning and making sense. This sense- 
and distinction-making happens on many levels; from the most subjective 
sphere of individuals all the way up to the macro scale of society as a whole. 
Organizations play an important part in the middle of these dynamics. In fact, 
the main social fields of contemporary societies would not be imaginable with-
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32  This affects the self-understanding of both traditional (rationalistic, objectivistic) and newer 
(socialized,  constructivist) approaches of  organizational studies. Both are - knowingly or unknow-
ingly - determined by (1) a radical uncertainty as their point of  departure.  Of course, most tradi-
tional approaches would deny that, because their world view is marked by rationalistic and de-
terministic presumptions. Their failure is,  so to speak, pre-kantian: they confuse concepts with 
reality. They make the false presumption that the world is rational, instead of acknowledging that 
rationality is a general concept that we apply in order to construct the world. Order is the point  of 
arrival,  not the point of departure. Both approaches do also (2) explain how organizations struc-
ture,  order,  and „synthesize“  the world. This, on the other side, is neglected by many newer ap-
proaches as they put their emphasis (both in their theoretical as well as empirical orientation) on 
the unstable and fragile character of organizations. 
! In short, rationalistic approaches deny the origin, socialized approaches the aimed end-
point of organizations. We will try to cover both.
out organizations (Kneer, 2001; Luhmann, 1975): today’s politics would not be 
possible without parties; education not without schools; science not without 
universities, or research institutions; economy not without firms; and religion 
not without churches. And what they all, as organizations, have in common is 
that they are „sensemaking“  devices that enable - on a collective level, medi-
ated by individuals - the creation of order out of chaos. Organizations enable to 
make distinctions and to act; to temporarily escape the senselessness and radical 
openness of human existence.
1.4 Conclusion
From the philosophical viewpoint developed in chapter 1.3, an organization is 
not only a group of people following shared goals, but a collective device of dis-
tinction- and sense-making, a source of world-construction. To organize is an 
attempt to cope with the radical openness of human existence. This begins with 
setting up goals which constrain openness and reduce complexity (chapter 1.1). 
Goals guide meaning and action of organizational actors who face a potentially 
open-ended scope of action. But organizations do not only define goals, they 
also define how to get there, i.e. their goal seeking is structured. In chapter 1.2 
we became acquainted with different modes of how organizations are struc-
tured. We called these mechanisms of structuring „organizational concepts“  and 
distinguished between two types of such concepts: „rationalized“  and „social-
ized“. Scholars who introduced „rationalized“  concepts were inspired by the 
idea of enlightenment, i.e. that reason and rationality are main vehicles in order-
ing the world. Hence, organizations are seen as formally structured institutions 
which are shaped by concepts like hierarchy, roles, rules, bureaucracy, com-
mands, „scientific management“, and so forth. Later on, this approach of organ-
izational studies was criticized as being too narrow. Critics argued that to fully 
understand organizational behavior other concepts have to be taken into consid-
eration. The reason for this can be seen in the simple fact that organizations are 
populated by human beings, i.e. that organizations are not only formal institu-
tions but also social practices. Thus, they cannot be fully put into rationalized 
patterns or abstract frames. We labeled these other concepts as „socialized“  and 
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discussed approaches which emphasize informal structures, culture, power, 
emotions, or narratives. They supplement rationalistic approaches resulting in a 
more holistic picture of the structuring of organizations.   
From our post-copernicanic view in chapter 1.3, organizational structure 
is not simply given but permanently reproduced. Like humans, organizations do 
not merely exist in a world. They constantly have to construct and structure 
their world as well as themselves. From this viewpoint, the research object of 
organizational studies can be defined as the concepts, organizations use to make 
distinctions, to construct their world, to structure their sensemaking, and to 
guide their action. Organizations construct, apply, and modify their rationalized 
and socialized concepts, resulting in a specific organizational practice (figure 
1.10).
Figure 1.10: Concepts as basic elements of organizations
With this chapter we gained a preliminary grounding and adequate terminology 
for our understanding of organizations. The central notion of organizational 
concepts will also play an important role in our further inquiry, where we are 
Bureaucracy
Formal Rules
Hierarchy
„Scientific Manage-
ment“
Rationalized
Organizational Reality / Practice
Informal structures
Culture
Power
Emotions
Narratives
Socialized
Organizational Concepts
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going to outline organizational knowledge as the driving force behind organ-
izational concepts. 
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Chapter 2: The relevance of organizational 
knowledge
Before exploring how organizational knowledge is applied (chapter 3) and cre-
ated (chapter 4) we will develop a general view on organizational knowledge as 
grounding of organizational concepts. Hereby, we are going to outline a „strong 
view“ which makes knowledge the basis for human action. As such its central 
relevance is given in all social fields, including of course organizations.  
2.1 A strong sense of knowledge in social fields
Our inquiry will opt for a „strong sense“  of knowledge, which locates knowl-
edge not only at the sphere of abstract cognition but at the origin of action. In 
its most basic form, this view was articulated by the social theorists Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 1969). In their pioneering 
work „The social construction of reality“  they define knowledge as something 
that „guides conduct in everyday life“  (Berger & Luckmann, 1969, p. 21). Hu-
mans draw on knowledge in order to be able to make sense of situations, to 
communicate, and to act. Our life is a conglomerate of various situations 
whereby knowledge helps us to interpret (to „typify“) these situations, and 
guides action. Actors draw on a „stock of knowledge“  which preserves specific 
ways of action for specific situations. Furthermore, knowledge is not mere sub-
jective because it can be „objectified“  to „signs“. This allows knowledge to 
transcend the mere internal and subjective mind of „here & now“  (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1969, chapter 1.3). By signs (and whole „sign-systems“) I am able 
to externalize knowledge, as well as to bring external knowledge into the situa-
tion. Hereby, language is the most capable sign-system and therefore plays a 
central role in any society. Complex social systems (like today‘s modern socie-
ties) are very much dependent on „objectifications“  because they allow to inte-
grate and align shared stocks of knowledge. Communicable knowledge of 
norms, values, and ways of „problem-solving“  is necessary to provide a more or 
less stable social world. This presupposition is at the heart of a strong sense of 
knowledge which emphasizes the crucial relation between a social field and 
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knowledge (and consequently also that between organizations and organiza-
tional knowledge).
2.1.1 Interdependence of ontology and knowledge: theory (Giddens and 
Bourdieu) 
Social fields are locked into a dialectical relation which will turn out to be cru-
cial to understand the connection between knowledge and organizing. A social 
field consists of social norms and structuring principles which affect the behav-
ior of actors in that field. At the same time social norms are not given, but cre-
ated by the actors of the field. Hence, a social field is being created in a circular 
process which the sociologist Anthony Giddens calls „structuration“: the struc-
ture is producing actors while the actors produce the structure (Giddens, 2008). 
Just as in M.C. Eschers „Drawing Hands“  (figure 2.1), social fields are struc-
tured dialectically by separate poles being mutually dependent on each other. 
This implies that the social has no stable foundation on which its existence is 
based on:
„(S)ocial structure is not a noun but a verb. Structure is not free-standing, like scaffold-
ing on a building-site, (...) it is a relational effect that recursively generates and repro-
duces itself. (...) It means, for instance, that no version of the social order, no organiza-
tion, and no agent, is ever complete, autonomous, and final.“ (Law, 1992, p. 386f.) 
Figure 2.1: „Drawing Hands“: M.C. Escher 194833
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33 copyright by the M.C. Escher Foundation (M.C. Escher Company B.V.)
According to another social theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, this is possible because 
the structure of the objective social field is coupled to the „perception- and 
distinction-principles“ 34  of its actors (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 141). These 
distinction-principles are manifest in the actors‘  mental perceptions as well as 
they are inscribed physically („incorporated“) into the actor‘s behavior. Actors 
are driven by their „habitus“, says Bourdieu; but the habitus of an actor is basi-
cally „practical knowledge“  (Knoblauch, 2003) which comprises skills and 
competencies, cognitive and incorporated knowledge, both „brain“  and „body“. 
Practical knowledge enables actors to make distinctions, to interpret their 
world, and to construct meaning. Consequently, it is the ultimate source of ac-
tion, though a source which is not (always) consciously reflected.  
The specific practical knowledge of an actor is dependent on the actor‘s 
position within the social field. For example, a laborer uses different distinction 
principles than a CEO. This leads not only to the fact that these two persons 
know different things and that they act differently. According to their specific 
„perception- and distinction-principles“, they also construct their world differ-
ently: the worker in metal production constructs the smelting furnace as a com-
plex technical artifact which requires specific operational steps; for the CEO, on 
the other hand, the furnace is a complex economical factor which requires to be 
integrated in the process of strategy planning. The differences are determined 
by their particular positions within the social field of the company and of soci-
ety in general. What a furnace „is“  and how to deal with it depends on which 
distinction-principles (which theoretical and practical knowledge) are at place. 
These distinction-principles are relative to the subject: a worker‘s sensemaking 
is different to that of the CEO‘s. Both have been running through different so-
cialization processes within the company as well as in their life in general. In 
the course of his life the worker participated in a shared practice of other work-
ers and learned how to view the world as well as how to act in it. From the tini-
est distinctions like how to sit, eat, or greet (Bourdieu, 1986), all the way up to 
how to operate machines and how to interpret the work environment. All this is 
inscribed into the social field and behavior of a shared habitus. Hence, epis-
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34 Author’s translation; original citation: „Wahrnehmungs- und Gliederungsprinzipien“
temic distinctions (knowledge) and the ontological field (social practice) are 
bound together. According to Bourdieu, social reality, habitus, distinction-
principles, knowledge, and so forth cannot be separated from each other. Based 
on their position in the social field, actors are equipped with practical knowl-
edge guiding their daily interactions with others and with themselves; thereby 
they create and actualize the very social field which in turn again will be their 
source for practical knowledge. It is a circular process: a social field gains its 
ontological manifestation (its objectivity) by the epistemological structuring of 
its actors (its subjectivity), whereby in turn the ontological structure influences 
epistemological structures. This circular dependency, which Giddens called 
„structuration“  (Giddens, 2008; Walgenbach, 2006), seems to be a central as-
pect of social fields (see figure 2.2). There seems to be an „ontological consen-
sus“  (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 144) between knowledge of actors and their objective, 
inter-subjective, and social world35. 
Figure 2.2: Mutual feedback and circularity of social fields 
Objective distinctions of the social field
Subjective distinctions of actors 
(practical knowledge)
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35 In fact, Bourdieu‘s notion of  „habitus“  connects society and individuals (Knoblauch, 2003). The 
interdependence between subjective and objective, between social field and habitus, or between 
structure and construction, forms a „structuralist constructivism [strukturalistischer Konstruktiv-
ismus]“  (Bourdieu, 1992,  p. 155) which is very similar to Giddens „structuration“. The inner rela-
tion between the theories of Giddens and Bourdieu (and to that of Actor-Network-Theory which 
will play a crucial role in chapter 4) is also claimed by John Law (Law, 1992, p. 386).
2.1.2 Interdependence of ontology and knowledge: examples
 Let us take a look at two cases which will hopefully exemplify and clarify the 
interrelation between epistemological and ontological distinctions of a social 
field. 
(1) The X-ray Student
Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) provide an example of a medical student who is 
about to learn how to read and understand X-ray pictures: 
„Think of a medical student attending a course in the X-ray diagnosis of pulmonary dis-
eases. He watches in a darkened room shadowy traces on a fluorescent screen placed 
against a patient’s chest, and hears the radiologist commenting to his assistants, in tech-
nical language, on the significant features of these shadows. At first the student is com-
pletely puzzled. For he can see in the X-ray picture of a chest only the shadows of the 
heart and the ribs, with a few spidery blotches between them. The experts seem to be 
romancing about figments of their imagination; he can see nothing that they are talking 
about. Then as he goes on listening for a few weeks, looking carefully at ever new pic-
tures of different cases, a tentative understanding will dawn on him; he will gradually 
forget about the ribs and begin to see the lungs. And eventually, if he perseveres intelli-
gently, a rich panorama of significant details will be revealed to him: of physiological 
variations and pathological changes, of scars, of chronic infections and signs of acute 
disease. He has entered a new world. He still sees only a fraction of what the experts can 
see, but the pictures are definitely making sense now and so do most of the comments 
made on them.“ (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 977)
Figure 2.3: Chest X-Ray Photo36 
70
36  http://www.sxc.hu/browse.phtml?f=download&id=262068 (licensed for free use by HAAP Me-
dia Ltd.; for terms of use see http://www.sxc.hu/help/7_2    
Notice the link between epistemology and ontology, and the centrality of 
knowledge. The actor is constantly developing new knowledge emerging from 
the flow of information provided by the other experts. Knowledge allows him to 
make finer and finer distinctions in order to understand; and later on, as practic-
ing doctor, in order to act. With the application of new knowledge „he has en-
tered a new world“. He may say that he „sees the world with other eyes“, but in 
fact, what happened was that equipped with these new distinctions, he was able 
to participate in the construction of an ontological field he shares with others 
and which enables him to act differently. 
(2) The customer and the CRM 
Similarly, also typical organizational actors are dependent on epistemological 
distinctions which enable them to construct their world and act in it. Consider 
this following brief use-case37:  
The IT department in an organization establishes a new CRM (customer relationship 
management) software, which allows the company to store information about customers 
in a much more detailed and sophisticated way (this enables the system e.g. to automati-
cally prioritize important customers from not so important ones). Once set up, and after 
being integrated with organization workflows and policies, this new system is a „real“ 
materialized part of the organization - it is part of the ontological field. Consequently, 
this new software equips organizational actors with a whole new set of distinctions. It 
reconstructs the way, sales people or account managers recognize, understand, and act 
upon their customers. As such, the CRM is an ontological artifact influencing the epis-
temology of the field, i.e. the distinction-capabilities of its actors. After full rollout these 
distinctions are not only ontologically manifested as data in the system but also episte-
mologically in the practical knowledge of organizational actors. As such it gets ontologi-
cal again, because knowledge results in real action and shapes the social field. 
Here again, knowledge enables world-construction: as practically relevant dis-
tinction, knowledge actually defines the customers and constrains the way or-
ganizational actors deal with them. And again, knowledge - this time provided 
by an organizational expert-system - is the underlying capability of actors in 
making distinctions and grounding action. Take the new feature that calculates 
the priority of customers: when successfully internalized by actors and in-
scribed to the structures of the organization, the calculated priority will not only 
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37 inspired by (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006, p. 123ff.)
be an attribute of the customer record in the digital database but will become a 
distinctive attribute of the customer itself. Informed by the system‘s data out-
put, the account manager now is capable to see something which literally did 
not exist before. Just as the medical student, also the account manager „entered 
a new world“ 38. In this case, again knowledge of actors provide distinctions to 
construct their organizational field (e.g. the priority of customer X) and serves 
as basis for action (e.g. next meeting will be scheduled for customer X and not 
for customer Y). And again, epistemology and ontology are linked together 
structuring the social field: organizational actors apply their knowledge in order 
to construct their customers as well as their organization. 
2.1.3 Interdependence of ontology and knowledge: entry point of a strong 
view
The correlation between the ontological and the epistemological structure of 
social fields marks the entry point of a „strong sense“  of knowledge. Such a 
view dissolves to a certain extent the separation between knowing actors (epis-
temology of a social field) on one side, and an independent, „external“  world 
(ontology of a social field) on the other side. This is to understand distinctions 
of a social field as connected to the cognitive and pragmatic distinctions of its 
actors. As such, knowledge has to be seen as a vehicle which enables actors to 
make distinctions and to construct their world (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 
979). Knowledge is then not only a „resource“  which is produced mainly by, 
say, „knowledge-intensive”  organizations (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997), but it is 
the epistemological grounding of any organization. Starting from the insight 
that organizations are social fields which are marked by a correlation between 
their ontological and the epistemological dimension knowledge gains more 
relevance than it may seem in the first place. Knowledge then not only is some-
thing that can be found in the organization, but  something that constitutes the 
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38  Of course this says nothing about success or failure of the new distinctions. Say,  the CRM 
would allow only a very inflexible prioritization of customers leading to dysfunctional effects and 
non-acceptability by the sales persons. The system then would be too „rigid“  and not adaptable 
to the flexible context of  its application. These drawbacks would be challenged with new distinc-
tions: if the system is too inflexible (but still has to stay in place) presumably new distinctions will 
be developed and informal „workarounds“ developed. This may in a longer term evolve to new 
formal procedures, e.g. to an updated version of the CRM system.
organization. This relevance of knowledge can be revealed, if we show how 
knowledge is not only the mere representation (of an objective world) but in-
herently connected to meaning and action. This „strong sense“  of organizational 
knowledge as well as its inner structure will be further developed in the next 
chapters.
2.2 A strong sense of knowledge in organizations
2.2.1 Data - Information - Knowledge
A conceptual vehicle which has widely been used in knowledge-management 
literature is the triad of „data“, „information“  and „knowledge“ 39. Hereby, data 
is mostly characterized as combination of items - e.g. written words, sentences, 
or bits and bytes. „Raw“  data is then transformed to information if it is success-
fully connected with meaning - e.g. when an actor is able to interpret (i.e. to 
„understand“) a sentence. And finally, information becomes knowledge when 
meaning is linked to its use - e.g. when an actor is able to carry out action upon 
the meaning of the sentence. 
Take, for instance, the sentence „The stock market price of OMV is 
42.33“ 40. First, we could analyze that string as constituted by items like letters 
and words which have been combined to a proper sentence. This view is regard-
less to the meaning of the sentence: it is „pure“  data. But when a person inter-
prets and understands this sentence s/he attaches meaning to it - it becomes in-
formation. For instance, an average adult in modern Western society with aver-
age English language skills, and so on, would very likely be able to understand 
the meaning of „stock market“  or „company“; i.e. the person would be able to 
relate objective words to subjective meaning. More sophisticated interpreters 
would additionally understand „OMV“  being an Austrian based company in the 
energy business. Here again, objective data becomes subjective (and inter-
subjectively exchangeable) information. Finally, a stock floor trader knows the 
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39 see - among many others - (Boisot, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Probst, et al., 2002)
40 This example is inspired by students of the class “Elektronisch gestütztes Lern- und Wissens-
management”  supervised at the Vienna University of Economic and Business Administration in 
winter term 2008.
significance of that information related to his context of action. For him the 
sentence does not only transport information about a specific price of a specific 
stock, but also knowledge about what to do with that kind of information; for 
instance, that the price „42.33“  is too low to keep the stock in the portfolio and 
therefore should to be sold. It is this kind of knowledge which enables the stock 
floor trader to act accordingly towards his goals. 
Let us look at another example. Think of an organization that measures its 
employees satisfaction related to further education on a 10-point scale. The av-
erage result is 8.9 points. According to the data-information-knowledge ap-
proach, first of all there is raw data. This would be the number „8.9“, or its rep-
resentation in a graphical chart. Information comes up, if someone interprets 
that number as being the result of a specific survey which lies on a 10-point-
scale, is the aggregation of specific questions x, y, z, and so forth. Here, just like 
in the former example, information is about bringing data into relation with 
(background) assumptions and other information, i.e. information is meaningful 
contextualized data. Interpretations may be distinguished differently (or even 
contrarily) by different actors. One actor may interpret the result as pretty good 
as it lies much higher than the half of possible points, i.e. higher than 5. Others 
may relate the result to a (to them available) benchmark value of, say, „9.3“, 
concluding the result as being not satisfying. Knowledge, finally, is about how 
to integrate that information into specific action contexts, i.e. knowledge is 
action-related contextualization. A human resources department, for instance, 
generates knowledge if the resulted information flows into the organization‘s 
strategical decisions. The actor „human resources department“  knows what to 
do with the information that the result of the survey is 8.9. Different grades of 
distinction making is possible here as well. A very basic distinction making 
would be given if the department followed simple routines like „if the result is 
satisfying, action x, if not, action y is carried out respectively“  (notice, the rela-
tion to information as the latter defines what actually is to be understood as 
„satisfying“). Finer distinctions would allow more detailed (re-)actions, like to 
define different strategical activities for different result ranges.
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2.2.2 Syntactic - Semantic - Pragmatic
The data-information-knowledge triad seems to be based upon a more general 
distinction which can be found in semiotics and philosophy of language. Ac-
cording to semiotic theory, signs can be depicted along a triangle with three dif-
ferent dimensions (Chandler, 2007)41: a syntactic, a semantic and a pragmatic 
(see figure 2.5). Syntax is about how the sign is constructed, semantics is about 
what a sign means, and the pragmatic dimension refers to how the sign is re-
lated to action. For instance, the sentence „I now pronounce you husband and 
wife“  is a sign which is grammatically built correct (syntax), transports a spe-
cific meaning (semantics) and has real world implications within the ceremony 
of a wedding (pragmatics). 
Let us now consider that there are different ways in constructing concepts 
which we use to establish relations to the world. Remember chapter 1.3 which 
introduced an epistemological stance based on the claim that there are no given 
„things“  passively „perceived“  by minds, but rather conceptually constructed 
relations to things and events. We will now try to describe such „concepts“  us-
ing the three-dimensional categorization from above. The syntactic dimension 
refers to the outward appearance of a concept - e.g. a written or spoken sen-
tence. According to specific syntactic rules and principles, we build words and 
sentences, draw pictures, and so forth. That dimension may be identified as the 
„signifier“  of a concept. Such a signifier, for instance, a word, is characterized 
by the fact that it points to something else: it is representational. But it points 
not directly to things in an „external“  world. It points to the meaning of some-
thing. From the viewpoint of linguist Ferdinand Saussure, the (written or spo-
ken) French word „arbor“  is a „signifier“  which represents and points at the 
„signified“  meaning of a tree (see figure 2.4). This second level marks the se-
mantic dimension which refers to the meaning of a concept, for instance, the 
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41 The concept goes back to Aristotle’s “On Interpretation” (Aristotele, 1984) and was further de-
veloped by the pragmatist tradition, e.g. by Charles W. Morris (Morris, 1946) or Charles Sanders 
Peirce (Peirce, 1913).
subjective perception of a sentence, or an inter-subjectively shared meaning of a 
sentence42. 
Figure 2.4: Saussures „sign“: a relation between the signifier, e.g. „arbor“; and the signified, e.g. 
the conception of a tree (Saussure, 1959, p. 78)
The pragmatic dimension relates the meaning of a concept to its use and its 
context-dependent application. This context is the „practice“  (Wittgenstein, 
1953/2006) or „consensual domain“  (Maturana & Varela, 1987) in which a con-
cept is used. 
From a semiotic viewpoint concepts would be describable on three levels: 
syntactical constructions (like words, sentences, or other types of signs) are rep-
resenting meaning on a semantical level, and are integrated into human (inter-
)actions on a pragmatic level. The latter is important because we „do things 
with words“  (Austin, 1962). Words and sentences do not only refer to subjec-
tive (internal) meaning, but also have „performative“  power, i.e. they enable 
action. Based on the ideas of semiotics, we could say that actors (individual 
persons but also collective actors like organizations) use concepts which be-
come visible on the three levels of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics: 
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42 Saussure expresses the relation between syntactic and semantic level via the notions of „sig-
nifier“  vs. „signified“  (Saussure, 1959). A similar distinction has been proposed by Charles S. 
Pierce who distinguishes between „representamen“ and „interpretant“ (Peirce, 1913).
Figure 2.5: Semiotic triangle
At least two important remarks have to be made here. 
First, a concept is not a (material or non-material) „thing“, but rather an 
effect of relations. This correlates to our non-essentialist epistemology pre-
sented in chapter 1. A car, a stock price, a new organizational rule, a story, or a 
feeling, does not simply exist out there and then is perceived by us. „Some-
thing“  rather is a construction which can take place at different dimensions, i.e. 
on a syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic level. This is also why „things“  do not 
even have to exist in a material sense. A unicorn, for example, can be expressed 
by the syntactically correct notion „unicorn“  or as a picture; it has a semantic 
dimension (many persons know what is meant by a „unicorn“), and it very well 
may be related to a pragmatic use (e.g. as way for bringing kids to bed). If a 
concept (here the unicorn) „is“  anything at all, it is the interconnection of the 
three dimensions of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics43: it is rather a relation 
than an entity.
Second, not all three dimensions have to have the same relevance. For 
example, a feeling has a strong meaning and pragmatic dimension but is diffi-
Semantic 
dimension
Concept
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Pragmatic 
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43 My proposed structure actually does not  take the problem of objective reference into account. 
Peirce recognized  this  additional dimension and called it  the “object”  vs. the mere “interpretant”  - 
i.e.  the object vs. its meaning. For Peirce the „object“  marks the entity to which an „interpretant“ 
refers  (Peirce, 1897/1932).  Note that  what we call „concept“  is not such an „object“, but much 
more the integrative relation of correlating representation (syntactic), meaning (semantic) and 
practice (pragmatic). My account therefore is more similar to Saussures dyadic approach which 
subsumes “sign”  as the unification of “signifier” (as the linguistic form a sign takes) and “signi-
fied”  (as the meaning, or “idea”, the signifier refers to). Whether that  idea is related to an object, 
i.e.  claiming ontological status or even truth, is not  relevant to Saussure‘s sign theory. The only 
thing that may claim some sort of ontological status is the signifier:  written or spoken words have 
to exist in order to be interpreted (Saussure, 1959). However, our account extends Saussure‘s 
as we add the pragmatic dimension which was later emphasized by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Witt-
genstein, 1953/2006).  
cult to put into words. An organizational rule, on the other hand, is very easily 
fleshed out in its syntactic dimension (e.g. as written directive) but may not that 
easily be integrated into the actor‘s actual practice. In fact, as we will see in the 
next chapters, one main challenge of organizations and management is to estab-
lish organizational concepts on all three levels44. 
2.2.3 Representation - Meaning - Action
According to the insights from chapters 1.3 and 2.1, knowledge is to make dis-
tinctions as basis for the construction of social reality. Organizational knowl-
edge then subsumes all distinctions which actors use to represent and under-
stand the organizational field, as well as to act in it. With the semiotic triad from 
above this organizational distinction-making can be located in representations 
(the syntactic dimension), in meaning (the semantic dimension), and in relation 
to action (the pragmatic dimension). This is what we have seen at the use-cases 
above: actors used and created knowledge which enabled them to make syntac-
tical distinctions (words, visuals, explanations in textbooks, computerized in-
formation), semantical distinctions (what does this trace on the X-Ray mean?, 
what is a customer?), and pragmatical distinctions (how to look at the X-Ray? 
how to act upon specific customer attributes?). Knowledge provides different 
ways of distinction-making and enables organizational actors to make a practi-
cal sense of the world45. Hereby, representation, meaning, and action are transi-
tional facets on a continuum. A continuum which is marked by the scope of 
contextualization of distinction making (see figure 2.6).
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44 the challenge for organizational studies then, of course, is  how to understand and conceptual-
ize organizational knowledge on all three levels, which is also one aim of our inquiry.  
45 But  notice that although pragmatical distinctions relate knowledge to action, knowledge does 
not equal action. Knowledge does not determine its real-world application to concrete organiza-
tional practice.  Hence,  organizational knowledge provides the possibility, not the necessity,  for 
actors to construct  specific representations, meanings, and actions in their organizational prac-
tice. Instead to support  a „too strong“ sense of knowledge where simply „knowledge is action“ we 
will rather position knowledge as concept with a distance to its concrete application to practice: 
knowledge is related to action, it not is action (see next chapter 2.2.4). 
Figure 2.6: Broader term of knowledge46
The more we move down to the pragmatic dimension, the more distinction-
making is contextualized to the practice of the actor. Remember the stock mar-
ket example. The possibility of constructing the representational distinction 
„OMV 42,33“ is pretty universal, although still dependent on basic skills like 
reading and counting. To make meaningful distinctions it becomes more spe-
cific as actors need to contextualize the representations towards a specific cul-
tural background (like knowledge about economical basics of Western econo-
mies, stock markets, etc.). Finally, the pragmatic distinction is even more con-
textualized because actors need to relate knowledge not only to, for instance, a 
shared idea of stock markets but to their own specific field of action: the floor 
trader needs to contextualize pragmatic distinctions (which allow a relation to 
action) to his very specific organizational context of floor trading.
Organizational knowledge is a vehicle for human distinction making and 
active on all three levels. The more we move down towards „action“, the more 
contextualized human activity is involved in the generation of distinctions 
which enable actors to make sense of their world and to act in it. Notice that 
this view does not define knowledge as being totally different from terms like 
data or information. We have seen this at the CRM example: a CRM system 
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46 inspired by (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 976)
provides generalized representations which, internalized by the actors, gives 
them the capability to construct certain views (meaning) of their customers. It 
also enables new ways of specific action towards their customers. Organiza-
tional knowledge here is a concept which allows distinction-making on all these 
different levels. 
Note also that the triad does not necessarily imply a hierarchy. For instance, the 
attributed meaning of a concept, i.e. its semantical dimension, does not neces-
sarily precede its pragmatic use. There is no definite one-way road from repre-
sentation, to meaning, and then to action. Authors like Ludwig Wittgenstein 
claim that the meaning of a concept is determined by its use and not vice versa 
(Wittgenstein, 1953/2006), i.e. we know things only because we know how to 
use them. Contrary to that, authors like John Law argue for the importance of 
representations (Law, 1992, p. 387). To order the world, social relations and 
knowledge are to be „translated“ into a „durable“ form:
„Imagine a continuum. Thoughts are cheap but they don't last long, and speech lasts very 
little longer. But when we start to (...) embody them in inanimate materials such as texts 
and buildings they may last longer. Thus a good ordering strategy is to embody a set of 
relations in durable materials.“ (Law, 1992, p. 387)47
Meaning is intertwined with action, says Wittgenstein; and meaning is only 
made relevant when materialized in representations, says Law. Views like that 
of Wittgenstein or Law indicate that distinctions like data, information, and 
knowledge are analytical concepts which cannot be distinguished in that clear-
cut way in real life. It is hard to see how we would refer to a concept as „pure“ 
data without any appreciation of its meaning (or vice versa). Or how we can 
refer to things only pointing to their meaning while blocking out their relation 
to action. In human life all three dimensions converge. This is why we placed 
the three modes of distinction-making on a continuum.
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47 Another noteworthy position is held by Sybille Krämer who emphasize the material and repre-
sentational dimension of human mind and thinking (Krämer, 2008, forthcoming 2011). See also 
the position of Klaus Krippendorff who highlights „meaning“  as intersubjective „distinction-
making“  within the domain of  (also organizational) design (Krippendorf, 1984, 1989, 2011; Krip-
pendorf & Butter, 2007).
According to our understanding so far, knowledge management is the organiza-
tion‘s activity of re-actualizing, re-constructing, and integrating representations, 
meaning and action (see figure 2.7)48. The aim of knowledge management is to 
support distinction-making on these three levels, and to provide successful dis-
semination and application to organizational practice. Knowledge ought to flow 
through the veins of the organization, and to manifest itself in objective repre-
sentations, subjective meaning and inter-subjective action. Managing that flow 
of knowledge is a core issue of post-modern management (Nonaka, et al., 
2008). 
Figure 2.7: Epistemic attributes of organizational knowledge: representation, meaning, and ac-
tion
2.2.4 Strong, but not too strong: the pitfall of holistic constructivism
Again, we should note that knowledge as foundation of meaning and action 
does not necessarily terminate in successful or efficient organizational action. 
Knowledge enables actors to make distinctions. But if and how this is actually 
happening in the concrete organizational practice is up to the practice. Of 
course, a CRM system provides distinctions on all three levels, for example, on 
the level of action it calculates and provides a priority on which customers have 
to be called (chapter 2.1.2). But this does not mean that these distinctions are 
actually applied in that way in organizational practice; it may, for instance, hap-
pen that customers are called in the old way. In such a case the new distinction-
making capability offered by the new technology would be ignored (a fate 
shared by many new technologies in organizations). The X-Ray student (chap-
ter 2.1.2) may construct specific distinctions which are related to meaning („this 
Meaning
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48  this integrative systematization is very much inspired by JC Spenders distinction of 
“knowledge-as-data”, “knowledge-as-meaning” and “knowing-as-practice” (Spender, 2008) 
shadow means x“) or to action („the proper treatment would be y“), but in con-
crete practice this may be exposed as being wrong. Finally, the nurse (chapter 
1.3.3) made correct meaning-distinctions (the symptoms are x, y, z) but wrong 
action-distinctions (physician x has to by informed in way z). These distinctions 
were applied to practice and terminated in unsuccessful results. Consequently, 
knowledge needed to be modified and again applied to practice. In all three ex-
amples the knowledge-flow between representation, meaning, and action did 
not turn out as coherent and smooth transition but was subject to disturbances, 
and sometimes lead to unsuccessful and non-desired results.  
Our constructivist stance, which has been developed from the beginning 
of this inquiry, should not make us blind for the simple fact that knowledge and 
the world are different. We should be careful and avoid the pitfalls of a too ho-
listic constructivism. Just as Kant stated that on one side it is impossible to de-
scribe „things-in-themselves“, it is on the other side equally impossible not to 
presuppose their existence. Knowledge needs a counterpart even if that coun-
terpart cannot be fully „known“; for organizational knowledge that counterpart 
is the organizational practice. Hence, although we acknowledge the „strong 
sense“, i.e. that via knowledge the organizational field is constructed, our sense 
of knowledge should not be too strong. We should avoid to understand the in-
terdependence between the epistemological and the ontological dimension of 
the organization as a 1:1 determined relation. Of course, knowledge enables 
actors to make distinctions in order to construct their world and give meaning to 
its objects. And of course knowledge empowers actors to act since it equips 
them with the needed distinctions to relate representations and meaning to or-
ganizational action. But just as my thoughts of something does not make that 
thing real, organizational knowledge is not automatically successfully applied 
and realized to practice in the intended way. Epistemic distinctions of actors do 
not 1:1 map the ontological field of the organization. Knowledge is related to 
meaning and action but if and how knowledge becomes relevant within a shared 
practice is dependent on the concrete use of knowledge, not on knowledge 
alone. Organizational knowledge creation is a critical selection process deter-
mining which distinctions remain in the stock of knowledge and which do not. 
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Not all possible distinctions are always integrated into the practice of the or-
ganization. For example, the CRM system may simply not be used, although (at 
least some) actors would be able to relate representations and meaning to ac-
tion, i.e. to make pragmatic distinctions. In this case, the offered distinctions 
became non-relevant to the shared organizational practice, although knowledge 
was theoretically available and relatable to action.
To summarize, organizational knowledge is related to action, but this does 
not mean that knowledge simply equals practice. There is a gap between both, a 
gap between epistemology and ontology of the social field. This is not a flaw in 
the relation between both but, rather contrary, constitutive for the relation itself. 
The gap makes possible that new knowledge can be created which is not al-
ready integrated in practice, i.e. new distinctions aiming at to change practice. 
Without that gap, knowledge and practice would be fully synchronized and no 
knowledge creation or application would be possible. There could be no dy-
namic interrelation between epistemology and ontology of a field. Ultimately, if 
both would be equal, the separation would not be necessary at all. 
This marks also the very condition of knowledge management. To manage 
the flow of organizational knowledge is to calibrate the epistemic field which 
enables its actors to interpret their world and to carry out context-relevant ac-
tion. But this is to say that knowledge may be changed in order to enable a rele-
vant change in practice. This relevant change is all what knowledge manage-
ment is about (as well as the definition what „relevant“  means in the specific 
context). And that is only possible if our knowledge is not fully inter-locked 
with practice. Hence, a theory of knowledge management has to decouple the 
notion of organizational knowledge (as three-dimensional relation to represen-
tations, meaning, and action) from organizational practice.
In the next chapters we will map existing approaches to knowledge manage-
ment and organizational knowledge and connect them with our framework de-
veloped so far. We will explore how all three dimensions of knowledge are 
compatible with existing knowledge-based literature of organizational studies. 
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2.3 Managing flow: implicit and explicit knowledge
In their groundbreaking book „The knowledge-creating company“  Nonaka and 
Takeuchi conceptualized organizational knowledge along the two poles of ex-
plicit and implicit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Explicit knowledge 
is expressed in representational statements being „about“  something: „know-
that“  or „declarative knowledge“. Implicit knowledge, on the other hand, is in-
ternalized knowledge about how to do things: „know-how“  or „procedural 
knowledge“ 49. Explicit knowledge appears as codified content, for instance, in 
documents, books, or databases. Implicit knowledge remains inside the actor, 
for instance, as a skill and as the ability to carry out action. According to 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, the key process for creating and leveraging knowledge in 
organizations is to convert knowledge from one form into another. „Conversion 
processes“  have to be in place to let data, information, and knowledge circulate 
from actor to actor („socialization“), from internal to external manifestations 
(„externalization“), within external forms („combination“), and again from an 
explicit state back to the actor („internalization“). 
The authors illustrate these conversion processes by giving a famous ex-
ample about bread baking (Nonaka, 1991, p. 98f.; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 
100ff.). To learn how to bake bread one could acquire knowledge about bread 
ingredients, mixture ratios, techniques, and so forth. This information may be 
gathered from instruction guides, books, and so forth. Doing so, a person would 
(at least try to) „internalize“  explicit knowledge from the book to his/her inter-
nal system, i.e. s/he would convert explicit to implicit knowledge. Of course, it 
is difficult to learn how to bake bread in that way. In fact, professionals acquire 
the skill of bread-baking not from books (alone) but learn from other human 
beings. In this case knowledge acquisition mostly is accomplished in a social 
setting: from a master to an apprentice50. Hereby, the master shows something 
while the apprentice imitates: knowledge is acquired through „indwelling“ 
(Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 20). According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, this act of 
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49  The distinction between „know-that“  and „know-how“ was introduced by the philosopher Gil-
bert Ryle (Ryle, 1949), that between explicit and tacit knowledge by Michel Polanyi (M. Polanyi, 
1967).  
50 Which is the prototype of the „socialization“ conversion (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 20).
„socialization“  transfers implicit knowledge from one person to another. An-
other type of conversion comes up if someone aims at constructing a bread-
baking machine (or at writing a book about bread-baking). In such a case the 
implicit knowledge which is transferred from the master to the apprentice has to 
be „externalized“  and to be converted into a codified form. This is to convert 
implicit to explicit knowledge, for example, by linguistically („metaphorically“) 
describing all the detailed steps necessary to bake bread. This explicit knowl-
edge then can be „combined“  with other knowledge resources like mechanical 
and electronic features of machine parts in order to finally build a bread baking 
device.  
Figure. 2.8: Knowledge conversion processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995)
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, organizations have to provide purposeful 
and efficient conversion processes to generate a „flow“  of information which 
enables the creation and application of the organization‘s most important re-
source: useful knowledge. Their approach converges with our strong sense of 
knowledge as distinction-making, whereby explicit knowledge is situated to-
wards the top and implicit knowledge towards the bottom of the continuum:
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Figure 2.9: Nonaka and Takeuchis knowledge distinctions applied to our broader term of knowl-
edge
Nonaka and Takeuchi claim that representational distinctions have to be con-
vertible to allow construction of meaning and relation to action. Only through 
becoming „implicit“, knowledge can be related to action and finally be applied 
to practice. On the other side, also implicit skills have to be explicable as repre-
sentations and meaning in order to be distributed and shared throughout the or-
ganization. 
2.4 Knowledge as organizational resource of individual and 
collective distinction-making
Other approaches in organizational studies focus on knowledge as being a „re-
source“  of creating results like products, services, money, and so forth. No mat-
ter how limited some of these typifications may be - e.g. because they only 
seem applicable to firms, or exclusively to the individual level of actors - we 
will see that every one of them is connected to the 3-level distinction-
continuum of our strong sense of organizational knowledge. 
2.4.1 Representation: knowledge as commodified resource
Take, for example, the „first stage“  of knowledge-management literature which 
was heavily influenced by the development of information technology 
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(Scharmer, 2009, p. 69). Here, knowledge (or rather the opportunity of knowl-
edge management) was mainly seen in context of the digital infrastructure of 
the organization. The main challenge of knowledge management was seen as 
how to store information independently from fluctuating actors and to make it 
widely accessible throughout the organization, i.e. making implicit knowledge 
explicit. Knowledge management has to provide technical and social structures 
to move data to where its „absence has created problems“  (Spender, 2008, p. 
169). Hence, knowledge is seen as a convertible resource, a „commodity“ 
which has to be distributed optimally51. This view certainly focuses exclusively 
on the representational level of knowledge. Nonetheless, it is a matter of organ-
izational knowledge and not only of „data“. As representational distinctions ba-
sically allow to construct meaning and relation to action (remember the CRM 
example), they form a legitimate dimension of organizational knowledge (man-
agement). 
2.4.2 Meaning: knowledge as individualized resource
Another approach is to narrow organizational knowledge to „expert knowl-
edge“. Peter Drucker, for instance, describes modern organizations as being un-
precedentedly dependent on a „plurality of expert knowledge“ (Drucker, 1993, 
p. 74ff.) which has to be imported mainly through hiring the right people. This 
view correlates with other definitions which take knowledge to be a „resource“ 
embodied in actors (Patriotta, 2003, p. 25). Organizational knowledge then is 
reduced to „human capital“  which is managed by recruiting activities and 
„competence management“  (Choo & Bontis, 2002). Basically, there is nothing 
to hold against those views as it is obvious that in today‘s fast developing 
global societies expert knowledge has become an important and central re-
source. Its contribution to reach organizational goals cannot be underestimated. 
Analysts, consultants, software developers, and even retail salespersons draw 
from knowledge as a set of distinctions to make sense of (as well as to act in) 
their organizational practice. Analysts and consultants may use their expert 
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51  Designing knowledge management systems can be rather „technological oriented“, i.e. opti-
mized towards creation and retrieval of  knowledge itself, or „human oriented“, i.e. optimized to-
wards creation and retrieval of knowledge holders (Maier & Hädrich, 2001).
knowledge (from „know-how“  like analytical skills, to „know-that“  like knowl-
edge about markets or best practices) to reveal market opportunities and thus to 
construct action-relevant meaning. Software developers use their knowledge 
about programming languages, algorithms, or the newest features of digital 
tools, to understand and solve given problems. In terms of our definition of 
knowledge the highly-skilled programmer is able to generate finer (or rather 
different) distinctions than someone who lacks her specific knowledge. Her ex-
pert knowledge enables her to analyze a specific problem in a specific way (i.e. 
a specific way to construct meaning, to turn „circumstances“  to „situations“), 
and to come up with a specific solution (i.e. she constructs relations to possible 
organizational action). When her knowledge-based distinctions are successfully 
integrated to practice she ultimately contributes to the achievement of organiza-
tional goals (e.g. the goal to provide solutions for the customers). Even retail 
salespersons use their knowledge about typical customer behavior and past ex-
periences to construct finer distinctions on (future) customer behavior (Nonaka, 
et al., 2008, p. 138ff.)52. This knowledge then enables them to make more effec-
tive item orders in the future. 
In all these cases, knowledge enables actors to construct distinctions. 
These distinctions allow them to understand their world and (directly or indi-
rectly) to contribute to the product, service, or „value“  of the organization. 
Knowledge-based distinction-making equip organizational actors to carry out 
actions which contribute to the achievement of organizational goals. This is 
even the case for externally codified and „dehumanized“  knowledge like ac-
quirable patents, market reports, program code, books, or imported data in a 
CRM database. All these „distinctions-as-representations“  are organizational 
knowledge, since they are relatable to meaning and action. If and how these rep-
resentations trigger purposeful action depends on its application in organiza-
tional practice (what will be discussed in chapter 3).  
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52 see also our use-case from Seven-Eleven Japan in chapter 10.
2.4.3 Action: knowledge as processual resource
We may also distinguish between knowledge as part of the product or service, 
and knowledge as guiding the organized process which creates that very prod-
uct or service. Knowledge then not directly merges into a product but provides 
a collective „architecture“  (Henderson & Clark, 1990), which is available as 
explicit and implicit „routines and interactions“  (Blackler, 1995, p. 1025). Typi-
cal examples would be role descriptions, routines, organizational command 
structures, meeting rules, decision making policies, and so forth. 
A similar distinction has been made between „product innovation“  and 
„management innovation“  (Hamel, 2002, 2007). Put shortly, product innovation 
makes the product better whereas management innovation makes the organiza-
tion better53. To thrive product innovation, knowledge about resources has to be 
created or modified. For example, for an organization to develop and produce 
MP3 players these resources could be the MP3-encoding algorithms, audio 
technology, displays, internet-protocols, and so forth, as well as non-technical 
knowledge about markets, or social structure of customers. To thrive manage-
ment innovation, on the other side, procedures, rules, and policies („architec-
ture“) have to be created or modified. This results, for example, in realignment 
of command structures, or in redesigning internal communication. The first type 
of innovation is directly related to the product or service, the second one deals 
with the way of how actors and resources generating the product or service are 
organized. 
This is also prevalent in Edith Penroses economical theory of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959). Penrose argues that the mere availability of resources cannot 
sufficiently explain a firm‘s success. It is much more the way how these re-
sources are combined, integrated, structured, and applied which distinguishes 
the firm from others and generates competitive advantage. The uniqueness of a 
firm is constituted by how it collectively understands its available resources, the 
possible services they could render, or the markets in which they could thrive. It 
is, for instance, one thing to have access to resources like transistor-technology, 
flash-storages, LCD displays, online-sales-infrastructure, and so forth; but a dif-
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53 And consequently of course also aims at making the product better.
ferent thing to assemble them to a holistic service which provides stylish MP3 
players seamlessly embedded in an online music store and business model: 
Figure 2.10: Organizational Knowledge according to Penrose (exemplified along Apple‘s© Port-
able Music Service)
Following Penrose, competitive advantage is dependent on organizational 
knowledge because the latter represents the connecting link between resources, 
i.e. the „input“  of the production process, and services, i.e. the „output“  of the 
production process. In today‘s digitalized and globalized environment with 
ubiquitous information access and worldwide supplier-networks there are only 
a few sectors where firms may distinguish themselves only on basis of their 
used material and non-material resources. As seen in the MP3 use-case, the 
unique value of a product or service is added in the way of how resources are 
organizationally combined. This „way“  can be understood as collective organ-
izational knowledge which „bridges the gap between the resources acquired and 
the services (organizations) provide“  (Spender, 2008, p. 169). Penrose very 
early identified that these differences constitute the pillar of a firms success as it 
enables an organization „to put its resources to particular uses – it is a distinc-
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tive way of thinking and acting in the world“  (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 
981). 
It is this type of trans-individual know-how which marks the distinctive 
organizational character of knowledge. Here the focus is directed towards the 
organizations processes, rules, routines, stories, shared understandings, and col-
lective know-how. Knowledge then is „organizational“  not because it relates 
representations, meaning, and actions only to individuals, but to the organiza-
tion as such. In fact, individual knowledge is only able to become part of the 
organizational sphere if its embedded in the trans-individual processes of the 
organization (F. B. Simon, 2007, p. 35)54.  
To conclude, the way how organizations organize is accumulated in the 
shared organizational knowledge actors can draw from to make distinctions (on 
the three levels of representation, meaning, and action). Which types of organ-
izational knowledge are at work on this processual level will be examined in 
chapter 3 and connected to the different paradigms in organizational studies 
from chapter 1. Hereby, rationalized views try to understand processes as a 
knowledge stock of formal routines or rules (chapter 3.1), whereby more social-
ized views detect organizational processes as informal narratives and stories 
circulating within the organization (chapter 3.3).  
2.5 Conclusion
Let us briefly summarize the steps made in chapter 2:
(1) Knowledge constitutes the epistemological dimension of a social field 
(chapter 2.1).
(2) This is because it enables actors to make distinctions in order to understand 
their world and act in it.
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54 System theory approaches of organizational research drive this even further.  According to an 
„autopoietic“  understanding of organizations, members of the organization are placed to the „en-
vironment“  of the system (i.e. humans are not „part“  of the organization but part of the „environ-
ment“  of the organization). Members become interchangeable and only  relevant insofar as their 
communications and actions are „coupled“  to the organizations processes (F. B. Simon, 2007,  p. 
35). The organization then does not consist of its members but of its own operations: organiza-
tions are „closed systems“ (Baecker, 1998; Luhmann, 1995; F. B. Simon, 2007). 
(3) This opens up the possibility of a „strong“ knowledge-based view on or-
ganizations: organizations are social fields in which knowledge as 
distinction-making is active on three levels: representation, meaning, and 
action (chapter 2.2).  
(4) The general theoretical framework outlined in (1) - (3) turned out to be 
compatible with existing approaches to organizational knowledge, like 
Nonaka‘s & Takeuchis‘  knowledge classifications (chapter 2.3), as well as 
with the idea of knowledge being an organizational „resource“  on both in-
dividual and collective levels (chapter 2.4).
Note that our definition of knowledge as distinction-making process which en-
ables world-construction and action is very close to that of organizational con-
cepts from chapter 1. There, we said that organizational concepts (rationalized 
and socialized) enable exactly what we said about knowledge in chapter 2, i.e. 
distinction-making, understanding of the world, and relation to action. Our fur-
ther inquiry will be driven by the idea that organizational knowledge (as out-
lined in chapter 2) is constitutive for organizational concepts and structure (as 
outlined in chapter 1). Hereby, we will follow scholars of organizational studies 
who recently introduced elaborated approaches to understand both the applica-
tion (Haridimous Tsoukas, chapter 3) as well as the creation (Gerardo Patriotta, 
chapter 4) of knowledge in organizations. Outlining their approaches will give 
us further insights of how constitutional concepts (like rules, roles, stories, re-
sources, skills, etc.) are bound to the epistemological dimension of the organi-
zation. In fact, both authors implicitly claim that we could neither understand 
the application, nor the creation of organizational concepts without the notion 
of knowledge. As we will see, both Tsoukas and Patriotta propose novel views, 
reformulating the structuring principles of organizations as organizational 
knowledge. The „capability“  of organizations to draw distinctions, to stabilize 
meaning, and to act is bound to knowledge. This culminates in the general defi-
nition provided by Haridimous Tsoukas: 
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“Organizational knowledge is the capability members of an organization have developed 
to draw distinctions in the process of carrying out their work” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 
2001, p. 976)55
The next chapters try to reformulate organizational concepts as organizational 
knowledge, thus introducing a knowledge-based view on organizations. This 
also opens up a new perspective. By interpreting the organization as being con-
stituted by knowledge we will be able to see challenges and problems of or-
ganizations in a new light, i.e. to interpret issues in organizations as epistemic 
issues. 
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55 Having said that, we should also accept the limits  of the introduced strong sense of organiza-
tional knowledge. Although the crucial importance of knowledge in organization forms both the 
assumption and the field of this inquiry, we should remember that not all before mentioned con-
cepts,  which create the organization (see chapter 1), can (or should) be covered by and traced 
back to organizational knowledge. Our inquiry will not opt for some kind of  knowledge-centrism 
which reduces everything in and around organizations to knowledge. I would not even choose to 
explain,  e.g. expert skills or organizational rules by the concept of knowledge alone as other 
factors  like social pressure, power, or culture may be involved as well. However, knowledge in 
the strong sense is  a necessary condition for organizations. Trading off limits against  importance 
of a knowledge-based view, we could conclude that on one hand knowledge for sure is not the 
only constituent of organizations, but on the other hand no organization would be imaginable 
without it. This is because no social field is imaginable without its epistemological grounding.
Chapter 3 - The application of organizational 
knowledge
In chapter 2 we emphasized the relation between the epistemological and the 
ontological dimension of organizations. We concluded that, on different levels, 
knowledge is able to provide epistemological distinctions allowing organiza-
tions (and organizational actors) to make sense of the world and to act in it. But 
the fact that knowledge shapes organizational practice does not imply that 
knowledge and practice are the same. In contrary, the relation between knowl-
edge and practice is marked by a fundamental gap which will become central 
for our further inquiry. The following chapter aims to show how the application 
of knowledge is open to contingency and plurality, and that knowledge does 
never perfectly fit to its application context. This is discussed along with Ha-
ridimous Tsoukas’ approach which will be connected to our hitherto developed 
ideas56.  
This chapter will (a) complete our understanding of organizational knowledge 
as distinction-making by connecting chapter 1 (organization as rationalized and 
socialized concepts) with chapter 2 (knowledge as distinction-making). We will 
further (b) define a fundamental gap between organizational knowledge and 
organizational practice which has important consequences for the creation of 
knowledge (chapter 4) and consequently for an organizational epistemology 
(part III).
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56  The following definitions of different types of  knowledge and their relation to organizational 
practice are mainly inspired by the collected writing of Haridimous Tsoukas carried out in an edi-
tion of collected papers named „Complex knowledge: Studies in organizational epistemology“ 
(Tsoukas, 2005c). Furthermore, Tsoukas is one of very few who uses the term „epistemology“ in 
regard to organizations. Nevertheless we are going to understand this term differently then he 
does.  Another rare use of the term can be found at Krogh‘s,  Roos‘ and Slocum‘s „Corporate 
Epistemology“ (Krogh, Roos, & Slocum, 1994).  
3.1 Rationalized Concepts: Organizational knowledge as 
„theory“
3.1.1 Knowledge as generalized theory
From a „rationalistic“  standpoint in organizational studies (see chapter 1.2.1) a 
„strong sense“  of knowledge would define knowledge as an explicitly encoded 
frame which structures the distinctions and actions of organizational actors. 
Such knowledge would appear as formal rules, roles, and routines which ought 
to be applied by organizational actors. According to the organizational theorists 
Haridimous Tsoukas and Efi Vladimirou, all such formal knowledge is in its 
core structured as propositional statements57; then organizational knowledge is 
„propositional knowledge“ (Tsoukas, 2005a):
„An organized activity provides actors with a given set of cognitive categories and a 
typology of action options. (...)  Such a typology consists of rules of action – typified 
responses to typified expectations. (...) Rules are prescriptive statements guiding behav-
ior in organizations and take the form of propositional statements, namely ‘If X, then Y, 
in circumstances Z’.“ (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979f.)
In chapter 2 we said that knowledge in a „strong sense“  constitutes the distinc-
tions of the organizational field. How does this happen with „propositional 
knowledge“ as introduced by Tsoukas & Vladimirou? 
The idea is that behavior is not arbitrarily performed by isolated individu-
als but rationally organized around generalized categories. These categories 
form a „stock of knowledge“  which shape the subjective distinctions of actors 
as well as the objective, „institutionalized“  structure of the field (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1969). From such a view, coordinated activity is possible because 
„individuals draw and act upon a corpus of generalizations in the form of ge-
neric rules produced by the organization.“  (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 
979).
A service call center, for example, is organized around general categories 
(a set of typical customers with typical issues which are to be solved in typical 
ways). The purpose of these general categories is to be able to cover all (or at 
least most) possible particular events within the call center and to regulate hu-
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57  A  similar approach, which points at routines as the core of organizational knowledge (and 
which will not be discussed here) is provided by Nelson and Winter (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
man action. Without any such conceptualized, rationalized, and explicable set 
of general distinctions no manageable modern organization would exist:
„On this view, therefore, organizing implies generalizing: the subsumption of heteroge-
neous particulars under generic categories. In that sense, formal organization necessarily 
involves abstraction. Since in an organization the behavior of its members is formally 
guided by a set of propositional statements, it follows that an organization may be seen 
as a theory – a particular set of concepts (or cognitive categories) and the propositions 
expressing the relationship between concepts.“ (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980)
To use the notion of „theory“  seems in fact being reasonable because knowl-
edge always involves some kind of abstraction: knowledge as theory does not 
refer to something purely particular, i.e. it is not simply reporting about singular 
events. For instance, the simple theory „water boils at 100°C if the surrounding 
pressure is at 1 bar“  does not report about any specific case where such an event 
(water boiling at 100°C at 1 bar) was accidentally observed. It claims to be 
valid for all particular instances of „water“. This is similar to a formal organiza-
tional routine for call center agents (e.g. „if an agent receives a call, then the 
calls has to be answered after 1 minute at the latest“) which usually also is not 
restricted to a specific employee but ought to be applied by all (or at least by all 
of one group of) agents. Both the categories („X, Y, Z“) as well as their rela-
tionships („if“, ”then“) are generalizations. Only as generalizations they have 
the capacity to typify behavior, situations, and actors. If an organizational rule 
would not be generalized, then it would only point to a singular instance. This 
would undermine the very idea of a rule, because rules are to be applicable to a 
plurality of possible cases in order to reduce complexity and make organiza-
tions more „organized“. Equipping rules with only singular terms would make 
them applicable only to singular events. Then a rule would be restricted to only 
one specific situation, applied by only one specific agent, and carried out only 
once. In the next situation one would need to set up a new rule. Strictly speak-
ing, the rule would not be a rule anymore. It would rather be transformed to a 
direct command which determines behavior instead of guiding it. To draw the 
analogy to science: the rule would only be one of millions of „protocol sen-
tences“  rather than a structuring and generalized statement. When lacking the 
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characteristic of generalization, rules would multiply the very chaos they were 
supposed to reduce. 
In fact, it is hard to imagine something like singular categories at all, i.e. 
categories distinctively referring to a unique entity in the world. The reason for 
this is not simply that the world is complex and that there „are“  no singular 
categories „out there“. The reason is that the meaning to which a category refers 
to is potentially open-ended. For example, „if the customer IBM calls Andy to-
morrow at 12:15, then the time-to-solve of the given problem should not take 
longer than 15 minutes“  would be a pretty specific and non-generalized rule. It 
would not be applicable if „Dell“  calls (which is a likewise large and important 
customer), or if „Bill“  (another call center agent) picks up the phone, or if it 
would be 13:00, etc. However, it is not that singular as it seems at first since 
every representation in that rule is still open for different meanings. Both „the 
customer IBM“  and „time-to-solve of the given problem“  are contingent. 
„IBM“  is contingent to how one understands „IBM“  and, in this specific case, 
how the call center agent identifies a phone caller as related to IBM (as it, 
strictly speaking, is never „IBM“  calling, but another person). Also the meaning 
of the category „time-to-solve“  cannot be unequivocally determined: for exam-
ple, does the time-measurement begin before or after the phone rings58? 
What this (constructed) example indicates is that still the most specified 
rule contains generalizations, i.e. - according to Tsoukas and Vladimirou (Tsou-
kas & Vladimirou, 2001) - the subsumption of heterogenous particulars (the 
manifold organizational practice) under generalized concepts (more or less ab-
stract categories like, e.g. „agent“  or „IBM“). And this is true for all proposi-
tional knowledge. Hence, we can summarize two important analytical remarks 
about propositions: (a) propositions have to be generalized in order to be (use-
ful) propositions for the organization. A non-generalized proposition (if possible 
at all) would ultimately be its one and only instance. And then it would fail to 
reduce complexity and to pattern recurrent behavior efficiently. Generalization 
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58  Of course, this does not mean that such a directive (or any other more general rule) is not 
executable.  The mentioned instruction may be very well carried out by „Andy“  if Andy is an expe-
rienced operator and knows the context  of the organization. Andy would not need all the details 
and context-sensitive information like what „IBM“  or what „time-to-solve“ means. Thus, it would 
not be useful to incorporate all details to the instruction.
is the strength and the very vehicle of propositional knowledge. (b) Proposi-
tions are not constituted by closed (distinct) but by open-ended (generalized) 
concepts59. This makes them open to interpretation as we saw with the catego-
ries of „IBM“  or „time-to-solve“. Propositions are open-ended and cannot al-
ways be unequivocally interpreted. Note the dialectical relation between (a) and 
(b): it is not the whole truth to say that on one side propositions establish gener-
alized distinctions, although, on the other side, they turn out to be open to inter-
pretation. They are open to interpretation because they are generalized. 
To talk about propositions is to view organizational knowledge as „the-
ory“  because it, just like scientific theories, aims at subsuming heterogenous 
particularities under general concepts. According to such a rationalistic view, 
the implicit motivation of knowledge is to order heterogeneity, to rationalize 
perception, to categorize the world, and ultimately to unequivocally guide ac-
tion. This rationalized view of organizing and organizational knowledge can be 
traced back to the roots of organizational theory, which basically started with 
Max Weber.  
3.1.2 Max Weber: organizing and scientific rationality
Understanding organizational knowledge as propositional „theory“  is related to 
the scientific approach to knowledge. Just as scientific inquiry strives to gener-
ate, apply, and falsify theories and hypotheses, modern organizations generate, 
apply, and falsify their formal roles, rules, and routines. Looking back to the 
dawn of organizational theory we can already sense the intrinsic link between 
the logic of science and the logic of organizations. The work of Max Weber - 
the „father of modern organization theory“  (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 30) - is based 
on the assumption that rationalization and formalization of concepts and rules 
constitute both the scientific paradigm as well as the idea of modern organiza-
tions (Weber, 1946, chapter VIII). According to Weber, optimal organizational 
decisions and actions are carried out „without regard of persons“  and „accord-
ing to calculable rules“  (Weber, 1946, p. 201). Once roles, rules, and goals are 
98
59  See our epistmological discussion in part II. Here, in the discussion of organizational theory, 
this  nature of propositions is  reflected especially in the dichotomy between rules and their in-
stances (Schauer, 1991; Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 78).  
defined properly, any non-functional bias ideally is removed from the equation. 
For example, when a new position is to be filled in an organization the decision 
maker is (again ideally) free from any non-rational factors: 
„all other circumstances being equal, it is more likely that purely functional points of 
consideration [rein fachliche Gesichtspunkte, K.S.] and qualities will determine his se-
lection“ (Weber, 1946, p. 201) 
Webers analysis results in a view that makes the organization („bureaucracy“) 
calculable, analogous to an objectively isolated natural phenomena described by 
a scientific theory. The description of the phenomena is to be free from personal 
and subjective bias, it should be as „objective“  as possible. And so should also 
the processes of organizing: “When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands, in 
a specific sense, under the principle of sine ira ac studio.”  (Weber, 1946, p. 
215). According to Weber, organizational knowledge (as theory), similar to sci-
entific theory, ought to be determined by rational reasons alone. Only the latter 
would enable the bureaucratized organization to guarantee „calculability of re-
sults“:  
„Calculability develops the more perfectly the bureaucracy is ‘dehumanized’, the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the spe-
cific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue.“  (Weber, 1946, p. 
215)
As already discussed in chapter 1, this ideal type of rationalized and standard-
ized human behavior would later become further applied, for instance, in Fre-
derick Taylors approach of „scientific management“  (F. W. Taylor, 1998 
[1911]). And although in organizational studies the rigid expectation of an or-
ganization being literally „calculable“  has been given up, the idea of a reliable 
and precise conceptual framework which rationally and efficiently structures 
collective behavior (as rules, directives, procedures, „processes“, and so forth) 
still shapes the understanding of organizations and management (Tsoukas, 
2005b). 
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3.1.3 Theory in action: rationalized organizational knowledge applied
We should be aware that the view of organizational knowledge as propositional 
„theory“  is not restricted to the early industrialized world of Max Weber or to 
tayloristic assembly lines. It is at work at the core of all today‘s organizations 
(Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980). Observing a telephone call center of a 
mobile phone operator in Athens, „theory“  as described above was found in 
many different forms (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980ff.): as a set of work-
ing instructions delivered in induction training; as information about how to 
answer telephone calls; as paper manuals and computerized information about 
the different products and services; and as formalized expert systems about how 
to solve possible issues customers bring with them when calling. All this 
knowledge can be understood as „theory“  of the organization: it frames, con-
strains, and orders the activity of the 250 employees. It aims at generalizing the 
distinctions on which the organization and its members draw in order to carry 
out their actions. We need not to fall back to a radical Weberian understanding 
of rational rules and roles to see that without these distinctions, i.e. without 
knowledge as „theory“  the organization would be „chaos“. Certainly, type and 
aims of an organization influence the extent and importance of knowledge as 
propositional „theory“. A „machine bureaucracy“  (like large standardized inter-
national services, e.g. McDonalds) demands more rationalization and rules as 
the „adhocracy“  of small consulting firms or think tanks60. However, it seems 
hard to imagine a permanent functioning organization without any rationaliza-
tion and generalization, i.e. without any „knowledge-as-theory“.   
The term „theory“ should not provoke the misleading conclusion that organiza-
tional knowledge as a generalized abstract set of concepts is totally detached 
from the real world of organizational practice. It would also be misleading to 
reduce the existence of rationalized concepts only to externalized representa-
tions, i.e. to define them as stored only in files, handbooks or digital databases. 
Already Max Weber reminds us that modern bureaucracy requires actors to in-
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60  see Mintzbergs “structures in fives”  model (Mintzberg, 1983); for further examples and re-
marks on the relation between type of organization and the extent of  rationalization, see (Hatch 
& Cunliffe, 2006, p. 117)
corporate the given set of rules and directives which are imposed on them. For 
Weber modern organizations are „among those social structures which are the 
hardest to destroy“  (Weber, 1946, p. 228). This is not the case because of writ-
ten rules, but because of the effective internalization of these rules. According 
to Weber, organizations are „practically unshatterable“  (ibid.) not because 
propositions appear as documented directives, but because organizational actors 
incorporate them. In Webers words, an actor (an „official“) has to enforce „dis-
cipline“, which 
„refers to the attitude-set of the official for precise obedience within his habitual activity 
(...)  This discipline increasingly becomes the basis of all order, however great the practi-
cal importance of administration on the basis of the filed documents may be. The naive 
idea of Bakuninism61  of destroying the basis of 'acquired rights' and 'domination' by de-
stroying public documents overlooks the settled orientation of man for keeping to the 
habitual rules and regulations that continue to exist independently of the documents.“ 
(Weber, 1946, p. 229, my emphasis)   
Note that „independently of the documents“  does not defer rules to a transcen-
dent level but to the heart of organizational activity: rules are „habitual rules“ 
embedded in everyday actions of organizational actors. This is what we - in re-
course to Giddens and Bourdieu - called the interdependence of epistemology 
and ontology of a field (see chapter 2.1.1). This interdependence is given for 
any propositional knowledge. Successful organizations integrate the epistemo-
logical dimension of abstract rules with their ontological dimension of habitual 
behavior. In other words, propositional knowledge is never only to be exclu-
sively representational. It has to be applied in its aimed context to be of organ-
izational relevance. And to be of relevance, organizational knowledge has to go 
beyond the level of external representation and embody itself as relation to 
meaningful action. Of course, such an application of „propositional knowledge“ 
to organizational practice is not a one-way road. The application may reveal 
weaknesses of propositional knowledge and trigger feedback which initiates the 
adaption and modification of roles, rules, or routines (just as scientific theories 
have to be adapted if incongruent to empirical verification)62. According to our 
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61 Bakunin was a theorist of anarchism in the 18th century (Masters, 1974).
62 Chapter 4 will show that  knowledge application and knowledge creation are just two analytical 
views on one and the same phenomena. 
framework in chapter 2, „knowledge-as-theory“  is related to all three levels of 
representation, meaning, and action, although its initial form lies (like „explicit 
knowledge“ in Nonaka & Takeuchis approach) at the representational level:  
Figure 3.1: Propositional knowledge („knowledge-as-theory“) and the triadic structure of 
knowledge 
Max Weber not only provided the first blueprint of a rationalized organizational 
theory; he also already spotted a gap between organizational knowledge and its 
application to particular contexts. Rules have to become „habitual rules“, i.e. 
they have to be related to action, and finally have to bridge the gap between 
knowledge and practice. As we will see in the next chapter, bridging that gap is 
not as easy as it may seem in the first place. 
3.2 The gap between organizational knowledge and practice 
This chapter will demonstrate that application of organizational knowledge is 
not as smoothly as it might appear to Weber and others. Knowledge application 
cannot be a mechanical deduction from formal rules to meaning, practice, and 
the „habitual activity“  of organizational actors. The holistic idea of a seamless 
integration between epistemological and ontological dimensions of the organ-
izational field collapses when we take a closer look at how propositional 
knowledge is actually contextualized to organizational practice.
The reason for generalizing concepts was to pattern and standardize or-
ganizational behavior. A call center agent, for instance, should first be able to 
unambiguously categorize the context of a call. Then he should carry out the 
respective predefined solution according to available rules and routines, i.e. ac-
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cording to given propositional knowledge of the organization. The assumption 
is that generic rules reduce the contextual complexity of that particular situation 
so it can be categorized and the actor can carry out his action in an appropriate 
way: 
“From a strictly organizational point of view, the contextual specificity surrounding 
every particular call (a specificity that callers tend to expand upon in their calls)  is re-
moved through the application of generic organizational rules.” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 
2001, p. 980)
This presupposes that the generic categories of those rules („X, Y, Z“  - e.g. „if a 
customer of type X has a problem of type Y it ought to be treated with a solu-
tion of type Z“) are applicable to the particular situations where they ought to 
be implemented. This is to say, the context has somehow to fit (i.e. it has to be 
reducible) to typified organizational rules. Hence, recurrent, rationalized, and 
standardized behavior requires not only generic propositions (knowledge) but 
also an appropriate and controllable context (practice) which is unequivocally 
subsumable by these propositions.
This is problematic as we already spotted at the example with the „IBM-
rule“: contextualization of knowledge to practice is a mediated process with 
different influencing factors. Tsoukas and Vladimirou explore the characteris-
tics of this contextualization. They conclude that propositions have to be (1) 
personalized, (2) justified and (3) applied (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 
980ff.). These three modes can be seen as integrative processes enabling organ-
izational knowledge (as „theory“) to be effective and to permeate the social 
practice of the organization. These three integration processes should allow 
knowledge to become an organizational „concept“  with a syntactic, semantic, 
and pragmatic dimension, and finally to be realized and implemented in the or-
ganizational practice. 
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 Figure 3.2: Application of organizational knowledge to organizational practice - based on (Tsou-
kas & Vladimirou, 2001)
Let us take a look at these three processes which connect organizational knowl-
edge with its practice.
3.2.1 Personalization
First, knowledge is contextualized towards „personalization“. The argument is 
that knowledge needs to be linked to the context of individual human action and 
judgement. According to Karl Polanyi, already abstract scientific knowledge is 
related to personal experience: 
“Even the most exact sciences must therefore rely on our personal confidence that we 
possess some degree of personal skill and personal judgement for establishing a valid 
correspondence with – or a real deviation from – the facts of experience.” (M. Polanyi, 
1975, p. 31)63
Just as the scientist uses human judgement to link theory to observations, the 
organizational actor has to link organizational rules to particular situations, in-
dividual judgements, and action-contexts: all knowledge is „personal knowl-
edge“  (M. Polanyi, 1958). Therefore, abstract rules are to be incorporated to 
their users, i.e. explicit knowledge (e.g. a set of formalized instructions) ought 
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Organizational Reality / 
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63 cited in (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 982)
to become „tacit“  (M. Polanyi, 1967). The epistemological concepts which 
guide the behavior of an actor may have been adopted through cognitive reflec-
tion, for instance, through reading a manual. But as this piece of knowledge en-
ters the daily routines of social practice it more and more fades from direct at-
tention and gets incorporated to the habitual practice and the skill-set of the ac-
tor. It then guides behavior „subsidiarily“. An experienced telephone operator 
does neither physically, and usually not even consciously, refer to written in-
structions every time a specific problem occurs. He has rather „instrumental-
ized“  the needed knowledge and applied it „tacitly“  to the particular situation in 
the organizational context: 
“Operators develop a set of diagnostic skills which over time become instrumentalized, 
that is to say, tacit. This enables them to think quickly, ‘on their feet’, and serve custom-
ers speedily. Over time, operators learn to dwell in these skills, feel them as extensions 
of their own body and thus gradually become subsidiarily aware of them, which enables 
operators to focus on the task at hand.” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 987). 
3.2.2 Justification
Second, organizational knowledge needs to be „justified“. It is always depend-
ent on and related to a „background“  (Patriotta, 2003) which co-determines its 
meaning. A proposition - e.g. „if an important customer calls, a call-center agent 
has to answer the calls by no later than 1 minute“  - is justified by (and relies on) 
aims, values, and presumptions of the organization. In this case an underlying 
aim could be to satisfy especially important help-desk customers, backed by the 
assumption that satisfaction means quick help. Rules and generalizations are 
contingent to purposes or aims which are neither explained by nor part of the 
rule. If actors enact rules without knowing anything about their justification, the 
application gets much more inflexible. In other words, actors should not only 
„know-what“ the rule is about but also „know-why“ it is in place. 
3.2.3 Application
Third, knowledge needs to be „applied“. This is the main contextualization is-
sue which more or less subsumes the two previous features of „personalization“ 
and „justification“. Talking about „application“, Tsoukas and Vladimirou mean 
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the application of knowledge to a context. Now the authors claim that knowl-
edge application is a complex issue because of both (a) the nature of context 
and (b) the nature of knowledge.    
(a) The nature of context
The organizational context seems to be too complex to be controlled by a set of 
rational propositions alone. It seems to be unfeasible to fully rationalize and 
pattern dynamic organizational surroundings (like markets, political, and social 
change) under generalized concepts. The same is true for internal complexity: 
even the best rules, routines, and role descriptions cannot guarantee to une-
quivocally guide human conduct inside an organization. Organizations are open 
systems facing „internal change“  and „external contingencies“  (Tsoukas, 2005a, 
p. 76) which both are resistant against being reduced to and categorized by 
propositional knowledge. If someone would seriously try to resolve the social 
world into a rational set of general rules, one would have to make the ontologi-
cal assumption that the social world „fits“  to those rules (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 
80f.). At least since Kant (see chapter 1.3) we know that such an assumption is 
problematic and that concepts which are constructed to explain (or order) the 
world are not to be confused with attributes of the world itself. So we may say 
that propositions are rationally patterned, but that does - strictly speaking - not 
entail that also the social world is patterned.
Another peculiarity of the context of knowledge application is the factor 
of time. As the future is „not a linear extension of the past“, propositional 
knowledge cannot sufficiently „provide actors with the knowledge of how to 
apply definitively a set of rules in the future, or how to create new rules“  (Tsou-
kas, 2005a, p. 76). In other words, a general rule for a specific scope (e.g. that 
of a telephone call center) cannot guarantee eternal validity. We simply do not 
know if it can be successfully applied to all possible future circumstances. In 
contrary, experience shows that in many cases rules had to be adapted and/or 
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replaced in order to deal with new situations64. Hence, also in a temporal sense 
the application context seems to be unpredictable, random, and patterned non-
linearly: organizations are „noisy“  (Tsoukas, 2005b). Their internal and external 
complexity retain a gap between organizational knowledge (propositions) and 
organizational practice (context). 
(b) The nature of (propositional) knowledge
We have seen that the knowledge application context is unstable. But what is 
with the propositional knowledge itself? We said that - from a rationalistic 
standpoint - organizational knowledge has to provide stable and recurrent or-
ganizational action. But to do so the categories and representations on which 
action is based would require stability of their meaning. Only then a rule would 
be interpreted in the same way by different actors. But that is mostly not, if 
ever, the case. Many rules are, as we intuitively know from our experience, 
open to different interpretations. Propositional knowledge is equivocally inter-
pretable because of its plurality and open-endedness. Tsoukas claims that    
„(t)he semantics of knowledge representation in an organized context is intrinsically 
unstable (although this does not mean permanently unstable) and, therefore, so are the 
rules underlying its functioning“ (Tsoukas, 2005b, p. 77)
But why is a rule ultimately „imperfect“  and why is its instability ultimately 
unavoidable? Tsoukas draws from Wittgenstein who came up with the simple 
proposal that a rule in itself does not determine how the rule has to be applied 
(Wittgenstein, 1953/2006). The application of rules always leaves „loopholes 
open“  because the meaning of a rule is not unequivocally encapsulated in its 
propositional content (Wittgenstein, 1969). Wittgenstein compares a rule to a 
„sign-post“: 
„A rule stands there like a sign-post. -- Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the 
way I have to go? Does it show which direction I am to take when I have passed it; 
whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way 
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64  This also affects the creation of new knowledge. To explain the creation of knowledge as a 
rational determination from past states would undermine its novelty. The creation of new organ-
izational knowledge can generally  not be understood in terms of the past alone but only from the 
„emerging future“ (Scharmer, 2009).
I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?“ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953/2006, §85)
The content of the rule is not enough to determine its application because appli-
cation very much depends on the actors assessment of the concrete situation as 
well as on his/her practical experience. To determine whether or not and how a 
rule has to be applied, actors have to draw from „historically evolved collective 
understandings and experiences“  (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 983). This is 
because „rule-following“  and „norm-guided behavior“  is based on generalized 
concepts which are inherently contingent and open-ended towards a plurality of 
possible and unpredictable instances:
„(Norms) cannot themselves fix and determine what actions are in true conformity with 
them. (...)  There is no logical compulsion to follow them in a particular way. Every in-
stance of a norm may be analogous to every other, but analogy is not identity: analogy 
exists between things that are similar yet different. And this means that, although it is 
always possible to assimilate the next instance to a norm by analogy with existing exam-
ples of the norm, it is equally always possible to resist such assimilation, to hold the 
analogy insufficiently strong, to stress the differences between the instance and existing 
examples. If norms apply by analogy then it is up to us to decide where they apply, 
where the analogy is sufficiently strong and where not.“ (Barnes, 1995, p. 55)65
The key here is the conclusion that rules do not unequivocally determine how 
they are used. Or in our knowledge-based view: knowledge does not unequivo-
cally determine its application. Hence, the application of knowledge is underde-
termined by its content. Between knowledge and its application there is an open 
range, a gap, which has to be filled by interpreting actors. Organizing is no 
mechanistic process where propositions are enacted by cog-like actors. Rules, 
understood as propositional knowledge, have to be connected to the heteroge-
nous field of organizational practice by sensemaking actors. This gap between 
knowledge and practice, a gap between „generic categories“ 66 and „heteroge-
nous particulars“  (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979f.), poses a challenge for 
any organization. It is a gap which has to be bridged repeatedly in every single 
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65 cited in (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980f.)
66 Tsoukas uses the notions „concepts“  and „categories“  interchangeably. In the case of rules we 
will understand rules as (organizational) „concepts“,  and the generic elements of rules „catego-
ries“. Of course, both are tightly related. Open-endedness and potential plurality is an attribute of 
both categories and concepts.  
situation. Only if actors are able to give meaning to propositional knowledge 
and to integrate it to their practice, application is possible. It is crucial to see 
that the gap between knowledge and practice cannot be permanently closed or 
avoided. No matter how elaborated a proposition is being formulated, there al-
ways remains a distance between itself and its possible application instances. Of 
course, this does not mean that application of organizational knowledge is not 
possible. It rather means that application is not unequivocally determinable. 
Figure 3.3: Gap between theory and practice
Due to this gap, Tsoukas and Vladimirou include „collective understanding“ 
and „particular contexts“  into their description of the relation between organiza-
tional knowledge and action: 
„Human action in organizations (…) necessarily draws on organizational knowledge, 
namely on sets of generalizations underlain by collective understandings, activated in 
particular contexts.“ (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 984)
Note again that this does not mean that there is no connection between the two 
levels (if this would be the case, no organizing would be possible at all). It just 
means that there is no 1:1 translation from organizational knowledge to its ap-
plication in practice. It means that propositional knowledge in regard to its 
meaning and relation to action, as well in its concrete integration to practice, is 
open-ended and contingent. How propositional knowledge actually is applied 
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can only be observed afterwards. Knowledge-application cannot be predicted: it 
is a post-factum occurrence.   
3.3 Socialized Concepts: Organizational knowledge as 
„narrative“
3.3.1 Knowledge as contextualized narrative
From chapter 1 we know that not only „rationalized“  but also „socialized“  con-
cepts shape the organization. How could a knowledge-based reformulation of 
„socialized concepts“  look like? Here again Tsoukas offers useful suggestions. 
Based on theoretical arguments and empirical observations he suggests to sup-
plement „propositional“  by „narrative“  knowledge (Tsoukas, 2005a)67. Narra-
tives provide a form which allows to condense, retain, and distribute contextu-
alized, practical knowledge throughout the organization, e.g. as stories, anec-
dotes, or best-practices. From a socialized perspective an organization is not 
only an „institution“  but also a „practice“  (chapter 1.2.2). Hereby, a practice is 
understood as a social field with shared meanings, a common history, and col-
lective aims (MacIntyre, 1981). Narrative knowledge then is the epistemologi-
cal dimension of that shared practice. Empirical research showed that actors not 
only apply propositional knowledge like instructions from repair manuals but 
also shared stories of former successful (or unsuccessful) events. Julian Orr ob-
served repair technicians in their problem-solving activities (Orr, 1996)68. Orr 
discovered that these actors draw from stories and best-practices circulating as 
shared experience in the community of repair technicians69. Unlike proposi-
tional knowledge, narrative knowledge is not arranged as a general, rule-like 
„if-then“  logic. And unlike propositional knowledge it is not built out of gener-
alized categories which decontextualize knowledge in order to make it reusable. 
Narrative knowledge is (in its content) not instructive and not generalized at all. 
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67  Other organizational studies authors do also put emphasis on the narrative dimension of or-
ganizational knowledge (Boland & Tenkasi,  1993; Czarniawska, 1997;  Geiger, 2006; Orr, 1996; 
Schreyögg & Geiger, 2005) 
68 Which was already mentioned in chapter 1.2.2
69 This community may be restricted only to the organization, but also may exceed its bounda-
ries.  „Communities-Of-Practice“ are mostly  centered around topics and not constrained to single 
organizations (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Wasko, 2005; Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002).  
Instead, it is linked to singular former events and circumstances which are pre-
served in a „collective memory“  of a practice and encoded into a narrative 
form:
„(S)tories of the good old days, about achievements and failures, about awkward people 
and memorable episodes; stories about everything that matters to those participating in 
the practice“ (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 82)
Narratives are centered around relevant events of the organizational practice, 
manifested in stories, anecdotes, best-, or worst-practices. Although not con-
structed as rules, narratives are very powerful in guiding organizational action. 
As Orr‘s field studies showed, actors draw on narrative knowledge as template 
for their actual situation. They solve problems not by following exact rules („if-
then“  logic) but by re-contextualizing narratives about former occurrences to 
their actual situations („as-if“ logic)70.
3.3.2 Narratives in action: socialized organizational knowledge applied
This type of knowledge refers to contextualized singular events, which mostly 
lie in the past. However, actors are able to apply such knowledge to a variety of 
other situations. They do so by comparing and adapting the singular circum-
stances of narratives to new situations. This adaption creates meaning and pos-
sibly guides organizational action. But narratives are also represented, namely 
in a vocal form: stories are told and are passed over verbally. Moreover, they 
can also be encoded into non-verbal, external media. There are, for instance, 
different cases in which narrative knowledge is put into a digital form allowing 
efficient access for a wider range of organizational actors71. This can easily be 
observed at organizations which carry out their activities within project life cy-
cles, e.g. consulting firms. Here, experiences and events of a particular project 
may help in other projects. Globally accessible databases help consultants to 
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70 As already mentioned, the comparison between „if-then“  and „as-if“  is motivated by (Tsoukas & 
Hatch,  2005) refering to Jerome S. Bruner‘s two „modes of thought“  (Bruner, 1986, 1996). The 
comparison is also made by Gerardo Patriotta, but in a different context (Patriotta, 2003, p. 189).
71  see e.g. the well-known „Rapid-Response network“ use-case from McKinsey Company 
(Probst, et al., 2002, p.  74); for implications on knowledge management systems in general, see 
(Schreyögg & Geiger, 2005, chapter 6)
search and find useful best-practices which they may draw from in their current 
and future projects (Probst, et al., 2002, p. 74). 
Hence, also narrative knowledge is active on all three dimensions of or-
ganizational knowledge. Anchored in the contextualized domain of action, it 
carries meaning which can be recontextualized in new situations as well as it is 
represented in spoken or written form:
Figure 3.4: Narrative knowledge and the triadic structure of knowledge
Knowledge-as-narrative, just like „knowledge-as-theory“, may appear on all 
three distinction-making levels. Take a consultant who faces a new circum-
stance which requires action, for instance, to set up a team for a new project. 
She searches and finds a best-practice in the organization‘s internal database. 
She is able to make sense of that best-practice in light of her new situation. The 
narrative encoded as best-practice gives valuable input for her specific team 
building activity. What happens here is distinction-making based on narrative 
knowledge as well as subsequent application to organizational practice. But un-
like with propositions, knowledge is not represented as rule but - in this case - 
as a best-practice report, i.e. as a written narrative. And concerning the interpre-
tation of its action-relevant meaning and its application to practice the actor 
does not assimilate the particular situation to generalized knowledge („if-then“ 
logic). Instead, she adapts and builds an analogy between her particular situa-
tion and the singular event of the narrative („as-if“  logic). And if afterwards her 
own case shows to be suitable for being a best-practice itself, then it may be 
passed on informally within the organization (in the representational form of 
spoken language); or it may even be converted to a more formalized state (in 
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the representational form of written language which is electronically accessi-
ble). The stock of organizational knowledge would then have been increased 
and other actors could draw on it for their own distinction-making and problem-
solving activities. 
This also explains why the flow of knowledge within the three dimen-
sions goes in both directions (symbolized as an arrow-circle in figure 3.4). Nar-
ratives emerge out of action (particular events) and get represented in stories 
which are distributed throughout the organization: knowledge flows from action 
up to representation, i.e. knowledge is created. From that form of representa-
tion narratives then may enable the construction of meaning and action in new 
situations: knowledge again flows from representation down to action, i.e. 
knowledge is applied. Hence, the circular movement within our three-layer 
model covers both application and creation of organizational knowledge.    
Although narratives show some basic differences to propositions, they also 
have to be applied by actors to the organizational practice. And also here a gap 
becomes visible between knowledge and the heterogenous field of practice. The 
specific characteristics of narrative knowledge is not that it does something to-
tally different than propositional knowledge. It is more the way how it does the 
same thing, i.e. how it enables actors to make distinctions and to carry out ac-
tion. Also narratives „can be seen as a form of problem-solving in our everyday 
coping with the world.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 69). But instead of relating actual 
circumstances to abstract propositions, actors link their circumstances (e.g. the 
team-building assignment) to particular events transported by narratives (e.g. a 
best-practice of a similar team-building process). And although application is 
possible without explicitly generalized concepts like in rules, narratives do offer 
a „flexible generality that makes them both adaptable and particular“  (Brown & 
Duguid, 1991, p. 44, my emphasis)72. From that viewpoint also narrative 
knowledge carries generalization because it is open to be adapted and applied to 
a range of particular instances. Also a narrative claims to transport knowledge 
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72 cited by (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 83)
that can be generalized and helpful in future situations. Otherwise it would „not 
be worth telling“ (Schreyögg & Geiger, 2005, p. 307).
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we followed Haridimous Tsoukas in formulating a knowledge-
based view on organizations. We reformulated „rationalized“  and „socialized“ 
organizational concepts from chapter 1 as „propositional“  and „narrative“  or-
ganizational knowledge respectively. 
Encoded into rules, routines, roles, or other explicit content, propositional 
knowledge operates with generalized categories which have to be applied to the 
concrete organizational practice. Like with scientific theories also organiza-
tional knowledge (as propositions) subsumes heterogenous particulars under 
generalized concepts. These concepts are located in a fundamental tension 
(„gap“) to its particular context of application. This was indicated by the Witt-
gensteinian insight that in general the content of a rule does not determine its 
use. The use is up to the interpretation and contextualization of organizational 
actors. It is up to „us“  to decide how to enact a rule, to bridge the gap between 
knowledge and practice. This openness of interpretation is given because 
propositional knowledge is based on generalized concepts. As such its content 
consists of categories (e.g. „a problem of type X“, or „action of type Y“) and 
relations (e.g. „a problem of type X ought to be solved with action of type Y“). 
Both categories and relations are generalized claims towards, potential infini-
tive, application cases. Moreover, generalized categories are unstable because 
in organizational practice new problematic particular situations may occur 
which are not subsumable under, for instance, „problem of type X“. General-
ized relations, on the other hand, are unstable because to solve problem X with 
action Y may have worked until now but one can never be sure if this is valid 
for all possible future cases, too. This is similar to the generalized knowledge 
claim that „all swans are white“ 73. Such knowledge is not derived from the fact 
that all current and future swans have been inspected (which is impossible). It is 
a general claim directed towards an open-ended empirical context; instead of 
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73 This famous example has been introduced by Karl Popper (Popper, 1959).
being „true“, it can only be „not yet falsified“. So even if its categories 
(„swans“  and „white“) would be unequivocal and stable, their relation (that „all 
swans are white“) is contingent to open-ended empirical observations. To con-
clude, all generalizations are potential falsifiable claims and latent ambiguous 
categories towards an open world. Hence, also propositional organizational 
knowledge is not unequivocally related to its application context. Organiza-
tional knowledge does not determine how it is interpreted and practically ap-
plied because of the intrinsically open-ended and ambiguous nature of knowl-
edge in general74. This is why we may state that the application of organiza-
tional knowledge is underdetermined by its representational content. A general 
epistemological gap separates knowledge and its application. 
We encounter that gap also within other forms of organizational knowl-
edge like that of narratives. As we have seen, to supplement „propositional“ 
with „narrative“  knowledge does not close the gap but embraces it. A story of a 
past event is evidently not describing my new situation, although I may use it as 
template for my actions in that new situation. Narratives clearly differ from 
formal rules. Nonetheless, they ultimately do not strip of generalization, they 
much more rely on „flexible generality“  (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 83); they also do 
not abandon ambiguousness or open-endedness as they draw their power from 
their „contingent connections to individual actions“  (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 83). 
Narrative knowledge is still knowledge, just as its supplementing counterpart: 
„(p)ropositional knowledge and narrative knowledge are the two ends of the 
spectrum of organizational knowledge“  (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 88). And as such, 
also narrative knowledge is located in a tension to the context in which it is ap-
plied. At some points in Tsoukas work, narratives may appear as the missing 
link between knowledge and practice75. But that link is „inconclusive“, „contin-
gent“  and „ambiguous“  (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 83), just like with propositional 
knowledge. The epistemic gap is prevalent, no matter in which form organiza-
tional knowledge appears. Propositional and narrative knowledge both share the 
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74 This claim will be backed by our general epistemological reflections in part II.
75  „their (narratives, K.S.) contingent connections to individual actions help bridge the gap  be-
tween generic rules and local circumstances in a flexible and inconclusive manner.“  (Tsoukas, 
2005a, p. 83).
fate to underdetermine their application, i.e. the way in which knowledge is ap-
plied to the heterogenous particulars of organizational practice, is contingent.  
Figure. 3.5: Tsoukas knowledge-classification and the epistemic gap in organizations 
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Chapter 4: The creation of organizational 
knowledge
4.1 The complete view: no application without creation
So far, we have identified organizational knowledge as being either proposi-
tional (chapter 3.1) or narrative (chapter 3.3) and explored the application of 
these concepts to the concrete and heterogeneous organizational practice. 
Hereby, we presupposed that rules, routines, handbooks, IT systems, stories, 
best practices, and so forth, are already in place and available within the organi-
zation. But there is of course no application without creation of what is being 
applied. Thus, we have so far discussed only one way of the gap between 
knowledge and practice. Of course, creation to a certain extent is involved in 
application, because to apply knowledge in a situation always includes to create 
new distinctions, and to eventually adapt applied knowledge. But to complete 
our reflections on the characteristics of organizational knowledge, we will now 
turn our focus explicitly to the other direction of the knowledge flow, i.e. from 
application to creation of organizational knowledge.
Figure 4.1: Application and creation of organizational knowledge 
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4.2 The creation of „theories of action“
4.2.1 Theories of action as organizational knowledge
Argyris‘  and Schön‘s contributions to the topic of „organizational learning“ 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978) provide a valuable source for our discussion because 
organizational learning ultimately is about permanent organizational knowledge 
creation. According to Argyris & Schön, organizations rely on a stock of 
knowledge which guide its behavior and activities. These „theories of action“ 
underly all individual and collective human behavior in organized settings. 
Similar to Tsoukas understanding of organizational knowledge as propositional 
„theory“, these „theories of action“  provide a structuring and rationalizing func-
tion. They strive for bringing order to the potential open-endedness and com-
plexity of meaning and action. The organizational theorist Gerardo Patriotta ex-
plains:
„(theories of action are) conceived as cognitive structures underlying all deliberate hu-
man behavior. A theory of action is a set of norms, strategies and assumptions informing 
human conduct. It contains hypotheses about the world aimed at realizing a correspon-
dence among situations, intentions and behavioral outcomes. Typically, a theory of ac-
tion consists of a set of interconnected propositions having an ‘if ... then’ form. Theories 
of action are inferential structures characterized by an instrumental quality: in situation 
S, if you want to achieve consequence C, under assumptions a,..., n, do A...“  (Patriotta, 
2003, p. 19)76
 These inferential structures govern how the organization and its members 
ought to react to specific situations in their day-to-day activities (embodied e.g. 
in routines or instructions) as well as in more general decision making activities 
(embodied e.g. in strategies or values). Now, this is nothing different from what 
Tsoukas classifies as „propositional knowledge“  and what we have already dis-
cussed in chapter 377. What interests us here is how organizational knowledge 
as theories of action come into existence and how they are reconstructed over 
time. Argyris & Schön propose that knowledge is repeatedly created when ex-
isting theories of action are not sufficient, i.e. when established routines and 
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76 see also (Argyris & Schön, 1978, p. 11)
77 In fact, Tsoukas refers to Argyris & Schön as well as to sociology of knowledge (especially to 
Berger & Luckmann) as sources for his conceptualization of propositional knowledge (Chia & 
Tsoukas, 2002, p. 580; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979).
strategies encounter problems which cannot be solved with the currently avail-
able stock of knowledge. In such cases organizations either fail to react to the 
new situation properly, or they „learn“. If the latter occurs an organization cre-
ates new knowledge and adapts its theories of action to the new situation. Such 
learning process is depicted as a „single loop“ (Argyris, 1976, 1977) between 
action and its results, between the underlying theory of action and reality, be-
tween knowledge and practice (figure 4.2).
Figure. 4.2: Single loop learning
Similar to scientific knowledge creation, it is the experience of new phenomena 
and problems which let knowledge creation emerge. Organizations learn as they 
adapt their „theories of action“  to their changing (internal and external) envi-
ronment. Also similar to their use in science, theories are vehicles for their users 
to solve predefined problems and/or allow predictability. As indicated previ-
ously, there is no fundamental difference between theories created in science 
and theories created in organizations. Both offer distinctions to grasp the com-
plexity of the given world. It may seem that science needs theories only to ex-
plain the world, whereby organizations need them only to act in it. But ulti-
mately all knowledge is bound to some sort of use and practice. This will be 
highlighted in part II of our inquiry where we will provide a social epistemo-
logical framework which binds knowledge to aims, standards, and uses in 
communities, no matter if scientific or non-scientific (chapter 8). For now it is 
important to see that organizational knowledge is central to enable a social 
group constituting itself as an organization. This is because concepts are based 
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on knowledge which offers distinctions for the organization and its actors in 
order to understand the world and to carry out action.
Of course also Argyris & Schön recognize different types of knowledge. Expli-
cated and official theories of an organization („theory espoused“) are distin-
guished from concrete, often non-explicated, knowledge manifested in every 
days practice („theory in use“). „Espoused“  theories are reflected in official 
documents, workflow descriptions, or instructions. „Theories in use“, on the 
other hand, are routines and strategies which have sedimented over time into 
tacit behavior, background assumptions, and embodied skills. Despite their dif-
ferences, both types of theories (just like both types of propositional and narra-
tive knowledge from chapter 3) are to be understood as organizational knowl-
edge which has to be related to organizational practice (see chapter 3.3.2). 
4.2.2 Double loop learning
Argyris & Schön introduce another useful analogy to science. The authors note 
that action is not determined by isolated rules or instructions, but that theories 
of action are always bound to premises, background assumptions, and „govern-
ing variables“. Just as scientific theories are embedded in „paradigms“, also 
theories of action are framed by a second order discourse which constrains their 
range, application, and possibilities. And just as in science, creation of new 
knowledge may be needed on that second order to cope with more fundamental 
problems which cannot be solved within the existing paradigm. Learning, in 
this case, results in the adaptation and reconstruction of governing values, 
premises, and assumptions. Learning and knowledge creation then occurs 
within an additional second loop (figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Single- and Double-Loop learning78 
In single loop learning, knowledge creation occurs in incremental steps by the 
adaption of existing action strategies piece by piece. In double loop learning, on 
the other hand, the underlying assumptions and the whole frame of the single 
loop is shifted. 
Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn made a similar distinction as he de-
scribed knowledge creation within a paradigm as „puzzle solving“, and the 
creation of a new paradigm as „revolution“  (Kuhn, 1970). „Puzzle solving“  oc-
curs, if a phenomenon in the world cannot be explained by existing (scientific) 
theories sufficiently. By adapting variables in these existing theories phenomena 
become explainable. But if this adaption fails and observed mismatches remain, 
puzzle solving is not adequate anymore. Increasing in amount and range, dis-
ruptive observations may reach an extent where a „paradigm shift“  is necessary. 
Such a shift reorders the basic assumptions of previous theories and problem 
solving strategies and introduces a new „framework of reference“  (Peschl, 
2006, p. 120). Through the creation of such a new framework of reference, con-
cepts of the field obtain fundamental new meanings and uses. Scientific para-
digm shifts are observed as „scientific revolutions“  like the change from New-
ton‘s physics to theory of relativity, the introduction of quantum mechanics, or 
the discovery of the DNA double helix. Revolutionary shifts also occur to tech-
nological paradigms. For instance, when Henry Ford did not improve transpor-
tation by adding more horses or optimizing carriages, but by developing a to-
tally new mechanical principle of transportation. An organization, of course, 
Organizational 
Knowledge
(„Theory of 
action“)
Organizational 
Practice
application / action
„single loop learning“
Context, Premises, 
Assumptions, 
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78 based on (Argyris, 1977; Argyris & Schön, 1978)
also can (and sometimes has to) change its core values to cope with change and 
new challenges (we will give examples for this in chapter 4.4).  
Single- and double loop learning do not only offer useful views to distinguish 
different levels of knowledge creation. They also indicate that construction of 
knowledge is contingent to underlying assumptions and premises. That there is 
no universal valid organizational knowledge, but only contextualized theories of 
action. This insight is important for us because we do not understand knowl-
edge construction as a one-way project from a given problem to an optimal so-
lution. The idea of double-loop learning urges us to understand change and 
learning as open for many directions. To understand knowledge creation as a 
pluralistic endeavor which has to be fueled by a range of multiple views and 
solutions. This is because the second loop allows to break out of existing rou-
tines and paradigms and to explore new viewpoints outside existing frames of 
reference. Hence, Argyris & Schöns model is not a „computer-model“  (Patri-
otta, 2003, p. 23). On the contrary, their contextualization of organizational 
learning to a contingent frame of reference helps us to see that knowledge con-
struction is not a rationally determined feedback-algorithm but an open project 
that always may result in unpredicted outcomes. Knowledge creation is no 
mechanistic process but a controversial social interaction with an open end. 
But if knowledge creation is open-ended and characterized by fundamen-
tal contingency, how does it reach a stable state so it can be applied by actors? 
How is the fragility of open-endedness compatible to the needed stability of 
recurring use within organizations? How does the contingent process of knowl-
edge creation terminate in relatively stable manifestations which are „ready“  to 
be applied to organizational practice?
4.3 Hallmarks of knowledge creation: contingency, controver-
sies and „black-boxing“
Again, if we claim that knowledge construction is a contingent and open-ended 
process we owe an explanation of how that contingency results in a passably 
stable set of applicable concepts. To do so, we will refer to „Actor-Network-
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Theory“  (ANT) which offers both theoretical and methodological concepts to 
grasp the transformation („translation“) from knowledge as an open process to 
knowledge as a stabilized and ready-to-use resource. Gerardo Patriotta‘s work 
on connecting ANT with organizations will guide our inquiry and will help us 
to understand organizational knowledge both as an open process and as a stable 
outcome; as „becoming“ and „being“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 202)79.
4.3.1 ANT, science & technology
ANT is an approach developed by philosophers and social scientists like Bruno 
Latour, Michael Callon, John Law, and others (Belliger & Krieger, 2006). It is 
tightly related and overlaps with „Science-Technology-Studies“  (STS) and „La-
boratory Studies“; attempts which have in common that they explore the social 
processes of (scientific) knowledge- and technology-construction80. ANT tries 
to deconstruct knowledge as an entity. It tries to focus on knowledge as a 
„heterogeneous network“  based on a diversity of elements being configured and 
put together in certain ways. John Law analyzes the origin of scientific knowl-
edge as follows: 
„Knowledge (...) is embodied in a variety of material forms. But where does it come 
from? The actor-network answer is that it is the end product of a lot of hard work in 
which heterogeneous bits and pieces--test tubes, reagents, organisms, skilled hands, 
scanning electron microscopes, radiation monitors, other scientists, articles, computer 
terminals, and all the rest--that would like to make off on their own are juxtaposed into a 
patterned network which overcomes their resistance. In short, it is a material matter but 
also a matter of organizing and ordering those materials.“ (Law, 1992, p. 381) 
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79  Other noteworthy connections between ANT and organizational studies are provided by 
authors like John Law or Czarniaswska & Hernes (Czarniawska & Hernes, 2005; Law,  1994). 
For a recent attempt see (Vötsch, 2010, chapter 2.2.3). We are mainly  going to be inspired by 
Gerardos Patriottas approach documented in his book „Organizational knowledge in the making: 
How firms create, use and institutionalize knowledge“ (Patriotta, 2003).  
80   These attempts can be subsumed as „techno-science-approach“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 42). 
They share the same underpinnings, i.e. a basic constructivist view on scientifical and techno-
logical „facts“, and a post-structuralistic way of identifying these „facts“  as socially constructed. 
Among others, ANT is about the „mechanics of power“  (Law, 1992, p. 380) which are involved in 
the construction of things and facts. This challenges traditional views on knowledge creation 
because social forces have traditionally only been counted as „biasing“ scientific knowledge-
construction (Longino, 2002).  Furthermore, the techno-science-approach is characterized by 
emphasizing empirical observation and being oriented on sociological methodology rather than 
exclusively on theoretical reflection (Law, 1992, p. 387; Patriotta, 2003, p. 45).      
This view can be expanded to the social in general. From the viewpoint of ANT 
a social field is never a pre-given substance but an „effect“  which is generated 
out of heterogenous elements: 
„This lies at the heart of actor-network theory, and is a way of suggesting that society, 
organizations, agents, and machines are all effects generated in patterned networks of 
diverse (not simply human) materials.“ (Law, 1992, p. 380)
Just as knowledge, the social is always a result of a generative process. And just 
as knowledge, „the social is nothing other than patterned networks of heteroge-
neous materials.“  (Law, 1992, p. 381). One other hallmark of ANT is that the 
elements of social networks are not only constituted by humans, but 
„also of machines, animals, texts, money, architectures-- any material that you care to 
mention. So the argument is that the stuff of the social isn't simply human. It is all these 
other materials too. (...) If human beings form a social network, it is not because they 
interact with other human beings. It is because they interact with human beings and end-
less other materials too. (...) Machines, architectures, clothes, texts--all contribute to the 
patterning of the social. And--this is my point--if these materials were to disappear then 
so too would what we sometimes call the social order. Actor-network theory says, then, 
that order is an effect generated by heterogeneous means.“ (Law, 1992, p. 381f.)  
ANT-oriented social scientists, in detailed field-work, explore how scientific 
facts are not simply „discovered“  but „created“. Investigating the concrete prac-
tice of scientists, e.g. in the laboratory (Knorr-Cetina, 1981), knowledge is seen 
not as a mere cognitive process inside the brain of an isolated scientist. Knowl-
edge creation rather is embedded in a complex social network, and related to a 
variety of human and non-human actors like scientists, instruments, experimen-
tal settings, specific rules of the particular scientific community, and so forth. In 
fact, „laboratory“  in general is a good metaphor since it indicates that knowl-
edge is not independent from its creation and application context, but interacts 
with heterogenous materials and actors. John Law says: 
„Actor-network authors started out in the sociology of science and technology. With oth-
ers in the sociology of science, they argued that knowledge is a social product rather 
than something generated through the operation of a privileged scientific method. And, 
in particular, they argued that ,knowledge‘  (...)  may be seen as a product or an effect of a 
network of heterogeneous materials.“ (Law, 1992, p. 381)
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Knowledge in a distinct field is not „true“  if it corresponds to reality, but when 
it is manifested in stable settings, accepted in the scientific community, reused 
in other settings, published in recognized journals, and taught on relevant 
schools. In short: when it becomes an „obligatory passage point“  (Callon, 1986) 
for anyone who enters the respective field. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the emergence of new technologies. 
New technologies or inventions are never predetermined by linear patterns. A 
new technological artifact has to go through a number of closure- and 
stabilization-processes in order to exist. Studies on the development of the bi-
cycle (Pinch & Bijker, 1984) or the electric automobile (Callon, 1980) showed 
that for a new technology to emerge scientific outcomes have to be interpreted 
and related to application cases in specific ways, social actors have to be con-
vinced, political, cultural and economical variables have to be set, and so forth. 
A vast number of heterogenous social actors have to be configured and cali-
brated („translated“) to make a technology an accepted one. For example, in the 
case of the electrical vehicle these relevant actors were catalysts, accumulators, 
electrons, users, scientific researchers, automobile manufacturers, suppliers, the 
public, and ministerial departments. All these actors81  were connected and 
„translated“  in specific ways which formed a temporarily coherent network sta-
bilizing the shared meaning related to the electric car technology in France 
(Callon, 1980). Similar to the creation of scientific knowledge, ANT conceptu-
alizes technological development „as a non-determined, multidirectional flux 
that involves constant negotiation and renegotiation among and between groups 
shaping the technology.“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 46). 
4.3.2 Being & Becoming: The dialectical nature of knowledge creation
Knowledge creation is a process qualified by underdetermination and equivo-
cality, by controversies and negotiations. This originated already from our anti-
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81 Some authors use the notion of  „actants“  instead of „actors“ because the former is more open 
to the possible non-human component involved (Latour,  1997). Note that an „actor“  is also not 
restricted to individual persons, but may represent human collectives as well.  Different actors 
(like individual persons) may form an actor-network (e.g. an organization) which then is „punctu-
alized“  (Law, 1992, p. 384f.) and so becomes part of a larger network (e.g. an organization within 
the wider network of a global economy).
essentialist philosophical stance, i.e. that reality is not constituted by fixed enti-
ties („things“) but rather is an effect of construction and connection of het-
erogenous circumstances (see chapter 1.3). This also marks the first aspect of 
the dialectical relation of knowledge-creation: due to their open-ended, plural, 
and „proximal“  (Cooper & Law, 1995a) nature, things (as well as knowledge 
about things) have no „naturally“  predetermined essence. Hence, knowledge is 
not simply „there“ but in its very nature an activity, a process, a becoming: 
„Knowledge agents are caught up in a network of relations, in a flow of intermediaries, 
which circulate, connect, link and reconstitute identities. (...) As a consequence, knowl-
edge is continuously subject to drifts and controversies. It is never given in the order of 
things.“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 44, my emphasis)  
But despite its contingent and process-like nature, knowledge creation leads to 
results: scientific theories are accepted and established, technologies are real-
ized and used, organizational routines are put into place and applied. This 
points to the second aspect of the dialectical relation of knowledge-creation 
which is about durability and stability. It is about the obvious fact that knowl-
edge is not only a process but also a product. Knowledge has an ontological 
dimension as well. In terms of our developed triangular understanding of organ-
izational knowledge (chapter 2.2) we can state that knowledge-creation proc-
esses (a) are manifested in some kind of media, (b) allow construction of stable 
meaning, and (c) can be connected to recurring organizational action. All three 
dimensions require knowledge to be ontologically relevant, i.e. to be (to a cer-
tain extent) stable and durable. Hence, knowledge is not only „knowing“  but 
also „content“  (Longino, 2002, p. 77ff.), not only „proximal“  but also „distal“ 
(Cooper & Law, 1995b). It is not only in flux and in permanent becoming, but 
also a being. ANT recognizes this second ontological aspect of knowledge-
creation and connects it to the first aspect of „becoming“: 
„Given the provisional, contested and controversial character of knowledge making, a 
main challenge for the researcher is to understand how durability is achieved. How it is 
that things are performed (and perform themselves) into relations that are relatively sta-
ble and stay in place. (...) The solution provided by ANT is particularly original and in-
sightful. Durability is the result of a temporary hooking up with circulating entities, the 
outcome of a technical black boxing of controversies. (...) In this respect, what we regard 
as ‘knowledge’, as a coherent unity, is an assemblage of heterogeneous materials and 
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multiple relations that have reached a stable yet provisional configuration.“  (Patriotta, 
2003, p. 44f.)
Knowledge creation is a translation from becoming to being82. It emerges out of 
an open space of possibilities (as a „happening“ within „circumstances“) and 
turns to a temporarily stabilized distinctive concept which can be interpreted, 
used, applied, and instrumentalized:
Figure 4.4: Knowledge translation - from becoming to being
Notice again the connection with our philosophical presumptions from chapter 
1. What is described by ANT is the materialized and socialized mode of world 
construction. Kant‘s idea of „synthesizing“ the „manifoldness“  of the given as 
the origin of knowledge was not only (implicitly) mirrored by Karl Weick‘s no-
tions of transforming „circumstances“  to „situations“, but is also at the bottom 
of the „translation“ process from becoming to being, as described by ANT83. 
The processual stages from becoming to being have also been pointed out by 
Klaus Krippendorff (Krippendorf, 1984, 1989, 2011; Krippendorf & Butter, 
2007). According to Krippendorff, a design-process84 should not primarily be 
driven by pre-determined „function“  but by contextualized „meaning“  (Krip-
Being
Knowledge as...
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product
stabilized result (black box)
„distal“
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Becoming
Knowledge as...
knowing
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open-ended construction
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82 In organizational theory this pair is defined by Patriotta (Patriotta, 2003, p. 202ff.), inspired by 
discussions in Actor-Network-Theory and Science-Technology-Studies (Knorr-Cetina,  1981; Law, 
1992, p. 381ff.). „Becoming“ and „being“  have already been introduced to the thinking on organi-
zations as „proximal“ and „distal“ by Cooper & Law (Cooper & Law, 1995a).
83 As also identified within our philosophical reflections in part I,  the origin of the becoming-being 
transition is the existential „condition humana“  which forces humans to „become what they are“ 
(chapter 1.3.2). 
84 „Design“ understood in a wide sense,  i.e.  not only as design of „products“  but also of „goods, 
services & identities“,  or „multi-user systems“; and even up to more general artifacts like „pro-
jects“ or „discourses“ (Krippendorf, 2011, p. 411f.).
pendorf, 1989, p. 14ff.; 2011). Both creating and using something artificially 
designed starts with an initially open state (a „fuzzy image“) which triggers 
(first „arbitrary“, then „meaningful“) distinction-making (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 
13). The latter gets „meaningful“  by constraining it to a specific context. Con-
cerning the creation of something Krippendorff defines a „context of genesis“ 
where „ideas“  and „patterns“  of designers are turned to „temporarily frozen 
manifestations“  (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 28). That context contains heterogenous 
actors („stakeholders“) who need to be addressed and integrated. Thus, a design 
cycle not only involves „designing“ in the narrow sense but also other domains 
as manufacturing, distribution, or consumption. These „networks of stakehold-
ers“  include actors like „engineers, investors, merchants, owners, users, by-
standers, consumer advocates, ecologists“, and so forth (Krippendorf, 2011, p. 
414). An artifact has to go through a creation process where patterns „must be 
designed to travel by efficient paths through a whole circular chain of stake-
holders“  (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 28). This circle may be endless, because arti-
facts can continuously be adapted and improved. But nonetheless, artifacts have 
to be use-able. In our words, the process of becoming have to temporarily result 
in a being. According to Krippendorff, the latter happens within an „operational 
context“  which has to be reflected and anticipated by the designer. This is im-
portant because in order to become a (re-)useable being a designed artifact has 
to be meaningfully incorporated by users, i.e. it „should fit or be interpretable in 
terms of the cognitive models that lead to their safe and socially desired use“ 
(Krippendorf, 1989, p. 17). „Being“  then means not only being a „thing“ but 
offering its potential users „identities“, „qualities“, „locations and orientations“, 
and so forth (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 16ff.). We cannot discuss the implications 
of Krippendorff's reflections on design for organizational knowledge here in 
detail, but his approach clearly highlights the importance of the complex social 
context of creation of artifacts, as well as the transformative steps from creation 
to a (temporarily stable) state of being which makes application possible. 
We will now return to actor-network theory (ANT) and discuss how Gerardo 
Patriotta describes the transformation from becoming to being, by adapting the 
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terms of „black-boxing“ and „epistemological closure“  to the field of organiza-
tional knowledge creation (Patriotta, 2003). 
4.3.3 Black-boxing and epistemological closure in organizations
From our theoretical position that we have developed in the last chapters, 
knowledge creation is seen as being basically contingent and equivocal. Crea-
tion of scientific theories as well as the development of technological artifacts 
are embedded in complex social networks; hence, they are contingent on a di-
versity of factors. A detailed philosophical analysis of the concept of knowledge 
in part II will discuss why knowledge creation in general is equivocal and po-
tentially open-ended. There we will also discuss one issue of philosophy of sci-
ence, which is called the „underdetermination problem“  (Duhem, 1954; Long-
ino, 1990, 2002). The latter states that scientific outcomes (theories) cannot be 
determined by observations, logic, and traditional scientific values alone, i.e. 
that the creation of theories cannot be understood as the mere „correct“  sub-
sumption of data; rather it is embedded within a social context of background-
assumptions which co-determine how data is connected and generalized . Crea-
tion of knowledge is not predetermined only by some unequivocal (scientific or 
technological) lines of development, logical patterns, or rational criteria. This is 
why it is beneficial to explore not only rationalistic but also social processes 
which actually lead to acceptance, stabilization and canonization of knowl-
edge85. 
The „underdetermination problem“  of knowledge creation is even more 
pressing in organizations as here knowledge is to be created to solve problems 
of action86. And as „action is equivocal, it generates problems of interpretation 
and sense making. Action is an open work whose meaning is in suspense.“  (Pa-
triotta, 2003, p. 176). And like in science, also in organizations the 
„main issue that needs to be addressed is the problem of epistemological closure; that is 
how controversial processes are turned into stable and durable outcomes. The translation 
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85 To understand such a social production of knowledge is the aim of ANT-inspired „sociology of 
science“ and „science and technology studies“.
86 Whereby, as we will see in part II,  knowledge in the sciences ultimately is also related to ac-
tion. 
from controversies to agreed facts and the description of the processes through which 
meaning is institutionalized are critical to the construction of a theory of knowledge.“ 
(Patriotta, 2003, p. 176)      
To understand epistemological closure under the condition of open-endedness 
and underdetermination, the notion of „black box“ may be helpful because it 
unites the two dialectical aspects of „becoming“ and „being“:
(1) Black box as being
We can see objects like a TV, but also an organizational routine, as black box. 
Applied by actors in their respective fields a black box is basically defined by 
input and output: all I need to know for watching TV is that it needs input 
(power, but also information about the desired channel or volume) and that 
there is output (picture and sounds). I need not to have any idea what in fact is 
happing inside the TV. This is why the box is opaque to its user, why it is 
„black“. The TV is simply there: for its user it is a „being“. And if everything 
works it provides the desired output to my input. 
This is similar to organizational routines. If I am a team leader in a fac-
tory I am concerned with routines of my assembly line. And although I am de-
pendent on outcomes of an upstream process, I do not need to know all internal 
details of the routines of that process. For me, the upstream process is a black 
box and my team has only to rely on its output which is processed as input for 
my own routines.
Furthermore, most routines are already in place and adopted by the per-
forming actors. In chapter 3.2 we have seen that actors mostly do not con-
sciously „know“  what they are doing. Routines become embodied as they get 
„implicit“  and „personalized“  and subsequently are „instrumentalized“. „Per-
sonalization“  (and ultimately „application“) of a routine then is nothing else 
than closing the black box and blurring its origins. Empirical observations as 
well as our daily experiences show that in fact we often do not know „how“ 
people do something. All we see is some input and some output: everything in 
between is hidden in the box.   
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(2) Black box as becoming
Black boxes conceal their inner structure. But this also implies that there is an 
inner structure. Only, it cannot be seen. This challenges organizational studies 
as well as reflexive practitioners. Because if we would be able to open it, we 
could see specific connections of various sub-components. We could see a spe-
cific order of materials that makes the black box instrumentally work as pre-
sented to the end user. Exploring the origin of that order reveals „that particular 
configuration of sub-components is the result of a controversial process of 
knowledge creation that at some point has been settled and concealed in the 
box.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 177). „Being“  was the point of departure for the end-
user (and for a functionalist view on organizational knowledge). But for the 
creator of the box (and for a constructivist view on organizational knowledge) 
that „being“  is rather the result of a contingent creation process („becoming“) 
which has been hidden. To focus on „becoming“  shows that the inner structure 
of the TV or the routines of the upstream process are no naturally given things: 
they have a history and passed contingent steps of development.  
The peculiar thing about a black box is that its inner constitution becomes 
effective in the very moment it is concealed. As its traces get blurred the black 
box gains its power, i.e. it becomes commodified and applicable. A black box 
works through the principle of „making manifest while hiding“  (Patriotta, 2003, 
p. 181). 
In applying the notion of black box to organizations, Gerardo Patriotta suggests 
to understand organizational knowledge as a flow in a „knowledge cycle“  re-
volving around black boxes (figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: The „knowledge cycle“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 179)
Knowledge then is a concept which is created in an open-ended process and 
subsequently closed into a black box by being utilized and institutionalized into 
the organizational practice. It is a „cycle“  because recurrent use of knowledge 
may encounter new problems which cannot be solved in the current way. This 
forces organizational actors to reopen the black box and to reconstruct its inner 
constitution. 
It is obvious in figure 4.5 that Patriottas „knowledge cycle“  maps both 
creation and application („utilization“). Hereby, its conceptual departure is the 
creation process and the problem of epistemological closure:
„(I)n order to be turned into a black box, knowledge has to be recognized as valid: the 
closure of the black box implies an act of social acceptance and legitimization. There-
fore, in order to understand the transformations occurring along the value chain we need 
to explain the process whereby knowledge comes into existence, becomes socially ac-
cepted, and is eventually embodied in durable outcomes.“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 178)
To detect these „processes whereby knowledge comes into existence“ Patriotta 
conducted various empirical field studies: via in-depth explorations he describes 
the events which lead to validation, social acceptance, and legitimization of 
knowledge. In the next chapters we will discuss two case studies from two dif-
ferent car manufacture sites in Italy (Patriotta, 2003, chapters 4-7). The first 
case study revolves around the construction of blueprints and routines for a new 
car factory („greenfield“). The second case study examines an old but yet op-
erational factory („brownfield“) where stories and best practices have been de-
veloped and deployed in order to cope with occurring problems. Together with 
the notions of our discussions in chapter 3 we will be able to understand these 
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cases as illustrating the creation of propositional knowledge (blueprints and 
routines) and narrative knowledge (stories and best practices). 
4.4 Creation of propositional knowledge: blueprints & 
routines
In a first field study, Patriotta observed design, construction, and the initial 
startup of a new Fiat car factory named „Melfi“  (Patriotta, 2003, chapter 5). He 
especially analyzed the construction of a foundational piece of knowledge: the 
blueprint of the new factory. As the „design concept of a new avant-garde fac-
tory“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 182) the blueprint for Fiat‘s „Melfi plant“  represents a 
crucial stock of organizational knowledge. The blueprint introduced a radically 
new model of Fiat‘s way of car manufacturing and changed some basic assump-
tions of the traditional and predominant Fordist model. From experiences in the 
U.S. and especially in the Japanese automotive sector as well as from bench-
marking results from other manufacturers, new elements were introduced into 
factory design. These new elements included team-based structures instead of 
strict hierarchies, a learning and proactive workforce, and especially the „lean“ 
production paradigm. The latter emphasizes on JIT („just-in-time“) and a „crys-
tal pipeline“  which both aim at high performant production flows (no buffers), 
and at a tight integration with suppliers, for example, on-site-suppliers instead 
of warehouses (Patriotta, 2003, p. 99f.). The post-fordist paradigm, prevalent in 
Melfi‘s blueprint, is not centered around a technology-determined hierarchical 
structure anymore, but outlines technology, skills, and division of labor as in-
terdependently changing factors aligned with „tasks“: 
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Figure 4.6: The Fordist blueprint vs. the Integrated Factory model of the new Melfi plant (Patri-
otta, 2003, p. 145) 
All this required changes in the core workflows and structures compared with 
existing Fiat manufacturing plants, and resulted in a blueprint for a completely 
new type of „integrated factory“  (Bonazzi, 1994). As a set of written informa-
tion, instructions, plans, and prescriptions of structure and processes of a new 
factory, the blueprint can be categorized as a typical case of propositional 
knowledge. 
If we connect Patriottas observations with Argyris & Schöns model of 
organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978), then the blueprint may also be 
considered as a „theory of action“. Its creation was triggered by changes and 
disruptions in the overall practice of Fiat and, beyond that, by shifts within the 
automotive sector as a whole. The inefficiency of traditional Fordist concepts of 
car manufacturing (especially in comparison to new models of production de-
veloped in Japan) forced Fiat as organization to adapt its own way of produc-
tion: 
„Knowledge creation is initially triggered by some kind of discordance: environmental 
perturbations in the automotive sector call the current performance of the company into 
question and emphasize an urgent need for innovation“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 183) 
The observed knowledge creation at Fiat was born out of a (huge) learning cy-
cle and feedback process between action and results, between theory and obser-
vation, between organizational knowledge and organizational practice. The 
blueprint hereby can be seen as an (again gigantic) hypothesis. It can be seen as 
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than technology-based distinction. In the Fordist model, the assembly line acts as
an independent variable driving the execution of the task and dictating the
division of labour. The assembly line is a social system in which the distinction
between task, technology, and human labour has been somewhat blurred. The
model stresses precisely the concept of automation, defined as the substitution of
human labour with machinery. Conversely, in the post-Fordist environment
observed at Melfi, competence seems to be built around the task. Accordingly, the
task mediates between human labour and technology. Figure 6.2 illustrates this
distinction between the two production paradigms.
Competence at Melfi is developed around a redefinition of the organizational socio-
technical system. On the one hand, the D/A template is so powerful in shaping
problem-solving and learning throughout the plant because it embeds the
‘archetype’ of the assembly line (Greenwood and Hinings 1988). The D/A
template apparently has been transferred almost intact from the slaughterhouses
in Chicago, where Ford first had the idea of the assembly line, to the avant-garde
plant in Melfi. At the same time, the knowledge template based on the D/A
concept is developed through a historical process related to the greenfield
experience. In fact, a crucial knowledge transfer occurred during the intensive
training period on the Melfi greenfield site, where the capabilities of the future
workforce were developed
Figure 6.2 The knowledge implications of production systems
Patriotta, Gerardo, Senior Lecturer in Organizational Behaviour, Nottingham University
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organizational knowledge which is based on a new paradigm of car manufac-
turing. In Fiat‘s organizational practice of car manufacturing, systemic pertur-
bations occurred which could not be compensated within existing Fordist con-
cepts any more. The new blueprint should be understood as organizational 
knowledge which was created out of this double-loop feedback with organiza-
tional practice:
Figure 4.7: Creation of propositional knowledge and organizational learning at Fiat‘s Melfi plant
The inability of the existing production paradigm to cope with challenges of the 
transforming automotive sector generated a situation in organizational practice 
which demanded new concepts. And although it was clear that new knowledge 
had to be created in order to cope with the changed environment, it was far 
from clear how that knowledge had to look like. The creation of the new blue-
print contained „strategic choices selected from a variety of options available“ 
(Patriotta, 2003, p. 183); it was contingent to diverse factors like benchmarking 
results, experiences with former projects, or new emerging standards in the 
automotive sector like JIT („just-in-time“) or TQM („total-quality-
management“). It was also contingent to multiple actors like Fiat experts and 
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than technology-based distinction. In the Fordist model, the assembly line acts as
an independent variable driving the execution of the task and dictating the
division of labour. The assembly line is a social system in which the distinction
between task, technology, and human labour has been somewhat blurred. The
model stresses precisely the concept of automation, defined as the substitution of
human labour with machinery. Conversely, in the post-Fordist environment
observed at Melfi, competence seems to be built around the task. Accordingly, the
task mediates between human labour and technology. Figure 6.2 illustrates this
distinction between the two production paradigms.
Competence at Melfi is developed around a redefinition of the organizational socio-
technical system. On the one hand, the D/A template is so powerful in shaping
problem-solving and learning throughout the plant because it embeds the
‘archetype’ of the assembly line (Greenwood and Hinings 1988). The D/A
template apparently has been transferred almost intact from the slaughterhouses
in Chicago, where Ford first had the idea of the assembly line, to the avant-garde
plant in Melfi. At the same time, the knowledge template based on the D/A
concept is developed through a historical process related to the greenfield
experience. In fact, a crucial knowledge transfer occurred during the intensive
training period on the Melfi greenfield site, where the capabilities of the future
workforce were developed
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managers who inhabited different viewpoints from „conservative“  to „progres-
sive“. The construction of this new piece of organizational knowledge went 
through a number of controversial  acceptance processes until it ultimately re-
ceived its final shape. At the end a finalized concept, the written and legitimized 
design, was „ready-to-use“  and its implementation „ready-to-go“. Former open-
endedness and contingency had been sealed into a black box through translation 
into the materialized, finished „official“  blueprint. Once stabilized in a proposi-
tional form as blueprint design the controversial nature of its creation became 
invisible and inaccessible to its observers and users. 
Of course, also this solid state of knowledge is only temporarily stable. In 
order to become an organizational concept with ontological effects the blueprint 
consequently had to be institutionalized in routines, rules, instructions, and so 
forth. This deduction and application of propositions from the Melfi blueprint 
into the new daily practice was a recurring knowledge creation process in itself 
(Patriotta, 2003, chapter 6). The blueprint needed to be translated to concrete 
organizational routines on all levels of the factory, into induction trainings, into 
instruction books, into human resources principles, into supplier handbooks, 
and so forth. This translation was also an open-ended creation process and, al-
though this time within a single-loop, located in a permanent gap to the organ-
izational practice. 
Both the blueprint itself, as well as the resulting routines, are „the expres-
sion of controversial knowledge in so far as it contains hypotheses about the 
future functioning of organization, which need to be tested and put to work.“ 
(Patriotta, 2003, p. 184). Hence, „knowledge-as-theory“ counter-parts the or-
ganizational practice87. Knowledge has to be „put to work“, i.e. it has to be in-
tegrated to daily practice and to prove being effective. But if then new (or old) 
problems occur („breakdowns“, „disruptions“), the applied knowledge did not 
meet the needs of practice. This usually triggers a new creation process which 
opens the black box and tries to provide new and better working solutions. Ex-
actly here, between the occurring discrepancy in practice and a new adapted 
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87 In discussing blueprints and routines as „clockwork“ of the organization,  Patriotta remarks that 
„(i)n fact,  practices can be seen as the empirical counterpart of the clockwork.“  (Patriotta, 2003, 
p. 187).
stock of knowledge there is a gap which opens a space for „controversy“, as 
well as for „ambiguity“ and „uncertainty“: 
„In the process of knowledge creation, disruptive events can be seen as a source of con-
troversy, since the lapse of time separating the occurrence of a disruption to its solution 
is intrinsically characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 187, my 
emphasis) 
The conclusion is that the „solution“  (new knowledge) to an „occurrence of a 
disruption“  (practice) is not fully determined. The whole process of knowledge 
creation (and application) is exposed to contingency and open-endedness.
4.5 Creation of narrative knowledge: plots & stories
The second field study leads us to a totally different, long serving, Fiat produc-
tion plant labeled „Mirafori“  (Patriotta, 2003, chapter 7). Here, Patriotta detects 
deeply situated organizational knowledge, which is about how to solve specific 
problems and breakdowns at the assembly line in a pressing plant. Organiza-
tional knowledge is identified as being imprinted in the „common sense“  of the 
workforce and encoded into narratives. Unlike propositional knowledge at 
Melfi, narrative knowledge at Mirafori is not materialized in devices like charts, 
papers, or digital repositories. The outwards appearance of „common sense 
wisdom“ is encoded into language discourses among actors: 
„While common sense is based on unspoken premisses, common sense wisdom is en-
acted in organizational discourse: narratives, anecdotes, jokes, and war stories. Narra-
tives (articulated as plots)  are the carriers of such a deep-seated, sticky, commonsensical 
stock of knowledge“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 191) 
Stories at the Mirafori plant are used to make sense of complex circumstances, 
especially when dealing with breakdowns of machines. Similar to Orr‘s copier 
machine technicians (chapter 1.2.2) managers and workers at Mirafori perform 
analysis and problem-solving not along official instructions but use narrative 
„templates“  which are available within the stock of the organizational 
„memory“. Such templates are encoded into stories which transport information 
about specific situations and events from the past. Patriotta analyzed that such 
stories are designed as „detective stories“. Mostly, such a story begins with the 
description of a breakdown (e.g. a quality issue in a production lot). Then it nar-
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rates the search for the source of the breakdown. It tells something about which 
hints were followed, which riddles were solved, which obstacles and throw-
backs were encountered on the way, and so forth. Finally, the source of the error 
(either a person or a machine, or both) is localized and consequences are drawn. 
Let us take a short look at such a „detective story“. Here is a short extract 
which was collected by Patriotta during his numerous interviews. A technolo-
gist retells a story about a specific case from the past: 
„The customer had returned five containers of defective parts, 156 in total, because they 
presented a deformed hole. We took the faulty component from the repair team, it was 
about 3–3.30 p.m. Together with the UTE leader88 of the second shift, I had a look at the 
anomaly. We consulted the maintenance person who was on duty when the lot was being 
produced. He said he had not done any work on the machines. Then we had a word with 
the die maintenance leader and with the line conductor of the second shift because they 
had completed the lot. Basically they had worked for three hours on Monday after-
noon—because the problem occurred on Monday afternoon—before they changed the 
dies. At 6 p.m. they performed the die change. I wanted to find out whether they had 
noticed any problem. They insisted that they had not noticed any problem nor had they 
performed any intervention work. This was confirmed by a line conductor, who called 
me about a different problem, at around four o'clock, (...)“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 157)
Then he goes on describing the further development of his investigative journey 
which finally terminates in the successful identification of the problem and in 
some lessons learned. Such an „emplotment“  of an equivocal happening is 
„idiosyncratic“  in its nature (Patriotta, 2003, p. 166), i.e. it contains very spe-
cific and contextualized content about the involved departments, persons, and 
machines. Furthermore, narrative knowledge is depicted on a concrete timeline 
in the past. All this makes it different from rationalized propositional knowl-
edge which tries to abstract from exactly such „sticky“  and contextualized cir-
cumstances. 
If such a story is retold and circulates through the organization, and if it is 
repeatedly used in sensemaking- and problem-solving activities, then the narra-
tive has been translated to organizational knowledge. It then is connected with 
the (implicit) claim to be applicable to future events within organizational prac-
tice: „(Narratives) are stored in the organizational memory and at the same time 
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88 „Unità Tecnologica Elementare“  („Elementary Technical Unit“):  a unit,  which is responsible for 
a specific work step in the production process
act as templates for the resolution of future problems.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 164). 
Hence, also narratives can be seen as hypotheses which counter-part organiza-
tional practice: 
„detective stories seem to draw on a repertoire of existing solutions which have sedi-
mented over time. Success stories of the past provide operators with effective templates 
for the solution of present occurrences.“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 192)
Application of narratives is different to that of propositions: unlike the „if-then“ 
method of propositional knowledge, narratives are guided by an „as-if“  ap-
proach. The latter enables actors to recognize similar patters and to reuse narra-
tive templates of the past in new situations (see already chapter 3.3.2). 
Thus, concerning the creation process, key questions are: „which cases 
will become part of the knowledge repertoire (...), which experiences will be 
retained, which occurrences will be remembered and therefore acquire the 
status of templates.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 164). Just as with the construction of 
the blueprint, also the creation process of narratives is not straight-forward. It 
cannot be coherently determined which story is a „noteworthy“  one and which 
not, because the criteria for such a selection are not universal. Relevance and 
problem-solving capability of a story cannot be derived from practice with full 
certainty, because many contextual factors are co-determining the selection. We 
may spot such contextual factors, if we take a look to another story, which is 
well known within the factory. Here it is told by a shift leader:
„Once a conductor accidentally broke a robot's arm. He immediately came to report the 
incident, assuming responsibility for it. This spared us the trouble of analysing the 
causes of the incident and made us save a considerable amount of time.“ !
This story can be seen as narrative knowledge, because it is represented in lan-
guage, has meaning for actors, and may guide action89. But the reason why it is 
knowledge is not because its content corresponds with reality of practice more 
than other stories, or because it per se allows problem-solving to be more effi-
cient than with other stories. Although such factors could (and should) be im-
portant, the translation to knowledge is related to a multiplicity of other factors, 
too. That a story at Mirafori is accepted and used is not determined by universal 
139
89  Moreover, we here can see that  narrative knowledge not only conveys explicit  problem-
solving, but also emotions, power-relations, and organizational culture.
objective standards (like correspondence to reality or efficiency) but relativized 
to a
„broader cultural system of the integrated factory where working together becomes a 
sort of ethical principle. The narratives of the team members emphasize such values as 
commitment, dialogue, transparency, being humble and keeping a low profile, collective 
responsibility, harmony, and mutual respect“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 160). 
This „broader cultural system“  as background-context co-determines the 
knowledge creation (and application) process and participates in the translation 
of the story becoming organizational knowledge-as-narrative. These dependen-
cies can again be depicted in connecting Patriottas empirical findings with the 
feedback learning model (figure 4.8). 
Figure 4.8: Narrative knowledge and organizational learning at Fiat‘s Mirafori plant
4.6 Conclusion
Chapter 3 showed that knowledge is applied to practice in order to guide actors 
in their sense-making and action. This chapter 4 showed that practice triggers 
knowledge creation because actors may encounter situations in which their ex-
isting knowledge is not sufficient anymore. And just as application was no triv-
ial execution of rules, also adaption and creation of knowledge is an open proc-
ess. This was captured by the notions of becoming, being, translation, and 
black-boxing. Hereby, the result of knowledge-creation in general is not pre-
determined. Problems in practice may trigger knowledge-creation but do not 
fully determine its outcome. Knowledge-creation is an open-ended process of 
becoming which is heavily contextualized and dependent on heterogenous ele-
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ments, background assumptions, and so forth. But at some point knowledge 
becomes a useful being as the flow of becoming is translated to a settled, ac-
cepted, and stable state. This results in useable outcomes like an accepted blue-
print (propositional knowledge) or a sedimented story (narrative knowledge). 
Knowledge then is „utilized“  and „institutionalized“  as it gets more and more 
integrated into daily practice. In this state, knowledge can be understood as ap-
plicable black-box which blurs and hides the internal mechanisms, its history, 
and its contingent character. Of course, the stable character is only temporarily 
given. At the moment black-boxes are reopened (e.g. due to breakdowns in 
practice) the next contingent knowledge creation process is triggered. 
This view is basically a theoretical interconnection between Argyris & 
Schön‘s model of organizational learning (see figure 4.3) and Gerardo Patriot-
ta‘s knowledge cycle (see figure 4.5). Figure 4.9 depicts a graphical representa-
tion of that combined theoretical frame of knowledge creation (and conse-
quently also application). 
Figure 4.9: Organizational knowledge creation (and application), according to the models of 
„knowledge cycle“ (Patriotta, 2003) and „organizational learning“ (Argyris & Schön, 1978)
Another theoretical interconnection was presented between Patriotta‘s empirical 
findings and Tsoukas‘  theoretical explication of knowledge as propositional 
(„knowledge-as-theory“) and narrative („knowledge-as-narrative“). In great de-
tail, Patriotta followed the complex creation processes of a blueprint of a new 
factory (propositional knowledge) and of stories in an existing plant (narrative 
knowledge). We should put emphasis not only on the differences, but also on 
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the similarities between propositions and narratives. Both types of knowledge 
enable organizational actors to draw distinctions and to make sense of the cha-
otic flux of their experienced world; both types appear as representations, 
meaning, and relation to action (chapter 2.2.3) and allow to temporarily bring 
order to chaos. Just as propositional knowledge, also narratives can be seen as 
„a way of appropriating order from disorder and therefore can be connected to 
dynamics of knowledge creation“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 193). 
This chapter 4 also reinforced our understanding of the epistemological 
gap between organizational knowledge and practice. The distance between 
knowledge and practice is already obvious in our concluding figure 4.990. The 
distinctions (on the levels of representation, meaning, and action) provided by 
knowledge are not 1:1 inter-locked with the concrete organizational practice. 
This view was supported by the characteristics of knowledge application in 
chapter 3. It was also supported by our discussions on knowledge creation in 
this chapter 4. The result of knowledge creation is not simply the objectively 
best practical solution of a problem in practice, but is open to contingency and 
plurality. How the final shape of the blueprint looks like, or how a story be-
comes „noteworthy“  within the organization, is no mechanical selection process 
but a translation within complex actor-networks. Knowledge creation is embed-
ded in a social environment with many heterogenous actors and contextualized 
background assumptions. Therefore, just as the application of knowledge to 
practice is not fully determined by the knowledge‘s content (chapter 3), the 
creation of knowledge is not fully determined by practice (chapter 4). 
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90  remember our arguments for decoupling the notions of knowledge from practice, of „episte-
mology“ from „ontology“ in chapter 2.2.4.
Chapter 5: From a theory of organizational 
knowledge to an organizational epistemology
5.1 The epistemological gap & underdetermination
Examining the application of organizational knowledge in chapter 3 we asked 
the question: how is knowledge applied to organizational practice? How is 
propositional and narrative knowledge related to the heterogenous particulars of 
the concrete organizational field? Answering that question revealed a gap be-
tween knowledge and practice as we saw that organizational knowledge (both 
as propositions and narratives) underdetermines its utilization, i.e. the way how 
some knowledge is applied cannot be determined by that knowledge alone. 
Propositional knowledge (e.g. as rules or routines) leaves „loopholes“  open and 
its application is contingent to the heterogenous social context. Any organiza-
tional actor needs to get to grips with the gap between generalized concepts and 
the particularities of practice in which those concepts have to be applied. Narra-
tive knowledge, on the other side, does not close that gap but embraces it. It 
„takes the bull by the horns“  because it - contrary to propositional knowledge - 
is non-abstract and contextualized in the first place. Its content does not sub-
sume particulars under general categories, but is particular itself. Hence, it is 
open-ended and ambiguous in its very nature. Narrative knowledge contains 
plots related to concrete and singular events taken from practice. But of course 
it is not practice; it has to be applied to practice; narratives are „templates“  and 
part of the available stock of organizational knowledge. As such it „helps to 
conserve and mediate individual experiences and can be used as background 
knowledge when experiencing novel situations.“  (Rögnvaldur, 2006, p. 348). 
Hence, narrative knowledge, just as propositional knowledge, is intended to be 
a reusable concept which ought to enable actors to cope with future situations. 
From this point of view also narratives are („dynamically“) generalized con-
cepts counter-parting heterogenous practice. Thus, it does not not eliminate un-
derdetermination, but instead offers an alternative way for dealing with it. 
By looking at knowledge creation in chapter 4 we examined the episte-
mological gap from the other direction, i.e. from practice to knowledge. We 
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asked the question: how is knowledge created out of the organizational prac-
tice? Unlike from the other direction, we did not start from the open-endedness 
of knowledge and its relation to practice. We started with the organizational 
practice, from where knowledge creation is triggered (e.g. through perturbations 
or breakdowns) as a controversial and open-ended process. From the viewpoint 
of creation there is a gap between knowledge and practice because the construc-
tion process emerging out of the practice does not follow a predetermined path. 
It is open to a multitude of possibilities which are blurred and finally hidden in 
organizational concepts as „black boxes“. This reveals another dimension of the 
underdetermination problem. It stems from the fact that the problematic prac-
tice from which new knowledge is created, cannot alone determine which solu-
tion is the definitive one. The connecting arrows from practice to knowledge in 
our concluding figure 4.9 should not lead to the interpretation that knowledge 
provides unequivocal solutions to unequivocal problems. There are no universal 
criteria of how problematic situations in practice ought to be solved. 
This view contradicts the paradigm of „rationalistic epistemology“ (see 
the upcoming chapter 6) which sees ideal knowledge as the objectively rational 
explanation (or solution) to a problem. We will see that this monistic and anti-
pluralistic view is highly problematic for knowledge in general (chapter 6) and 
even for scientific knowledge (chapter 7). Thus, underdetermination is charac-
teristic for any kind of knowledge. Empirical sciences, for instance, create theo-
ries to explain observed data. And also here there is no unequivocal path from 
particular data to generalized theories. The reason for that is that knowledge 
(theories) contains more that just what it subsumes (data). In the creation of sci-
entific knowledge it is not only general rational methods which determine how 
data is to be subsumed by theories. Many other social factors and background 
assumptions are (and have to be) involved as well, like the aims of the respec-
tive scientific community, general assumptions about the structure of the re-
search objects, used instruments and methods, the paradigm from which re-
search is pursued, and so forth. The consequence is that no universal criteria 
can fully determine successful knowledge creation, i.e. the final subsumption of 
data under generalized theories. The factual outcome of scientific knowledge 
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production is then contingent to the social context of knowledge creation (we 
will in detail analyze this issue as the „underdetermination problem“  in chapter 
7).  
We already detected something similar at the core of organizational 
knowledge creation. The latter is characterized by potential plurality and open-
endedness of its final shape instead by a predetermined mechanism. Also here, 
particularities (organizational practice) are subsumed under generalizations (or-
ganizational knowledge). And also here there is no ideal, unequivocal, or purely 
rational way from particularity to generality. This is important, because the tan-
gible manifestations of knowledge creation (e.g. blueprints, routines, or best 
practices) often make us forget that they also could be different, that they are 
inherently contingent concepts (a feature concealed by being a black box). With 
the underdetermination problem in mind, organizational studies are motivated 
to reveal socially embedded creation processes and to locate the involved fac-
tors which finally lead to institutionalized knowledge. This is what we saw at 
the organizational studies author Gerardo Patriotta in chapter 4: to describe or-
ganizational knowledge, basically is to open black boxes and to analyze their 
contingent inner constitution, to trace their history, and to describe how they 
became what they are. 
This also connects creation with application, because black boxing is 
partly accomplished by the application of knowledge into organizational rou-
tines, accepted instructions, embodied, and implicit actions. Black boxing trans-
lates controversial and contingent epistemological construction processes into 
the structure of the ontological field. Again, this is what interests organizational 
studies and authors like Tsoukas and Patriotta: to empirically detect and to theo-
retically understand the making of black boxes, the creation of knowledge, and 
its application to organizational practice. 
5.2 Description vs. Normativity
But we should be aware that the theoretical concepts discussed as well as the 
empirical field studies presented still lack a sufficient normative reading of 
knowledge. Just like Tsoukas‘  work, also Patriotta‘s approach is descriptive and 
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ultimately directed towards empirical research. Their main aim is not to bring 
up normative criteria in order to answer the question of how knowledge should 
be justified, accepted, and distinguished from non-knowledge. Instead, the con-
tingent and open-ended character of knowledge is embraced: knowledge is not 
compliance to any epistemological criteria, but simply what has been estab-
lished and accepted. This acceptance process, the „closing of the box“, is what 
interests social scientists like Patriotta and Tsoukas. From their descriptive 
standpoints they (correctly) infer that the social factors which lead to accep-
tance of knowledge can virtually be anything. Just like for ANT and „laboratory 
studies“, knowledge is ultimately an empirical phenomenon. A phenomenon 
embedded in complex creation processes which are to be traced and made ex-
plicit via observations and methods of social sciences. 
But we should remind ourselves that there is another reading of knowl-
edge which is challenging that view. Knowledge can be seen as more than 
something that is created, applied, or transformed. It can be seen as more than a 
process or content: it can be seen also as a claim. Knowledge inherently claims 
to be valid (Adams, 2004, p. 228; Habermas, 1984; Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 
p. 83), it claims to be true vs. false, it claims to correspond to reality vs. being 
an illusion, it claims to be knowledge vs. mere belief. That knowledge as a 
claim is not only a theoretical notion but fairly close to our daily experience: we 
all intuitively sense that only believing something can be different from know-
ing something. But what is the significant difference between something which 
is only believed and something that is really known? 
What makes knowledge to knowledge is not only that it is created and 
applied, but also that it is more than mere belief (or more than just a proposi-
tion, or more than just a narrative, etc.). Traditional epistemological approaches, 
beginning with Plato, have claimed that a belief in order to qualify as knowl-
edge has not only to be a „belief“  but a „justified true belief“  (Plato / Cooper, 
2001, Theatetus 201). From its outset, Western epistemology has always been in 
search of normative criteria of knowledge, i.e. what something has to fulfill in 
order to be valid knowledge (Fuller, 2002, p. 61). This is why we, in part II, 
will take a closer look at different philosophical approaches which try to de-
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velop such epistemological criteria of knowledge. Some of them traditionally 
are based on pure reason and logic, some of them try to incorporate social com-
plexity. But it is important to see that what unites normative epistemological 
conceptualizations is their non-relativism: not anything ought to be knowledge. 
This is because it has to fulfill specific epistemological criteria like truth, corre-
spondence to reality, justification, or - in more „social“  epistemologies - com-
pliance to aims and standards of a community, critical discourse, usefulness, 
and so forth. In the next part we will try to systematize and structure these crite-
ria taken from the two paradigms of „rationalistic“  (chapter 6) and „social“ 
(chapter 7) epistemology, in order to come up with a conceptual toolkit which 
can be used to extend the merely descriptive theories of organizational knowl-
edge by a normative organizational epistemology. 
But what makes the latter normative? Is not any theory of organizational 
knowledge normative? Are not Tsoukas as well as Patriotta defining normative 
criteria for organizational knowledge? Well, they draw conclusions from em-
pirical and theoretical research to define attributes of organizational knowledge: 
as we have seen, knowledge may be classified as propositional, narrative, indi-
vidual, collective, personalized, tacit, explicit, and so on91. But all these notions 
are rather epistemic attributes of organizations, than epistemological criteria of 
organizational knowledge. Epistemic attributes are about the observable (and 
theoretically describable) manifestations of knowledge like how and in which 
forms propositional knowledge exists in organizations. Epistemological criteria, 
on the other hand, are about validation like what should qualify propositions to 
become valid knowledge. The former says how something is, the latter how 
something ought to be. The former is descriptive, the latter normative92.            
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91  An example of such a classification is also our three layers concept of  distinction-making 
(chapter 2.2).
92  Just consider moral philosophy: it is one thing to define how and from where human action 
originates, which factors determine them and how actions are related to individuals (this is a 
topic of  anthropology, cognitive science, psychology, or sociology). But  it  is another thing to try to 
formulate which are right and which are wrong actions, and which criteria could be governing the 
evaluation of  actions being ethical right or not (this is a topic of moral theory and ethics). E.g. 
Kant‘s  moral philosophy strongly demonstrates  this division between description and normativ-
ity. For Kant even the question if human action is free or determined by natural laws, i.e.  the 
question of freedom, can be discussed independently from morality. What makes an action ethi-
cally  right or not  is not affected by humans being free or not (Kant, 1785/2005). For a detailed 
discussion on that topic see (Seirafi, 2010, chapter 11). 
So far, organizational studies have done a great job in identifying epistemic at-
tributes of organizational knowledge but very few have been engaged in asking 
for epistemological criteria. Very few have been trying to integrate the unique 
epistemological questions of philosophy to descriptive approaches. It seems 
like organizational studies and knowledge management up to now have over-
looked that dimension of knowledge. This need for normative distinctiveness 
will be the driving force of our further inquiry.
5.3 The need for normative distinctiveness
A similar argument has been introduced by Schreyögg & Geiger who criticize 
knowledge management literature to rely on a too blurry and undefined concept 
of knowledge (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 2005, 2006). Driven by the fear of 
missing some aspects of organizational practice many authors tend to declare 
knowledge as anything that leads to action (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 79; 
2005). Knowledge then becomes an „umbrella notion“  which includes implicit 
knowledge, tacit skills, competencies, and all other factors leading to action. 
This is backed by pragmatist-phenomenological underpinnings like the social 
constructivist concept of „Lebenswelt“  (Berger & Luckmann, 1969), like the 
idea of tacit knowledge (M. Polanyi, 1967), and generally by the equation of 
action with knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1987). Although these approaches 
are useful to understand the groundings of action in organizations (and else-
where), Schreyögg and Geiger claim that knowledge has to fulfill two crucial 
features which are mostly overlooked (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 83ff.): 
(1) Knowledge has to be contestable, i.e. it should be available and accessible 
in a way which is open for reflection, discussion, and falsification. Knowl-
edge has to be treated as verifiable „validity claim“ which is open for dis-
cursive interaction. 
(2) An adequate concept of knowledge should in general include the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong, true and false, appropriate and inap-
propriate, or „high“  and „low“  quality knowledge. Note that such a distinc-
tion does not require that „true knowledge“  can be identified with full cer-
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tainty. Validation is always subject to falsification and the state of „true 
knowledge“  only temporary. But that does not imply that it is impossible to 
develop meaningful criteria for validation.    
Feature (1) would become somewhat problematic to fulfill if knowledge would 
only be defined as the thing (or „process“) which makes action possible. In that 
case knowledge could be anything which can be defined as a driving force be-
hind action. According to the two authors, this is problematic because in order 
to be part of a reflective discourse, knowledge should in general be able to be 
put into the form of language and argumentation. This is of course opposed to 
the idea of tacit skills being knowledge. Therefore, Schreyögg and Geiger ex-
clude implicit knowledge from their concept of organizational knowledge 
(Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 83). According to this view, knowledge has to 
be encoded into some sort of language, because only in this form it can enter 
critical discursive interaction where it can be reflected, contested, evaluated, 
and eventually falsified. 
In our 3-level-view on organizational knowledge (chapter 2) the possibil-
ity of discursive interaction is given within the dimension of „representation“, 
i.e. knowledge as codified in written or spoken words, or in other concepts 
which makes it inter-subjectively exchangeable. If knowledge is represented it 
can be communicated and negotiated. Knowledge as communicable concept 
was also given in our typifications of propositional and narrative knowledge 
(chapter 3 & 4): both reside within the realm of language. Remember, as Tsou-
kas discovered the insufficiency of propositional knowledge (chapter 3) he did 
not extend it by, for instance, tacit knowledge. Instead, he introduced narratives 
as the missing type of knowledge93. The tacit dimension then comes in not as 
specific knowledge-type but as a factor when knowledge is applied to a specific 
context. 
However, the question remains if it really is necessary to go as far as 
Schreyögg and Geiger do and to deny tacit knowledge being knowledge. To 
make tacit knowledge inter-subjectively exchangeable (and also somehow dis-
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93  See also Daniel Geigers emphasis on narratives as the „core“ of knowledge management 
(Geiger, 2006; Schreyögg & Geiger, 2006).
cussable) may not be impossible. Remember  Nonaka‘s & Takeuchi‘s conver-
sion process of „socialization“  which was about to communicate and to share 
implicit knowledge: the master shows bread baking and the apprentice imitates, 
thus gradually acquiring tacit knowledge (chapter 2.3). Here, representation is 
in use, although knowledge is not mediated by language as alphabetically en-
coded sign-system. Instead, the master applies another representational sign-
system by using (parts of) his body to express tacit knowledge. Hence, we 
could claim that „representation“  appears not only as spoken or written words, 
but may also be explicated via more incorporated sign-systems like body 
movements or haptic performance.  
Feature (2) is the actual normative part of Schreyögg & Geiger‘s argu-
ment, because it is about what it means for knowledge to be „valid“. What has 
to be fulfilled for knowledge to be valid? Which conditions have to be given, 
for instance, for a sentence to be true94? At this point, we leave the discussion 
about epistemic attributes (what is a sentence?) and enter the realm of epistemo-
logical criteria (what is a true and justified sentence?). Asking for such episte-
mological criteria inherits difficult questions about truth and justification which 
have been discussed for a long time in the philosophical discipline of episte-
mology (or as Schreyögg & Geiger state, of „philosophy of science“) but so far 
has hardly been reflected in knowledge management literature: 
„Philosophy of science first of all has always aimed at differentiating knowledge from 
other concepts such as simple opinion or meaning. At the core is the basic distinction 
between true or false knowledge and a theory of truth that can legitimate that differentia-
tion.“ (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 82)
Although we certainly cannot provide a universal „theory of truth“, we will in 
part II get acquainted with different theories of epistemological criteria for 
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94  As in feature (1) this again raises questions concerning tacit knowledge. Just as to exclude 
tacit knowledge from being communicable, Schreyögg and Geiger also exclude it from possibly 
being verifiable.  Because (for them) tacit knowledge cannot be put into words and cannot be part 
of a discourse, it can neither be verified nor falsified. 
! But is it  really impossible to understand also tacit  knowledge as a validity claim? If I, for 
instance,  attribute the skill of bike-riding to a person I do attribute „tacit  knowledge“  of  bike-riding 
to that person. Although on a communicative meta-level,  one may ask back: „Verify it! Is this 
person really capable of riding a bike?“. In chapter 8.2 we will discuss this more in detail, 
whereby again the gap between knowledge (bike-riding as implicit  knowledge of  a person) and 
practice (the concrete event of this person riding a bike) will play a crucial role: knowledge (even 
tacit knowledge) always involves some kind of distance or abstraction from practice making it 
open-ended, changeable, as well as contestable and verifiable.
knowledge. Part III will shift these criteria to the field of knowledge in organi-
zations. Schreyögg & Geiger draw from Habermas discourse theory (Habermas, 
1984) and Toulmin‘s argumentation theory (Toulmin, 1958) to explicate the 
normative characteristics of knowledge. We will try to develop epistemically 
normative criteria for the social context of knowledge creation drawing from 
the „social epistemology“  of Helen Longino (Longino, 2002), a philosophical 
approach which will be discussed in part II and then will be connected to or-
ganizations in part III. The latter may be seen as an unnecessary step, because 
knowledge in organizations is something different than that in the sciences (or 
than that of epistemologists): is not knowledge as a true and justified sentence 
something totally different than, for instance, an organizational narrative? The 
former has to be true, the latter „only“  useful. Why should epistemological cri-
teria for the former be of use for the latter? The answer is that knowledge ulti-
mately always is bound to pragmatic ends. This means, also scientific knowl-
edge is never simply the true correspondence to reality, but has to „work“  in 
specific settings according to specific aims and standards within a social field. 
The same is true for knowledge in organizations. Acceptance and confirmation 
for both scientific and organizational knowledge is relativized to respective so-
cial fields and communities, thus making an a priori validation impossible. But 
this does not mean that a „social“  epistemology cannot set up normative criteria 
for knowledge creation. In contrary, such a social epistemological project has 
been carried out (Longino, 2002) and hopefully will give us valuable input for 
our integration of normative epistemological elements with the theory of organ-
izational knowledge. 
We will call that normative extension of a theory of organizational 
knowledge, organizational epistemology. Such an organizational epistemology 
supplements epistemic attributes with epistemological criteria because it dis-
cusses not only what organizational knowledge is (as something that is ob-
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served and typified) but also what knowledge ought to be (as criteria distin-
guishing true from false knowledge). It is not only descriptive, but normative95.  
5.4 Towards an organizational epistemology
5.4.1 Starting point & desideratum of an „organizational epistemology“
It is important to mention that a normative conceptualization of knowledge was 
already (although only implicitly) inherent to some already discussed ap-
proaches in organizational studies. Organizational concepts („theories of ac-
tion“, „propositions“, or „narratives“) are not only what they are, i.e. rules, sto-
ries, or skills which are black-boxed and institutionalized. They are also ex-
pected to be effective for organizational actors in order to carry out action. And 
if knowledge is not able to sufficiently provide meaningful distinctions for ac-
tion, breakdowns and problems in practice occur. This is why knowledge is in 
place only as long as it is not contested by new or adapted knowledge. Within 
feedback processes organizational knowledge is exposed to critical scrutiny and 
falsification. This implies that - in context to the specific organization - there are 
concepts which tendentiously are better than others. This also implies that there 
is good and bad, true or false knowledge. If this was not the case, there would 
be no reasonable need for change, adaption, and the creation of knowledge. 
Then „feedback“  and knowledge creation would happen by pure accident. The 
question is, whether we are able to come up with criteria giving orientation for 
knowledge creation, or not. Criteria that would help us to generate a knowledge 
flow drifting towards „true“  instead towards „false“. Because if we are not suc-
cessful in providing such epistemological guidance, then we have to leave that 
to the practice, admitting that all we can do is to empirically observe and ex-
plain which knowledge becomes „established“ and accepted“, and which not.    
Of course, we do not have to deal in absolutes. As knowledge is always 
provisional and open to „falsification“, truth is a matter of degree rather than of 
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95 A similar distinction has been introduced by Steve Fuller (Fuller, 2002). According to Fuller,  we 
can distinguish between „empirical indicators of knowledge“  on one side and formal non-
empirical knowledge criteria on the other (Fuller, 2002, p. 58f.). For Fuller of  course, this is a 
dichotomous separation, i.e.  a „materialistic“  understanding of knowledge as embedded in 
spatio-temporal context vs. a „platonistic“  understanding of knowledge as „transcendent“ view 
from nowhere. We will try to overcome that dichotomy in part II. 
absolute value. But this does not diminish a normative understanding of knowl-
edge. It just traces truth on a continuum instead on a discrete matrix. Notions 
like „truth“, „justification“  or „correspondence with reality“ will be re-
conceptualized and dynamized in part II where a „social“  epistemology will 
help to detect more pragmatic and flexible understandings. Truth is then not un-
derstood as claim towards a universal, unequivocal 1:1 correspondence with an 
objective world, but rather as a critical social interaction of confirmation within 
the aims and standards of a specific community. Such an extended view of a 
normative understanding of knowledge will be identified as being also applica-
ble to non-scientific contexts, like organizations96. 
For Tsoukas and Patriotta (and many other organizational scholars) 
knowledge is anything that enables individual and collective agents to carry out 
their actions. This „anything“  can be whatever fits to our discussed descriptive 
frameworks, for example, propositions, narratives, tacit knowledge, competen-
cies, and so forth. But from a philosophical standpoint this characterization is 
not enough, because what interests us is not only appearances of knowledge, i.e. 
what interests us is not only epistemic attributes. If we seriously want to oper-
ate with the notion of knowledge then we also need to be interested in answer-
ing the question what makes knowledge to be true, good, or useable. What 
makes it to be not a mere belief, not a mere content? What interests us beyond 
epistemic attributes are epistemological criteria of knowledge. In the field of 
science we may ask: what should make a particular theory more appropriate 
than another? In the field of organizations we may ask: what should qualify an 
organizational concept in becoming part of the stock of knowledge of an or-
ganization? Descriptive approaches would state (driven by the epistemological 
gap and the underdetermination problem) that this question cannot be answered 
a priori and is fully contingent to what is happening „on the ground“. All we 
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96 Normative epistemology is neglected by most organizational researchers. One reason for this 
may be that  (a) the concept  of truth seems inappropriate for the organization because the latter 
is about getting things to work rather than producing true knowledge. Another reason may be 
that  (b) truth is conceived as a too narrow concept which may (if at all) be applicable to scientific 
contexts but not to such complex social systems like organizations (Nonaka, et al., 2008, chapter 
1). The complex social structure of an organization, the argument goes,  requires a more holistic 
concept of knowledge. It is our aim to show that in drawing from more flexible approaches like 
„social epistemology“, social embeddedness of knowledge can be appreciated without  loosing 
normativity (chapter 7).
can do is to observe knowledge formation, utilization and institutionalization 
processes, and their determining „real world“  factors. Such descriptive inquiry 
may illuminate and extend our understanding of the complex mechanisms of 
knowledge creation in science and organizations, but only to the price of epis-
temic relativism. Knowledge is then what is put into place, no matter if en-
forced by despotic leaders, if incrementally grown by unreflected practice, or 
e.g. if resulting out of pure luck. As long as some organizational concept pro-
vides distinctions to act in the world and is translated into organizational prac-
tice it is knowledge. Note that this relativism is not only problematic for norma-
tive philosophers. Organizational scholars as well as practitioners may be 
highly interested not only in how knowledge is phenomenologically graspable 
but also in what makes good, or appropriate knowledge, what makes the differ-
ence between „high“  and „low-quality“  knowledge (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 
p. 94). Thus, epistemological criteria are not only fancy concepts for philoso-
phers, but probably could provide orientation and guiding principles for organ-
izational knowledge creation. 
Hence, I would propose to use the notion „organizational knowledge“  as out-
lined in this first part of our inquiry. This is to understand knowledge as per-
formative organizational concepts with all the attributes developed in the last 
chapters: knowledge on the three different dimensions of representation, mean-
ing, and action; knowledge as in a „strong sense“  enabling distinction-making 
and organizational action; knowledge as propositions and narratives, etc. Such 
understanding of the epistemic attributes of organizations can be used as theo-
retical toolkit for empirical field studies as well as a mindset for the „reflective 
practitioner“  who pursues a deeper insight in the nature and types of knowledge 
in organizations. 
On the other hand, I would propose to introduce the notion of „organiza-
tional epistemology“  as to identify a normative account of organizational 
knowledge which tries to formulate epistemological criteria for qualifying 
„good“  or „high-quality“  knowledge: we do not only want knowledge to make 
distinctions, we want knowledge to make right distinctions. But are there 
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grounded criteria to define how knowledge ought to be in order to be rather 
knowledge than non-knowledge (or false knowledge)?
5.4.2 Summarized research questions
Our previous discussions have indicated both a desideratum and a demand for 
what we have called „organizational epistemology“. Our so far defined ques-
tions can be summarized and and systematized into following three research 
questions: 
 
Q1
How can a normative epistemological account for organizations be grounded 
and justified? 
Q2
Which normative criteria and guiding principles for organizational knowledge 
creation can be developed out of such a foundation?
Q3
How can such guiding principles be applied to real world organizations? 
5.4.3 Research hypotheses
Parts II and III of this inquiry will be led by these questions and will try to de-
fine and validate following research hypotheses: 
H1 
A normative epistemological account for organizational knowledge creation 
has to be grounded in the philosophical discipline of epistemology. As we have 
already discussed organizations in depth, the next step, obviously, is to address 
the notion of epistemology. Therefore, we are going to discuss the philosophical 
discourse of epistemology in part II. Based on Plato‘s famous definition of 
knowledge a broad literature (mostly in the analytical anglo-american tradition) 
has evolved which aims at defining normative rational-logical criteria for 
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knowledge. Such a „rationalistic epistemology“  (chapter 6) tries to bring up an 
a priori and final definition of knowledge as „justified true belief“. This would 
give us a foundation for knowledge in organizations too. Unfortunately, a criti-
cal reflection will reveal internal incoherences of rationalistic epistemology. By 
focusing on the „Gettier problem“  we will discover that in general no rock-solid 
definition can be provided by a purely rationalistic approach. Knowledge will 
be identified as being generally open-ended. So no matter how hard we try, no 
rationalistic criteria may allow an analysis which would validate a given 
knowledge proposition as true or false with universal certainty.
From that negative outcome many authors were tempted to discard the 
normative epistemological project as a whole. Inspired by the postmodern con-
tinental tradition, approaches like Actor-Network-Theory or „laboratory stud-
ies“  deny any a priori definition of knowledge97. According to these positions, 
knowledge is a purely social phenomena created in complex social relation-
ships: true knowledge is what is accepted and enforced as „true“. All what is 
left is to conduct empirical research in order to systematize and explain the ob-
served truth- and knowledge-building processes. The old dream of philosophy 
to theoretically guide truth-seeking conduct is over. 
Although the two positions (normative rational epistemology vs. descrip-
tive social studies) seem to be trapped into a dichotomy, there is a third way 
which on one hand accepts the social and open-ended character of knowledge 
creation, but on the other preserves normativity and the search for epistemo-
logical criteria. We will work out how such a „social epistemology“  continues 
the epistemological project but opens it towards social complexity and contin-
gency (chapter 7). Here, we will encounter challenges already discussed, like 
the epistemic gap and the underdetermination problem. We will also encounter 
epistemological responses to these challenges. Helen Longino‘s „social episte-
mology“  offers such a response and suggests to establish epistemological crite-
ria at the social level of knowledge creation. Acknowledging that what becomes 
knowledge is determined within a social context (within a specific scientific 
community with specific goals, specific standards, etc.), social epistemology 
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97  A noteworthy exception in the analytical tradition is  W. O. Quine who also denies an a priori 
concept of knowledge (Quine, 1969a, 1969b)
defines epistemological criteria which are directed towards critical social inter-
action. What we can do then is not only to describe knowledge creation (e.g. 
via field studies) but to also prescribe social criteria for successful knowledge 
creation. Such an attempt is pluralistic, open-ended, and social, but not relativ-
istic. 
H2 
Criteria and guiding principles for organizational knowledge creation can be 
derived from a „social epistemology“ which outlines general criteria of the so-
cial environment of knowledge creation and application. Such an „social epis-
temology“  is presented by Helen Longino (Longino, 1990, 2002). It opts for a 
social environment of knowledge creation which is open to critical discourse, 
provides venues of criticism, the active uptake of criticism, transparency of 
goals and standards of the respective (scientific) community, intellectual equal-
ity, or potential plurality of contributions. In part III we will try to connect „so-
cial epistemology“  with organizational knowledge studies and develop guide-
lines for organizations (chapter 9).
H3
The developed guidelines can be used to describe and evaluate real world or-
ganizations.  This will be explicated and presented along an extensive use-case 
in chapter 10. Here a specific part of the company „Seven-Eleven Japan“  will 
be examined by using the presented knowledge creation concepts and guide-
lines.  
5.4.4 Summary
The way how underdetermination and the epistemic gap is tackled in social 
epistemology may guide a response to challenges in organizations. A response 
which gives us the opportunity to develop not only typologies and empirical 
concepts about organizational knowledge, but also criteria which guide success-
ful knowledge creation. Hence, an organizational epistemology is not only rele-
vant to organizational studies (and the empirical observation of knowledge 
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creation). It is also relevant to practitioners who aim at reflecting, evaluating, 
and designing knowledge creation spaces in organizations. 
Organizational epistemology can be seen as the quest for developing 
normative criteria of knowledge creation which have been widely neglected by 
research so far. However, organizational epistemology, as outlined in the in-
quiry, is not substituting but rather supplementing the hitherto available under-
standing of organizational knowledge.  Subsequently, additionally to the de-
scriptive theory of organizational knowledge (part I), an organizational episte-
mology (part III) would provide a second theoretical toolkit for researchers in 
order to normatively evaluate knowledge creation environments. It would also 
provide practitioners with guiding principles for designing appropriate knowl-
edge creation environments. In introducing normativity our ultimate aim is to 
provide a ground for a better understanding of how to enable successful spaces 
for knowledge creation in organizations. 
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Part II - EPISTEMOLOGY
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Chapter 6: Rationalistic Epistemology
Epistemology is the study of knowledge. As philosophical discipline it has a 
long tradition and ranges from questions like how knowledge can be defined, 
how it is structured, and which limits are given to it (Steup, 2005). Traditional 
attempts, beginning with Platos „Theatos“, try to expose the rational criteria of 
knowledge, i.e. to universally define the core distinction between a mere belief 
and knowledge. Its basic (and, as we will see, questionable) idea lies in the 
conviction that there ultimately is one ontologically given universal truth which 
is the same for all cognitive agents. According to this monistic and objectivistic 
view, there consequently has to exist a fixed set of true beliefs as a subset of all 
possible beliefs. Thus, a cognitive agent possesses knowledge if it can be ra-
tionally shown that its beliefs are true. The main epistemological question then 
is, how knowledge is justified, i.e. how the separation between mere beliefs and 
knowledge is accomplished. Note that the answer to that question, no matter 
how it looks like, will have a normative stance. This is because traditional ap-
proaches to knowledge not only describe, but prescribe: „for beliefs to be 
knowledge, they have to comply with following criteria:...“  is the explicit or 
implicit attempted solution of these approaches. In this chapter 6 we will out-
line the basic concepts of such a traditional approach, as well as its contempo-
rary proponents. We will subsume that paradigm as rationalistic epistemology 
and discuss its main issues. 
In chapter 7 we will deal with an approach, which tries to overcome the 
traditional attempts of rationalistic epistemology. This social epistemology 
looks for the distinction between knowledge and belief not at the level of ra-
tionalistic universality, but at the social processes in which knowledge creation 
is embedded. For this alternative epistemological approach there is not one uni-
versal truth which would be accessible by all agents, if they would only follow 
rational criteria of truth. It rather defines knowledge relative to the respective 
community where it is created. Nonetheless, knowledge ought not to be any 
content that is created within a social group. Rather, social epistemology inher-
its the normative stance of the rationalistic paradigm and strives for defining 
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criteria for successful knowledge creation. But instead of locating the distinc-
tion between knowledge and non-knowledge to some hypothetical rational 
agents, the distinction is defined as a social process. Thus, how this social proc-
ess looks like (or better: how it should look like) will turn out to be the main 
question for „social epistemology“. But first let us take a look at the paradigm 
of „rationalistic epistemology“.
In the wake of western thinking Plato brought up the first systematic definition 
of knowledge which usually is being described as „justified true belief“  (Plato / 
Cooper, 2001, Theaetetus 201, Meno 298) :
S knows p if (and only if)
i.  p is true
ii.  S believes that p
iii.  S is justified in believing that p
Other definitions are structurally equal, like, for instance, in (Chisholm, 
1957, p. 16) 
i. S accepts p,
ii. S has adequate evidence for p, and
iii. p is true.
or in (Ayer, 1958)
i. p is true,
ii. S is sure that p is true, and
iii. S has the right to be sure that p is true
Inside the analytic, rationalistic discourse, the justified-true-belief triad has been 
widely accepted, although varied in many ways (Steup, 2005). There is high 
agreement on the fact that justified beliefs tend to „co-vary“  with truth (Adams, 
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2004, p. 228), i.e. that where belief (p) is justified, or „illuminated“  (Nozick, 
1981) it is more likely that p also is true. Therefore, disagreement between dif-
ferent epistemological schools are mainly not driven by questioning (i) how 
something can be true or (ii) how something can be believed, but rather on (iii) 
how a belief can be justified. Hence, the search for proper methods and criteria 
for belief-justification marks one main challenge of the rationalistic discourse98. 
Adequate creation of knowledge is therefore connected to the transformation 
(„justification“) of beliefs: 
Figure 6.1: The basic idea of rationalistic epistemology: knowledge as justified true belief
6.1 Terminology
Before we go on let us clarify some terminology. According to common vo-
cabulary from rationalistic epistemology, we will define beliefs as expressed 
through propositions, whereby propositions are constituted by language terms. 
For instance, the belief of Smith that „Jones has 10 coins in his pocket“  is ex-
pressed in the proposition 
! (p) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.  
BeliefsTruth Knowledge
justification
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98  Again, we will refer to all these analytical approaches (which try to find logical, formal, and 
universal explanations for the justification of knowledge) as „rationalistic“. In their view (as we will 
see) „knowledge“ can be fully rationally encoded and is totally independent from any „non-
rational“,  social,  or other presumably biasing factors. The underlying ontological assumption is 
(as we also will see) that there is an objective truth which (at  least  theoretically) corresponds to 
knowledge (and not corresponds to non-knowledge, i.e. to mere belief). 
! Our term of „rationalistic epistemology“  should not be confused with „rationalism“. The 
latter is a term from history of philosophy which subsumes all those approaches which give the 
rational mind („rationalism“) priority to sense impressions („empiricism“) as the ultimate source of 
knowledge (Markie, 2008).  
Hereby, „Jones“  or „10 coins“  are syntactically constructed terms. Of course a 
proposition (p) is not merely the result of adding up syntactical terms. A propo-
sition, as a whole, refers to a meaning. A proposition is a concept which repre-
sents an intended meaning to the knowing agent (and of course may have a rela-
tion to his/her practice)99.  
As epistemological discussions are normative, we will understand propo-
sitions not only as concepts but also as claims. The latter are implicit to the 
propositions and a main characteristic of knowledge. Therefore, propositions 
are always also knowledge claims100. Hence, knowledge is not only the result of 
creating concepts with some content, but of creating concepts with some content 
intended („claimed“) to be true or useful, or both. 
6.2 Debates within rationalistic epistemology
6.2.1 Internalistic Evidentialism vs. Externalist Reliabilism
Let us return to the main question of rationalistic epistemology: what is the ba-
sis of justifying that proposition (p) is a true belief? One stream („evidential-
ism“) holds that what makes (p) justified is that (p) is „reasonable or rational, 
from S's own point of view“ (Steup, 2005, chapter 1.1), i.e. that S justifies (p) 
by giving reasonable evidence. Another stream („reliabilism“) argues that it is 
not the evidence itself that justifies belief, but much more the reliability of the 
sources (or „faculties“) which are used to create the belief. According to this 
second view, a belief is justified if it „results from a cognitive origin that is reli-
able“ (Steup, 2005, chapter 2.2). 
Another debate revolves around the question, if justification depends on 
external or internal factors. To most evidentialists, justification of true beliefs is 
based on internal processes like perception, representation, introspection, and/
or logical deduction. These activities are internal to the knowing agent, thus jus-
tification is independent from external conditions. A presupposition of this view 
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99 Just as in our 3-layer-model (chapter 2.2) of organizational knowledge also here propositions 
as concepts may appear on three levels.
100  As a consequence we will use the terms „proposition“, „concept“, and „knowledge claim“ in-
terchangeably. 
is that proposition (p) as well as its evidence is transparent for internal („men-
tal“) reflection. For instance, if Smith had four cups of coffee this morning, then 
he might claim:
(p) I had four cups of coffee this morning. 
According to internalist evidentialism, this proposition is justified if Smith has 
an accurate representation of (p) in his memory which is transparently and con-
sciously accessible via introspection. That would be denied by reliabilists. For 
them, beliefs are not justified by the fact that enough „luminous“  evidence for it 
is given, but because it has been created by sources which, under normal cir-
cumstances, produce true beliefs. Therefore reliabilism is mostly ascribed to 
externalism. And even if the sources of justification are internal (e.g. memory), 
their reliability is not (Steup, 2005, chapter 2.3). 
6.2.2 Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
Another venue of epistemological discussion deals with the justificatory struc-
ture of  beliefs and knowledge. The main challenge is how to cope with with an 
infinite regress which seems to be inherent to justification. This regress goes as 
follows: to justify a belief, a cognitive agent uses other beliefs. Now, these other 
beliefs have to be justified, too, if we want the justification to be substantial. 
Hence, these beliefs again call for further grounding beliefs, and so forth (Bon-
jour, 1978). 
One approach in solving this issue is foundationalism. It states that true 
beliefs are ultimately grounded on principles („basic-beliefs“) which are not 
further questionable. Different attempts have tried to show how there can (and 
have to) be such beliefs which are „immediate“  evident. Candidates for such 
„rock bottom“  beliefs are arithmetical and logical axioms or instantaneous per-
ception. The idea is that these beliefs are directly „cognitive(ly) given“  (Bon-
jour, 1978, p. 9), thus not have to be separately justified.
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Coherentism, on the other hand, denies such a pyramid-like structure and lo-
cates justified beliefs in a „web“  of other true beliefs which interdependently 
sustain a coherent structure (Sosa, 2000). 
Figure 6.2: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
6.3 „Gettier problems“: the knowledge gap in rationalistic 
epistemology
The different debates, shortly outlined in chapter 6.2, aim at providing a stable 
explanation of how true things can be known and justified. They are based on 
the presumption that „justified true belief“  is a sufficient criteria, as long as it 
coherently can be clarified how justification is possible (therefore questions 
asked are: is justification based on internal or external means? Is justification 
based on basic beliefs or not?, etc.). Edmund Gettier introduced an argument 
which seriously questions this general assumption, i.e. the correctness and 
completeness of the classical definition of knowledge (Gettier, 1963). His ar-
gument does not originate from questioning the existence of truth or clear justi-
fication (as constructivists or postmodernists would do), but rather reveals the 
internal inconsistency of knowledge as „justified true belief“. It stresses that the 
criteria (i), (ii), and (iii) do not guarantee a jointly sufficient definition of 
knowledge. This is remarkably demonstrated in different cases (in the literature 
referred to as „Gettier cases“) where even though all three conditions are given 
it seems difficult imaging that (S) actually knows (p). Let us recapitulate the 
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rationalistic epistemological definition of knowledge again and then discuss a 
“Gettier case”. 
First, let us recall the definition provided by rationalistic epistemology:  
S knows p if (and only if)
i.  p is true
ii.  S believes that p
iii.  S is justified in believing that p 
Now, let us take a look at one well known Gettier scenario:
“Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith 
has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Smith's evidence for (d)  might be that the president of the company assured him that 
Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's 
pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:
e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d)  to (e), and accepts (e) on the 
grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in 
believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, 
also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then 
true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, 
then, all of the following are true: (i) (e)  is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e)  is true, and 
(iii)  Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does 
not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, 
while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief 
in (e)  on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man 
who will get the job.” (Gettier, 1963, p. 121f.)
What happened? All conditions for „justified true belief“  were given. Also the 
justification is based on valid grounds: Smith’s evidence is supported by em-
pirical adequacy (he counted the coins), trustful testimony (the president of the 
company), memory, and introspection; his inference is logically accurate (d-
>e); and the sources of knowledge (observation and testimony) seem to be reli-
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able; and most important: the final proposition (e) is true. The latter guarantees 
that we cannot dismiss the case simply in arguing that although justification was 
accurate, the proposition is not true, i.e. to say condition (i) is not given. It is 
given, and so are (ii) as well as (iii). Nevertheless, it would be somewhat crude 
to say Smith knows the proposition. Many authors have tried to solve or avoid 
the problem stated by Gettier, mostly by adding some additional criteria in or-
der to bypass such cases101. But what is its origin?
6.4 The origin of Gettier problems 1: open-endedness of 
context
According to Linda Zagzebski, the Gettier problem is generally “inescapable”: 
both internalist and externalist theories ultimately fail to solve them (Zagzebski, 
1994, p. 65). For internalists, enough internal evidence is given to tick off the 
proposition (e) as knowledge, although it obviously is not. This is possible, be-
cause there are external events which are „inaccessible to the believer”  (Zag-
zebski, 1994, p. 65). In the presented case, these inaccessible events are (1) that 
unexpectedly Smith gets the job, and (2) that Smith by chance also has got 10 
coins in his pocket. Such events are always potentially given and are able to 
undermine the integrity of any knowledge claim. And as no cognitive agent can 
ever be certain if given evidence will be sufficient to generally exclude such 
possible external events, internalists cannot solve Gettier cases. Note that the 
argument here deviates from most sceptic positions, which usually claim that 
(at least fully certain) true propositions can never be reached. Contrary to that, 
Gettier cases presuppose that there in fact is a true proposition, which neverthe-
less cannot be knowledge. And this seems to be the substantial threat against 
internalism: that a true proposition which is justified by internal evidence can 
possibly be no knowledge. There seems to be an unavoidable „gap“  between 
justification and knowledge (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 65), not only in a weak sense 
(that there may be justifications that turn out to be wrong), but also in a strong 
sense, i.e. that even the most accurate justification of a true proposition in the 
end not necessarily results in knowledge. 
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101 See, among others, (Kirkham, 1984; Nozick, 1981, chapter 3). 
But not only internalism fails to solve (or avoid) the Gettier problem. Also ex-
ternalism cannot overcome that issue, although at first sight it may seem to be 
better suited to do so. Remember that externalists think that justification of a 
true belief is based on the reliability of the faculties used. Hence, if we were 
able to show that the means which are at work in our case were not appropriate 
to that very situation, externalism would successfully block the Gettier case (in 
negating the justification-condition). This is what is proposed by the externalist 
position of Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga, 1993). According to his view, reliable 
faculties like perceptions or inferences have (a) to be „appropriate“  to the „envi-
ronment“  and (b) to be aimed at serious truth seeking. Would not these addi-
tional criteria avoid Gettier cases? Could we then not reject the above case, say-
ing that (a) Smith should not have been trusting the testimony in that situation, 
or that (b) the inference based on the combination of two independent facts like 
coins and getting the job, is not seriously aimed at truth, but only a puerility? It 
may be that adding auxiliary conditions to the knowledge formula reduce the 
amount of uncertainty for belief-justifications. But there are reasons to believe 
that no matter how reliable or „appropriate“  the sources or faculties of justifica-
tions are, the gap cannot be closed. Zagzebski introduces a case which shows 
that also externalist strategies in escaping Gettier problems - like that of Platin-
ga‘s - are fruitless:
“Suppose Mary has very good eyesight, but it is not perfect. It is good enough to allow 
her to identify her husband sitting in his usual chair in the living room [...]  She had made 
such an identification in these circumstances many times. Each time her faculties have 
been working properly and the environment has been properly for the faculties. There is 
nothing at all unusual about either her faculties or the environment in these cases. Her 
faculties may not be functioning perfectly, but they are functioning well enough, so that 
if she goes on to form the belief ‘My husband is sitting in the living room‘, that belief 
has enough warrant to constitute knowledge when true and we can assume that it is al-
most always true. [...] Suppose Mary simply misidentifies the chair-sitter who is, let us 
suppose, her husband’s brother. [...] We can now easily emend the case as a Gettier ex-
ample. Mary’s husband could be sitting on the other side of the room, unseen by her. In 
that case her belief ‘My husband is sitting in the living room‘  is true and has sufficient 
warrant for knowledge [...], but she does not have knowledge” (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 
67f.).         
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From the position of reliabilist externalism, the given case would fulfill the cri-
teria for faculties of being appropriate to the situation, and of providing the de-
manded degree of reliability. Platingas criteria (a) for „appropriateness“  of the 
justification sources are satisfied102. It also seems that the environment and con-
textual events of Mary‘s case are not somehow unnatural or too fictive, as it 
may appear in the 10-coins case. Mary is in a situation that plausibly could 
happen in the „real world“ 103. And finally (b) the cognitive agent infers in a 
manner that is not suspect of being artificially constructed or somehow not seri-
ously aiming at a useable truth, what also could have been objected against the 
10-coins case. Hence, also the externalist position fails to avoid (or generally 
solve) Gettier problems.     
Zagzebski correctly interprets Gettier cases as situations where the link 
between justification and truth of a belief first can be „broken“  (Mary is justi-
fied in that her husband sits in the chair - but: he is not) and then be „regained“ 
(it turns out that he actually is in the room). There seems to be a constitutive 
„degree of independence“  between justification and truth, allowing for „luck“  to 
penetrate every belief-justification (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 69). In fact, Gettier 
cases are based on a combination of both „bad“ and „good luck“. „Bad“  luck 
(Mary misidentified her husband; Smith was wrong in believing Jones will get 
the job) and „good“  luck (unexpectedly Mary‘s husband was in the room which 
turned her claim right; and unexpectedly Smith also had 10 coins in his pocket 
making his belief true, too) are both involved when Gettier cases arise. The 
problem for both internalism and externalism is, that cognitive agents never 
will be able to control the context sufficiently to exclude uncontrollable features 
like luck. Zagzebski concludes that the source for the inescapability of the Get-
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102  This is not rejected by the fact that Mary’s  eyesight is „almost  always true“. In contrary,  reli-
abilism incorporates the fact that sources of justification are often not fully reliable and not al-
ways necessarily lead to truth.  Externalists here are right to say that if this would not be the 
case, „the component  of truth in the analysis of knowledge would be superfluous. Knowledge 
would simply be warranted belief.“  (Zagzebski,  1994, p. 67). Hence,  externalism correctly leaves 
the gap open - but this is also the reason why it cannot escape the Gettier problem.
103  Whereby the circumstances of the 10-coin case seem to be artificially constructed with the 
only intention to construct a Gettier case (although, of course, it is not  unthinkable that this  could 
happen in the real world). 
tier problem is the gap between justification and truth which exposes knowl-
edge construction to „epistemic luck“. 
Figure 6.3: The inescapable gap between truth and justification
6.5 “Inescapability” of Gettier problems: consequences and 
non-consequences
Zagzebski‘s analysis of the Gettier phenomenon correctly identifies a major is-
sue in rationalistic epistemology. She introduces arguments and cases which 
provide strong evidence for the gap between justification and truth staying 
structurally open - it never can fully be closed. The explanation, for her, is that 
agents in creating knowledge (i.e. in justifying true beliefs) can never entirely 
control the creation context. As we saw, in every situation unexpected events 
may pop up in the „neighborhood of the belief“  (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 70): events 
which could not be controlled or fully anticipated by the knower. And it is this 
persisting uncertainty of the circumstances which paves the way for Gettier 
cases and makes the peculiar combination of „good“  and „bad“  luck possible. 
The knowledge creation context is open-ended and penetrates creation and jus-
tification of rational concepts (i.e. of propositional knowledge claims).
Figure 6.4: open-endedness of context influencing the stability of knowledge concepts
gap
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For Zagzebski, one consequence of complexity and open-endedness of the 
knowledge creation context is the need to incorporate „luck“  into the definition 
of knowledge:
“So knowledge is true belief + x + luck” (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 72). 
Hereby, „x“ is any definition of justification, be it motivated by internalism, ex-
ternalism, evidentialism, or any other conceptualization of justification. 
Zagzebski‘s definition of epistemic luck also appreciates the open-
endedness of context and simultaneously frees knowledge creation (as justifica-
tion) from its too rigid connection with truth. But although she loosens the defi-
nition of knowledge (and leaves open how justification could at best be 
achieved), Zagzebski still preserves its normative notion as justified true belief. 
This is a noteworthy argumentative move, since her rejection of a too narrow 
rationalistic-normative epistemology does not terminate in relativism. For sure, 
knowledge claims may always be surprised by unexpected events in the world, 
as any scientific theory at any time may be falsified by non-expected contradict-
ing observations (Popper, 1959, 2002). But this does not imply to give up the 
search for useful normative criteria of knowledge creation. Hence, the conse-
quence is not to give up the normative drive of the epistemological project. On 
the contrary: especially when the idea of pure rationalistic knowledge creation 
collapses, i.e. when it has been recognized that knowledge cannot be defined 
and reached by compliance with rational criteria alone, we need criteria more 
than ever104. 
Zagzebski shows that it is possible, if not compulsive, for an epistemo-
logical approach to take up the revealed latent uncertainty of the knowledge 
creation context (in her account: „luck“) without giving up the idea of knowl-
edge being directed towards truth and justification. She introduces a viewpoint 
which connects (1) open-endedness of context and (2) normativity towards 
truth. But not as a connection which simply adds up two complementing view-
points. The connection between (1) and (2) insists on their mutual necessity. 
Zagzebski not only adds „luck“  (open-endedness of context) to „justified true 
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104  We will in chapter 7 follow Helen Longino‘s reflections on science. There we will see how 
open-endedness of concepts allow not only  for „luck“ but also for social processes to play a cru-
cial part in knowledge creation. 
belief“  (the normative definition of knowledge), but presents the former as a 
condition for the latter. This becomes more clear, if we think about what fol-
lows from a position that would exclude open-endedness and latent uncertainty 
from the knowledge creating context. Within such a position the gap between 
justification and truth would be closed. This would lead to the peculiar result 
that justification alone always necessarily leads to truth. In treating any justified 
belief as being true one not only makes the „component of truth in the analysis 
of knowledge (...) superfluous“, but would also neglect the fallibility of justified 
beliefs. And this would be hard to believe, because both from the view of daily 
life as well as from scientific practice it seems highly problematic to deny the 
possible fallibility of (even justified) beliefs. From a purely rationalistic episte-
mological viewpoint the situation is even more pressing, since closing the gap 
would undermine the very idea of knowledge being normatively directed to-
wards truth. This is why without opening the gap (and introducing the open-
endedness of context) there can be no normative definition of knowledge. 
Hence, the idea of justified true belief implies - and depends on - latent uncer-
tainty, complexity, and open-endedness of the knowledge creation context.
6.6 The origin of Gettier problems 2: open-endedness of 
concepts
We have driven rationalistic epistemology to a point where open-endedness was 
not only a tolerable but a necessary factor. But only a factor of the context of 
knowledge creation, not a characteristic of the created concepts. Thus, this 
chapter will try to understand how knowledge claims themselves are, by their 
very nature, open-ended entities. 
For Zagzebski, the source of uncertainty of all knowledge claims (or the 
gap between „justification and truth“) lies in the unpredictable context of know-
ing agents. In order to save a normative approach of knowledge she retains the 
traditional definition of rationalistic epistemology but constrains it to an uncer-
tain context. In other words: clear and well-formed knowledge claims of 
knowledge-seeking agents are constrained by the messy world the agents unfor-
tunately have to deal with. Zagzebski recognizes external factors and the open-
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endedness of the context, but her knowledge agents are fully rational believers 
capable of accurate construction of unambiguous propositional terms105. Hence, 
we should take the possibility into consideration that it is not the context alone 
which threatens rational justification of knowledge claims. We should rather 
focus on the knowledge claims themselves, because they probably also contrib-
ute to (and not only mirror) the open-endedness of context. To do so, we will 
analyze the introduced Gettier cases not so much in relation to unexpected ele-
ments which pop up in the environment of the agent, but analyze the internal 
propositional structure and constituents of knowledge claims.
Remember the „10-coins case“, where Smith claims to know (a) that 
Jones (and not he himself) will get the job, as well as (b) that Jones has got 10 
coins in his pocket. Smith then creates his final proposition by (correctly) infer-
ring: if both (a) and (b) are true, then „the man who will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket.“  (Gettier, 1963, p. 121f.) has to be true, too. As it turns out 
that Smith will get the job and unexpectedly also has 10 coins in the pocket, his 
final claim is true even though he not really seems to know it. Just as Zagzeb-
ski, most commentators are tempted to trace back the problem to unexpected 
external factors of the context. The solution then is either to add more rational 
epistemological principles to control such unexpected contexts, or to accept the 
open-endedness of context and to reduce the rigidity of the definition of knowl-
edge (which is Zagzebski‘s approach). Both have in common to narrow their 
analysis to external factors of the context of knowledge claims. But why not 
take a closer look at the knowledge claims themselves? How are these proposi-
tions structured and interrelated? How do they allow the epistemic gap between 
justification and truth to emerge? Is it only the messiness of a chaotic and un-
predictable context that undermines the otherwise rational knowledge creation 
agents? Or is there something in the belief-justification process itself that is co-
responsible for the inescapability of the gap? 
I will argue that the latter is the case because creating knowledge claims 
in (almost) all cases includes the creation (or utilization) of generalized con-
cepts. The meaning of such concepts - like „the man“  or „the room“  - allow a 
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105  This, of course, only holds within an objectivistic presumption which implies the delimitable 
separation of rational subjects from an external independent world. 
specific grade of ambiguity and openness which, in my view, constitute the 
deeper grounding both for Gettier cases as well as for the epistemological gap. 
Let us recap the three knowledge claims of Smith in the 10-coin case:
 
(a) Jones will get the job.
(b) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
(p) The man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
Even if (a) is false - i.e. if not Jones but Smith gets the job - the proposition (p) 
turns out to be true, because accidentally the man who gets the job (Smith) also 
has got 10 coins in his pocket. That „unluck-luck“  combination of the context 
makes (p) surprisingly to be true. And what puzzles us is that we would say 
Smith not really knows (p) although traditional criteria of knowledge (as justi-
fied true belief) are fulfilled. We (correctly) tend to say that what Smith actually 
wanted to say, was that „(a) and (b)“  is true. That what Smith meant to claim 
was the proposition: 
(pmeant) Jones will get the job and has 10 coins in the pocket.
If the case would be based on the proposition pmeant Smith would simply be 
wrong and articulate a false belief. According to the rationalistic definition of 
knowledge, Smith would fail to pass the epistemic test and no Gettier problem 
would arise to challenge analytical philosophers. But unfortunately Smith 
chooses to create proposition (p) although he may meant (pmeant) and may see 
no difference between them with regard to their truth values. For Smith both (p) 
and (pmeant) should be false as they seem to refer to the same state of affairs. But 
this is not the case: (pmeant) is true and (p) is false, although to Smith both 
should be false. So what is it that allows (p) in contrast to (pmeant) to be true? 
The answer is that (p) is based on the generalized term „the man“, whereas 
(pmeant) keeps the particularized term „Jones“: 
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Figure 6.5: Creation of the Gettier case knowledge claim  
The creation of (p) is based not only on the conjunction of the attributes (a) and 
(b), but also on the generalization of the subject of these attributes. Figure 6.5 
shows the generalization of Jones from (a) and (b) to „the man“  as dotted lines. 
This seems to be the main difference to (pmeant). In (pmeant) „Jones“  is not being 
generalized to „the man“, but transferred in its particularized form:
Figure 6.6: Creation of a non-Gettier-case claim
It is that creation of a generic category which opens a space in the meaning of 
the proposition (p). A space which did not exist in (a) or (b) or in their singular 
conjunction in (pmeant). A space which allows also Smith to be subsumed under 
the subject of the proposition („the man who gets the job“). This stands in con-
trast to (pmeant), where the term „Jones“  obviously would have been too particu-
lar, too narrow, and too distinctive to include „Smith“ 106. It is the elasticity of 
(a) Jones will get the job. (b) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
(p) The man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
generalization
attribution
(a) Jones will get the job. (b) Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
(pmeant) Jones will get the job and has 10 coins in his pocket.
transferred particularization
attribution
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106  Although it may be possible to construct another Gettier context around the proposition 
(pmeant),  too. For instance,  if unknown to Smith a third candidate also named „Jones“ were to get 
the job, and who were also carrying 10 coins in his pocket.
generalized concepts of knowledge claims like (p) which allow unpredictable 
contexts to cause trouble in the justification of beliefs. Thus, it is not simply the 
context that somehow blurs the clarity of propositions, making them open-
ended and allowing Gettier cases to intrude. It is rather the propositions and 
concepts themselves which provide the conditions for ambiguity and latent plu-
rality. The situation seems similar with our second Gettier case. Here, the 
proposition 
(q) My husband is sitting in the living room. 
turns out to be true and justified even if she actually meant something like 
(qmeant) My husband is sitting in the living room in the chair in which he 
usually sits.
 
The latter of course would not be true if her husbands brother was sitting in that 
chair. But the proposition (q) is true as (accidentally, of course) her husband is 
sitting somewhere else in the living room. (q) runs into the Gettier case and 
(qmeant) not, because the latter is somehow closer to what she actually meant. 
(qmeant) narrows the scope of potential meaning of the claim and its terms (like 
„Jones“  compared to „the man“). Hence, if (qmeant) would have been the knowl-
edge claim, then the Gettier case would not have emerged (though one could 
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probably build another Gettier case with that proposition107). Akin to the trans-
formative generalization from „Jones“  to „the man“, here „the chair he usually 
sits“  is transformed to „living room“. Hereby, „living room“  is a term which is 
more general than the more distinctive term „the chair he usually sits in“  (at 
least it allows other subsumed particularities). This fact allows unpredicted 
events to turn the proposition true, what in fact happened: the term „living 
room“ was broad and general enough to incorporate her husband who (acciden-
tally) sits on the other side of the room. Similarly, the proposition „the man who 
gets the job“  was broad and general enough to incorporate other people than 
„Jones“ (like e.g. „Smith“).
At this point it is useful to recall what we said about propositions. 
Namely, that they are not only knowledge claims, but also concepts, i.e. they 
refer to a meaning. And reference to a meaning is not always (if ever) une-
quivocal, because concepts are - to a certain extent - generalizations which sub-
sume particularities108. Now, there is nothing wrong in creating generalized 
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107  In fact, it was Zagzebski‘s argument that Gettier cases can be constructed for virtually any 
knowledge claim (Zagzebski, 1994, p. 68). A  proposition that would be secured against Gettier 
cases would have to be constituted by concepts which close the scope of their meaning and 
refer to an unequivocal entity. In the 10-coins case „Jones“ could have been such a closed con-
cept  because it seems to refer to a singular and unique person. But as already mentioned be-
fore,  we could exploit the fact that the same name can be shared by different people, similar to 
that  more than one person can sit  in a living room. One would be tempted to solve the problem 
in giving more details for „Jones“  (e.g. date and place of  birth, relatives) or for „the chair my hus-
band usually sits in“ (e.g.  the exact position and relation to other objects in the room). But it 
seems questionable if we ever would reach a level where a concept could be isolated to one 
certain, unique and unequivocal meaning. Remember our attempt to create a unequivocal or-
ganizational routine like „if the customer IBM calls Andy tomorrow at  12:15,  then the time-to-
solve of the given problem should not take longer than 15 minutes“ in chapter 3.1.1. There we 
saw that even this  seemingly particular instruction is an organizational concept being open for 
different interpretations. 
! This  whole issue has been controversially discussed in philosophical literature. Some 
philosophers argue that there are some „basic“  beliefs which we know immediately  and in an 
unambiguous sense: e.g. beliefs like „I have two hands in front of me“  while looking at my hands 
(Moore,  1962). Such a view corresponds with the idea that we have undoubtable and unique 
meanings for things we know by „acquaintance“  (Russell, 1910) as they „appear“ to us in „per-
ception“  (Chisholm, 1964). For these authors, the terms „this man I  am pointing at“ or „the chair 
in front of me“ probably would be capable to form propositions which escape the Gettier prob-
lem.  But even if there are knowledge claims which refer to purely singular and unequivocal ele-
ments,  (a) the knowledge claim as a whole still may carry some sort of generalization (we will not 
follow that here; see (Sellars, 1956) for a detailed discussion), and (b) they would only constitute 
one part of all possible (and possibly true) knowledge claims (Foley, 1993, p. 190). There will 
always remain knowledge claims with generalized terms, simply because they are necessary 
both in science as well as in daily life (and as we saw also in organizations: rules without gener-
alizations are more or less senseless; see, again, chapter 3.1.1).
108  We have seen this both with knowledge concepts in general (in this chapter) as well as with 
organizational knowledge concepts (in chapter 2).
concepts. In fact many (if not most) knowledge claims in daily life are based on 
generalizations. And what science is all about is to create hypotheses, which 
essentially is about to generalize observations. But the „price”  of a generalized 
concept is the potential plurality of its subsumable particulars. It is that open-
ness, plurality, and potential ambiguity of concepts which allow Gettier cases to 
emerge and contextual uncertainty (e.g. „luck“) to enter knowledge creation 
processes. Generalized concepts always transcend - and are underdetermined by 
- their particulars:
 Figure 6.7: the gap between generalized concepts and particulars 
Note the turn we made, as well as the contrast to the approaches reviewed 
above. Instead of stating that an open-ended context allows knowledge proposi-
tions to become potentially ambiguous, we argued that - because of the un-
avoidability of generalized concepts - knowledge propositions themselves are 
intrinsically ambiguous, thereby allowing open-ended contexts to emerge. It is 
both our world as well as our concepts of the world which are open-ended and 
dynamic. The „inescapability“  of the Gettier problem shows that also rationalis-
tic epistemology cannot avoid the „open-endedness of concepts“.
To conclude, open-endedness of concepts and context are bound together; 
there is not a one-way relation. On one side, we observe a complex world: this 
is why we need open-ended concepts to deal with it. On the other side, our con-
cepts are open-ended: and this is why our world is, too (since we construct our 
world using our concepts). It seems not to make sense to choose either of these. 
openendedness
gap
(Generalized) 
Concepts
Particulars
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We should rather, from a more holistic viewpoint, make the claim that there is 
no causal or foundational hierarchy between both: one hand depicts the other109:
Figure 6.8: Context and concepts as interrelated poles of open-endedness
6.7 Normativity connecting epistemology and science
Rationalistic epistemology is a normative project. We can find epistemic norma-
tivity at all authors discussed above who take knowledge as justified true belief 
as their point of departure. No matter whether justification is internal or exter-
nal, is structured as pyramid or network, or is based on evidence or reliability: 
what epistemological authors strive for is to understand the principles of the 
path to knowledge via the development of „epistemic norms“  and „cognitive 
values“  (Longino, 1996). Take, for instance, foundationalism: as it argues for 
last basic beliefs at the bottom of all knowledge justification, it actually states 
normative criteria: for (p) to be knowledge and not mere belief, it ought to be 
justified ultimately upon basic true beliefs; these basic beliefs ought to be, for 
example, „self-justified“, or „given in appearance“  (Chisholm, 1964). Episte-
mology is aimed at normative criteria for a distinct concept of knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge as something opposed to non-knowledge (like, for instance, unjusti-
fied belief).
In this light we may better understand why epistemology is intuitively 
attracted to the field of science. This is because science in its self-conception is 
directed towards truth and ought to create rather knowledge than non-
ConceptContext
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109  This repeats also the dialectical interrelation of our previous notions of epistemology vs. on-
tology of social fields (chapter 2.1). Note, that we also had a very similar dialectical relation at 
our previous discussion on organizational knowledge: drawing from Haridimous Tsoukas we 
identified two interrelated sources of the epistemological gap in organizations: the „nature of 
context“ and the „nature of knowledge“ (chapter 3.2.2). 
! Do also note, that this was already prevalent in Kant‘s  constructionism, where it be-
came clear that not only the manifold and chaotic impressions of the world are open-ended but 
also the categories we use to „synthesize“ those impressions (see chapter 1.3.1).  
knowledge. But to do so it needs a distinct concept of knowledge. Now, this 
distinct concept cannot be systematized by one of the many scientific disci-
plines themselves. Although scientists may have their own epistemological as-
sumptions, the biologist, while looking through the microscope, will usually not 
ask general questions like how far perception is an appropriate source of 
knowledge. A discipline, under normal circumstances, does not coherently ex-
amine its own epistemological axioms. These questions are, so to speak, out-
sourced to meta-disciplines like philosophy of science and epistemology. There-
fore, W.O. Quine states:  „Epistemology is concerned with the foundation of 
science“ (Quine, 1969b, p. 69).
In the next chapter we will see how philosophy of science (in its rational-
istic form) demand from scientific inquiry to be aligned with epistemic norms 
like „empirical adequacy“, internal and external „consistency“, the accurate use 
of instruments and testimony, and logical reasoning (Adams, 2004, p. 228; 
Longino, 1996). All these rationalistic epistemic „norms“  and criteria are ulti-
mately linked back to general criteria of knowledge from rationalistic episte-
mology. 
But our discussion revealed that the definition of  rationalistic knowledge 
criteria runs into deep trouble when confronted with the complexity of knowl-
edge contexts. The Gettier problem demonstrated that even rationalistic episte-
mology has to admit knowledge claims being intrinsically plural, thus allowing 
„non-rational“  factors to enter. One of these supposed „non-rational“  factors is 
the social context of knowledge creation. Therefore, we will in the next chapter 
present a „social“  epistemology which tries to extend rationalistic normative 
criteria of knowledge creation. Put shortly, for social epistemology social fac-
tors influencing knowledge creation are not seen only as a biasing and disturb-
ing context which undermines „real“  and „pure“  knowledge creation. In con-
trary, because rationalistic driven epistemology fails, social epistemology asks 
if not the social context, aims and values of the scientific community may be 
„validating“  sources of knowledge creation (Longino, 2002, p. 122f.). The 
questions of such a social epistemology will be: to which extent can the social 
context bring about knowledge creation instead of merely belief (or content) 
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creation? To which extent may we be able to reconcile normativity on one side, 
and open-ended context and concepts on the other? How do we avoid dogmatic 
rationality on one side and borderless relativism on the other? How could we 
define normative guidelines not only for abstract (non-existing) rational agents 
but also for the social environment of knowledge creation? And finally, how 
could this help us with defining normative guidelines for organizational knowl-
edge creation? These questions will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 7: Social Epistemology
7.1 The rational-social dichotomy
If we take a look at theories of scientific knowledge creation, we can identify a 
„rational“ and a „social“ approach (Longino, 2002, Chapter 4). 
7.1.1 The rational approach
The „rational approach“  is based on rationalistic epistemology as discussed in 
the previous chapter, i.e. it treats scientific knowledge as an outcome of proc-
esses which follow normative-rationalized criteria based on justified true belief. 
Scientific content has to be true, as well as justified by rules of logic, rational 
reasoning, and its correspondence with reality. For supporters of the rational 
approach, the normative foundation of the distinction between scientific knowl-
edge and non-knowledge (or mere scientific content) can be derived from ra-
tionalistic epistemology. 
Longino suggests three views at (scientific) knowledge: knowledge as (a) 
content (knowledge is something), (b) knowing (knowledge is known by some-
one), and (c) knowledge-production (knowledge is something that is being cre-
ated). Applying these views to the rational approach, knowledge (a) is a subset 
of what is „true“. Furthermore, knowledge is (b) known by individual cognitive 
agents fulfilling the „justified true belief“  criteria. In science this construction 
process has to transform content (beliefs, ideas, theories) to justified and true 
knowledge. To do so, the rational approach also defines (c) basic criteria of sci-
entific knowledge-production processes like „empirical adequacy“, „logical co-
herence“, or „simplicity“  (figure 7.1 summarizes the rational approach of 
knowledge production along these three dimensions of knowledge).
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Knowledge as... The „rational“ approach to scientific knowledge
...content (a) Content is a subset of what is true
==> monism
... knowing (b) S knows p if
 S believes p
 p (p = true)
 S is justified in believing p
==> non-relativism
... knowledge-production (c) to justify true belief
• by observation (empirical adequacy)
• by reasoning (logical coherence, simplicity, etc.)
==> individualism
Figure 7.1: The „rational“ approach to knowledge, according to (Longino, 2002, p. 77ff.)
7.1.2 The social approach
According to Longino, there on the other hand is a „social approach“  which op-
poses the rational approach and defines knowledge as something produced and 
arranged exclusively within social processes. Here, knowledge is not what is 
true but only what becomes accepted and established in the social context of a 
scientific community. This view is backed by (social) research which indicates 
that modern science is far from being a purely „rational“  and „objective“  pro-
ject. Critical reflections have shown that many scientific practices are biased by 
ideological, sexist, racists, political, or economical factors (Haraway, 1988; 
Harding, 2004). Observing scientific knowledge creation in its day-by-day prac-
tice shows that for a scientific theory to become accepted (or to prevail against 
competing theories) is often not regulated by „rational scientifical“  criteria, but 
by external social factors, power relations, or sometimes even pure luck. Simi-
lar remarks have been made about technology creation (Pinch & Bijker, 
1984)110. The underlying claim is that the transformation from subjective con-
tent to objective knowledge cannot be measured by clear epistemic standards or 
criteria, but is taking place in „an action-based process that unfolds in a contro-
versial manner.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 43). Thus, to create knowledge is not to 
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110 See our reflections in chapter 4.3.1. 
discover the truth but to prevail in the struggle for acceptance within specific 
social groups (e.g. a specific scientific community). The creation of accepted 
knowledge is achieved by „epistemological closure“, i.e. as „(process) by which 
knowledge is socially legitimized and made durable.“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 44). 
For this „social“  approach, rational criteria like justified true belief or truth as 
an a priori concept of scientific inquiry are non-relevant for understanding sci-
entific knowledge (at least they do not have more legitimization than any other 
factors which influence knowledge claims becoming accepted). Thus, knowl-
edge ultimately is (a) not what is true but what is accepted; (b) not something 
that is justified but what a community agrees on; and (c) not something that is 
produced by individuals according to clear-cut rational rules, but something that 
is produced in a collective and controversial social process:  
Knowledge as... The „social“ approach to scientific knowledge
...content Content which is accepted in the community
==> non-monism
...knowing S knows p if
p is accepted in community
==> relativism
...knowledge-production Social processes, determining how knowledge is 
accepted in the community
==> non-individualism
Figure 7.2: The „social“ approach to knowledge, according to (Longino, 2002, p. 77ff.)
The social approach, in its most intensive form, has been introduced by soci-
ologists of science and technology. They are driven not by a normative but by a 
descriptive paradigm. Instead of defining an a priori normative concept of 
knowledge they focus on the observable, empirical, „real-world“  processes of 
knowledge production. These processes are not located in individualized cogni-
tive agents, but rather in communities. Knowledge is created in institutions and 
groups, lead by specific scientific and non-scientific interests, aims, and goals. 
For the defenders of the social approach, rational or normative criteria have no 
privileged status because knowledge-production can be determined by any 
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„processes or practices that succeed in fixing belief or in having some content 
accepted in some community“ (Longino, 2002, p. 84). 
From a rationalistic view, this is of course not acceptable, because the dis-
tinction between knowledge and non-knowledge would be entirely substituted 
by contingent social factors. The rationalistic philosopher would object that the 
„social“  approach consequently collapses in relativism. And in fact, although 
the social approach correctly criticizes the philosopher in relying on contrafac-
tual, over-rationalized, and idealized subjects, its flip-side is relativism. Without 
any normative criteria the social approach can only tell us something about 
what is empirically observable in scientific communities, which social proc-
esses (scientific or not) are involved in knowledge creation, and so forth. This is 
very similar to our objections agains Tsoukas‘  and Patriottas‘  descriptive ap-
proaches with regard to organizational knowledge (see chapter 5). And also 
here, within the field of science, a purely descriptive approach is somewhat un-
satisfying not only from the rationalistic philosophers standpoint. Also from a 
very intuitive standpoint it seems to be problematic that knowledge is nothing 
else than „belief-fixation“, i.e. nothing else than accepted content:
„there are patterns of belief fixation or content acceptance that have epistemically wor-
thy outcomes and some that do not. Divination, tea-leaf reading, the dictate of civil or 
religious authority are all methods of belief fixation that under most familiar circum-
stances issue in systems of representation that are less reliable than those resulting from 
sense perception or inductive inference. The normative philosopher wants to exclude 
those from the category of warranting practices.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 79)  
7.1.3 Towards a third approach: dissolving the dichotomy 
Longino suggests that philosophers are right in doing so but unnecessarily re-
strict their criteria to rationalized epistemology. Not only rational, but also so-
cial normative criteria are needed to guide knowledge creation processes. In 
other words, also the social can (and has to) be rational in regard to epistemic 
effectiveness. To „dissolve“  the dichotomy between rational and social, Long-
ino suggests to embrace the idea of the social construction of knowledge but to 
overcome its relativistic and merely descriptive stance. Connecting social con-
textualization of knowledge production (social approach) with epistemological 
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normativity (rational approach) could turn epistemology into a „normative the-
ory of social knowledge“ (Longino, 2002, p. 122).
But first we will analyze the insufficiencies of a rationalized approach. 
With these insufficiencies in mind we then will discuss the suggested social 
epistemological alternative. 
7.2 The underdetermination problem: insufficiencies of the 
rationalized approach
Similarly to our critical reflection upon rationalistic epistemology in chapter 6, 
Longino reveals an epistemic gap. This gap will turn out to be the reason why 
in science the creation of knowledge cannot be separated from its social con-
text. 
7.2.1 Underdetermination: the epistemic gap at the core of science 
Science usually produces theories („hypotheses“) which are based and backed 
by observations („evidence“)111. In philosophy of science it was early proposed 
that scientific content (knowledge claims, hypotheses, theories) has to be dis-
tinguished from the concrete observations on which that content is based on112. 
Hereby, the gap between theory and observations introduces a philosophical 
question. It stems from the fact that science does not only summarize observa-
tions but creates hypotheses about causes and connections of these observa-
tions. This implies that a theory always contains more than just observations 
and is not determined by data alone. A scientific theory is not only a bulk of ob-
servational data but a hypothetical construction about processes or structures 
explaining (and being supported by) observational evidence. There is a 
„gap between what is present to us and the processes that we suppose to produce the 
world that is present to us“ (Longino, 2002, p. 125). 
The philosopher of science Pierre Duhem first coined that issue the „underde-
termination problem“, stating that a theory can never be fully determined (or 
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111 I will not discuss formal sciences like mathematics or logic. 
112  The first  such explicit distinction was introduced by the „logical empiricists“  (Carnap, 1932; 
Neurath, 1932; Skirbekk, 1977)
justified) by the data it is based on (Duhem, 1954). The motivation for taking 
such a view is that theories and hypotheses contain much more than just refer-
ences to raw data. A theory is embedded in assumptions of how to select and 
collect data, thereby predetermining scope and characteristics of the theory en-
visioned. It has to establish connections and correlations between observations, 
hereby assuming processes or structures in the world which themselves cannot 
be observed. Generally, the creation of scientific hypotheses and knowledge 
claims is always embedded in a framework of conditions, standards, and aims 
of inquiry, as well as in methodological and substantive „background assump-
tions“. And as these background assumptions guide the creation of theories (as 
well as interpretation and collection of data), not only data itself determines a 
theory or knowledge claim. 
Duhem‘s argument for theories being underdetermined by data was that 
scientists indispensably rely on (material and/or mental) instruments which lie 
between the world and the theory-creating scientist (Duhem, 1954). For exam-
ple, the resolution of a microscope (or, say, specific features of a telescope) 
constitute methodological assumptions which permeate theory building and 
makes already observation itself „theory-laden“. Other methodological assump-
tions are, for example, the choice of a specific field method, the specific con-
figuration of experiment settings, and so forth. 
Additionally to methodological assumptions, there are substantive as-
sumptions prevalent, which are based on presumptions about the world. For in-
stance, to conclude that the observed correlation between a specific hormone 
and a specific human behavior gives evidence of that the specific hormone 
causes the specific human behavior, is carried by the assumption that hormones 
causally control central behavioral processes. It excludes the possibility, for in-
stance, of the two observations (hormones and behavior) being epiphenomenal 
or being causal in the opposite direction (both variations which may also have 
been supported by the given data). More generally, to trace back observational 
correlation to a causal relation is itself based on a high-level metaphysical as-
sumption about causality. As Hume or Kant have remarked a long time ago, 
causality is not an observable phenomena in the world but an assumption of ob-
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serving subjects to explain and structure their world (see chapter 1.3). Scientific 
theories are based on „claims that link the events observed as data with postu-
lated processes and structures“  (Longino, 2002, p. 126). This „link“  cannot be 
accomplished by data alone, because observations do not link themselves to 
their underlying processes, which are hypothesized by the scientific theory. 
Substantive claims like causality are, similar to methodologies, instruments, 
tools, or mental frameworks, carried into scientific inquiry by scientists and 
their respective scientific communities. Background assumptions of the knowl-
edge creation context pervade the creation of scientific theories and co-
determine how observational data is both fabricated and interpreted. 
Besides methodological and substantive assumptions also the aim of sci-
entific inquiry already contains assumptions about the world and how it is to be 
explained. If, for example, a scientific community commits itself to the aim of 
curing cancer in determining its causes, this already presupposes that cancer 
exists and that it has a cause; or to aim at knowing the structure of matter, re-
quires to assume that there is matter and that it has a structure (Longino, 2002, 
p. 176). The existence and importance of aims and background assumptions 
shows how „questions and tools (...) presuppose (...) a model of the portion of 
the world being investigated“  (Longino, 2002, p. 188). Aims, standards, sub-
stantive and methodological presuppositions are „assumptions that guide in-
quiry and play a role in the interpretations of data“  (Longino, 2002, p. 176). 
This also explains the underdetermination issue and why „data alone are consis-
tent with different and conflicting hypotheses and require supplementation“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 126). Since theories not only contain protocols about data 
but also connect data in specific ways, it is possible that different theories ex-
plain the same observation. 
The supporters of the underdetermination problem explain this gap be-
tween theory and observations with the existence of background assumptions 
which are „supplementing“  data. And just as data, also background assumptions 
are contingent: the instruments used, the paradigm involved, and the method-
ologies applied are „chosen“  by the respective scientific community, which ex-
plains the possibility of plurality in science: 
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"in the context of their differing background beliefs and assumptions different aspects of 
the same state of affairs [become] evidentially significant“ (Longino, 1990, p. 47f.)
This does not say that theories cannot be compared or that aims and assump-
tions are a totally arbitrary choice. It just says that background assumptions are 
not self-evident or logically necessary: they are open to change113. Hence, the 
gap stated by the underdetermination problem is a fundamental one. It cannot 
be unequivocally or universally closed, since a theory always contains more 
than the data it is based on.
7.2.2 Underdetermination: the rationalists view
The presented view is challenged by many philosophers who - based on ration-
alistic epistemology - try to close the gap or to deny its existence. Positivists 
and other supporters of the „rational approach“  do so by referring to rational 
reasoning and logic as the missing link between data and hypotheses. Data is 
then not being supplemented by some contingent background assumptions but 
by universal and rational norms. According to this objection, scientific inquiry 
produces correct theories if, and only if, data is acquired and interpreted accord-
ing to rules of logic and rational „epistemic virtues“, whereby theories would be 
unequivocally acceptable or reject-able. Data supplemented by logic would be 
the ultimate indicator of truth. Hence, rational reasoning and empirical corre-
spondence by observations would be sufficient conditions for scientific knowl-
edge. „Rational reasoning“ hereby refers to well-known „epistemic virtues“  like 
accuracy, simplicity, coherence, explanatory power, and so forth (Goldman, 
2003, chapter 8.6; Longino, 1997, chapter 3). 
But such a rational approach is not as universal as it claims to be. If we 
take a closer look at the above „rational“  norms, then it turns out that they 
themselves are nothing but background assumptions. For instance, the rational-
istic norm that a theory has to be as simple as possible is itself a substantive 
(metaphysical) assumption that the world is simple. And this assumption is, to-
gether with all other background assumptions, neither self-evident nor logically 
190
113  In fact this openness for change of general assumptions is historically  important. Scientific 
revolutions where never based only on new observations, but on a general shift  of the „para-
digm“ from which a scientific community operates (Kuhn, 1970).  
necessary. Traditional epistemic values (i.e. the norms suggested by the „ra-
tional approach“) are background assumptions, and as such contingent. This can 
be shown by cases from scientific practice. 
7.2.3 Underdetermination: the scientific practice view
There may, for instance, be situations where defenders of a theory have to de-
cide which epistemic virtue is prioritized against another. A case from molecu-
lar biology demonstrates such a prioritization114:
In the 1950s the same phenomena (properties of mitochondrion blood cells) where ex-
plained by two diverging theories defended by two different scientific teams. One theory 
relied on the coherence with existing research, thereby accepting low accuracy in the 
micrographs of the electron microscope. The other theory was able to show much higher 
accuracy concerning micro-graphical evidence but was not compatible with existing 
research. One theory prioritized coherence, one accuracy. But both accuracy and coher-
ence are traditional epistemic virtues, and both theories represented „epistemic respect-
able positions“  (Longino, 2002, p. 180). However, only the theory with higher coherence 
prevailed. Being coherent (to other important disciplines) made it accepted in the com-
munity despite the fact that its accuracy of results was inferior. 
The prioritization of one virtue (coherence) over another (accuracy) was not 
logically predefined or determined by data, but dependent on many factors like 
the aims and standards of the epistemic community. 
Other cases show that it also is possible to (deliberately) depart scientific 
inquiry from other assumptions than the traditional ones. It has been observed 
that feminist driven scientists who based their work on non-traditional virtues 
like complexity, multi-causality, or pluralism successfully contributed new per-
spectives and gained epistemically accepted viewpoints (Longino, 2005).
Observing cases from scientific practice and the way how scientific content is 
produced reveals the relevance of background assumptions. The latter contextu-
alize scientific theories towards a variety of possible (and conflicting) values, 
norms, virtues, standards, presuppositions, social backgrounds, metaphysical 
foundations, and so forth. This contextualization makes plurality of scientific 
theories possible.  
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114 this case was introduced in (Longino, 2002, p. 179f.)
Helen Longino‘s „contextualism“ summarizes our hitherto developed view:  
 „(...) data underdetermine the theories, model, and hypotheses for which they serve as 
evidence. Theories and hypotheses always overreach available data. More crucially, the 
content (and language) of data descriptions and of explanatory hypotheses are different. 
For example, data can consist of correlations while hypotheses assert causal relations 
among correlated items. Thus, no purely formal relations can be established between 
them. Evidential relevance of data is secured instead by background assumptions, with 
the consequence that the same data can in different contexts serve as evidence for differ-
ent hypotheses.“ (Longino, 1996, p. 39)
7.2.4 Underdetermination: the philosophical view
That the underdetermination problem cannot be solved, i.e. that observation 
cannot be supplemented by logic (and epistemic virtues) alone, is not only sup-
ported by cases from scientific practice. It is grounded in the concept of (scien-
tific) knowledge itself. The origin of underdetermination lies in a „logical“  gap 
between observations and theory: 
„Data (...)  do not on their own (...) indicate that for which they can serve as evidence. 
Hypotheses, on the other hand, are or consist of statements whose content always ex-
ceeds that of the statements describing the observational data. There is, thus, a logical 
gap between data and hypotheses.“ (Longino, 1990, p. 58) 
Figure 7.3: The epistemic gap between scientific theory and observations 
It remains a general equivocality and ambiguity between concrete observations 
and generalized theories, no matter how accurate or wellformed a theory may 
be. This is confirmed by scientific practice but is ultimately grounded in the 
gap
Theory
Observations
192
open-ended character of knowledge itself. To see this more clearly we may 
compare (and connect) this discussion about scientific knowledge with the dis-
cussion about knowledge in general from chapter 6: 
Figure 7.4: The general epistemic gap & the gap at scientific knowledge  
In chapter 6.6 we concluded that knowledge propositions themselves are intrin-
sically ambiguous (allowing e.g. Gettier cases to emerge). This flexibility and 
latent ambiguity of concepts/theories undermine their unequivocal deduction 
from particulars/observations. Knowledge is open-ended and underdetermined 
not because an otherwise rational subject has been corrupted by a non-rational 
social world („context“), but - as we have seen analyzing the Gettier cases - be-
cause the constructed knowledge claims themselves are the source of open-
endedness and ambiguity. Hence, the gap between theory and observations 
claimed by underdetermination (figure 7.4, right illustration) is grounded in the 
gap between knowledge (as generalized concepts) and particulars (figure 7.4, 
left illustration).
Like in the discussion about general epistemology, this not necessarily has 
to terminate in epistemic nihilism; it does not entail to give up the search for 
criteria separating knowledge from non-knowledge. On the contrary, it should 
motivate us to adapt and enhance traditional rationalistic criteria: „reasoning, 
logic or observation are not irrelevant, but epistemologically insufficient“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 128). And they are insufficient because epistemology has to 
gap
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Knowledge in general Scientific knowledge
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define epistemic norms also for the social environment of knowledge produc-
tion. To get there, Longino suggests to connect the rational with the social ap-
proach. Let us first repeat the dichotomy in which both approaches are inter-
locked: The social approach takes underdetermination as reason to abandon 
normativity at all. Its conclusion is that all we can do is to observe and describe 
the social processes of knowledge creation (and criticize the alleged ideological 
blindness of the rationalists). From this view, knowledge criteria cannot be 
philosophically discussed or derived from some idea of knowledge, but are 
fully contingent to social interaction. The rational approach, on the other hand, 
operates with a too narrow idea of normativity which ultimately fails in provid-
ing sufficient justifying norms, since it cannot deal with open-endedness and 
underdetermination. Within the social approach, anything that is generated in 
social interaction can be knowledge, because no normative justification criteria 
are available at all. Within the rational approach, knowledge is constricted to 
non-social criteria only: 
„The dichotomizers each propose one kind of principle as either explanatory or justifica-
tory or both. Philosophical dichotomizers propose logic and basic empiricism. Socio-
logical dichotomizers propose social interaction. The former operate as norms, the latter 
as causal explanation. What each proposes is necessary, but neither is sufficient either as 
explanation or as justification. Logic and observation alone underdetermine, social inter-
action alone (where it determines at all) overdetermines.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 139)
As said before, the solution is to integrate both approaches. This can be done by 
acknowledging that knowledge creation is a justificatory practice guided by 
normative criteria. And as the social is the ultimate sphere where knowledge 
creation, confirmation, and acceptance is actually taking place we do need not 
only universal, a priori rules of rationalistic epistemology, but also social crite-
ria of knowledge creation. The social is epistemologically relevant. It is not 
only biasing rational justification but enabling it: 
„The social is not a corrupting but a validating element in knowledge." (Longino, 2002, 
p. 122).
But how is scientific knowledge connected to its social context in an epistemo-
logically relevant way?   
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7.3 „Map making“: community-dependent aims & standards in 
knowledge creation
How is the social connected to knowledge claims and science? To answer this 
question, let us compare knowledge creation with the making of a map115. 
In his story „Sylvie and Bruno“  Lewis Carroll ironically describes a map 
with a „scale of a mile to the mile“  (Carroll, 1890). The story tells about the 
process of map making which is guided by the criterium of accuracy alone. Fol-
lowing that criterium,  ultimately the map gained the same size as the terrain it 
mapped. Although being the most accurate map possible, it looses its ability for 
being a map at all. Inspired by Carroll, Jorge Luis Borges tells a similar story 
about a kingdom in which map making was driven by narrow scientific excel-
lence, and where again, in the end, maps had the same size and accuracy of the 
represented kingdom itself:
„In that empire, the craft of Cartography attained such perfection that the map of a single 
province covered the space of an entire city, and the map of the empire itself an entire 
Province. In the course of time, these extensive maps were found somehow wanting, and 
so the college of cartographers evolved a map of the empire that was of the same scale as 
the empire and that coincided with it point for point. Less attentive to the study of Car-
tography, succeeding generations came to judge a map of such magnitude cumbersome, 
and, not without irreverence, they abandoned it to the rigors of sun and rain. In the west-
ern deserts, tattered fragments of the map are still to be found, sheltering an occasional 
beast or beggar; in the whole nation, no other relic is left of the discipline of Geogra-
phy.“ (Borges, 1972)
A map is a representation of a part of the world. As such it has of course to cor-
respond („confirm“) to the world as well as it has to be accurate and coherent. 
But in which ways and in which accuracy it represents the terrain is not only a 
matter of the world or of the logical rules the map maker follows:
„The map with the best fit is not the one with the greatest possible resolution. Because 
that would duplicate the terrain being mapped, it would be useless.” (Longino, 2002, p. 
116).
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115 Strictly speaking, this is  no metaphorical comparison because creating a map  is a knowledge 
creation process.
Exclusively relying on criteria like accuracy and correspondence with observa-
tions, would possibly lead to the most „accurate“  and „true“  map there can be 
but nonetheless would be useless; who needs a map with a 1:1 resolution? 
Hence, the most accurate map is the most useless. Why? Because the advantage 
of a map (as well as that of scientific knowledge) stems from the fact that it 
subsumes concrete particulars under generalized concepts. Maps and scientific 
laws are both useful because they „do not represent a particular situation, but 
rather make salient a feature common to a family of similar situations.“  (Long-
ino, 2002, p. 117). Remember our discussion about organizational rules in chap-
ter 3.1: a non-generalized rule would simply be its one and only instance, and as 
such no rule anymore (at least not a useful one). Similarly, a scientific theory 
without general claims would consist only of a number of concrete „observation 
sentences“  and in consequence would seize to explain or predict anything. 
Loosing generalization is loosing meaning as well as usefulness. 
But one feature of generalization is its tension to particulars. And this fea-
ture opens the space both for open-endedness of knowledge claims as well as 
for the underdetermination problem (see again figure 7.4). The consequence for 
epistemology is that the distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge is 
not as easy to make as expected. Since knowledge claims (mundane claims, sci-
entific theory, maps, etc.) are in their nature open-ended and transcend the par-
ticularities of their instances, clear-cut, a priori criteria (e.g. pure accuracy or 
pure correspondence with the world) are not sufficient anymore. To make such 
criteria universal would, at the most, terminate in the 1:1 copy of observations 
and neglect the possible plurality of scientific theories (and that of different 
maps). However, this does not mean that maps do not have to be accurate or do 
not have to confirm to the world. It means that the required grade of accuracy 
and the way in which it has to confirm to the world is not determined a priori. 
Which criteria guide the creation of map-making and how these criteria are in-
terpreted is not regulated by a universal principle but by the intended use of the 
map:    
„How much confirmation, which accuracy and which kind of representation is required, 
depends on the purpose the representation is designed to serve” (Longino, 2002, p. 116). 
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The creation of a map, as well as of a theory, is bound to a community with spe-
cific aims and purposes in which the map will be used: a map designed for hik-
ing has other properties and a different need of accuracy than that designed for 
car driving or, say, oil drilling. The criteria of knowledge creation are not de-
termined by a priori principles or raw data, but are also a 
„social choice, a matter of goals collectively endorsed in the community conducting in-
quiry (...) We rate the adequacy of theories and models by their power to enable us to 
pursue our endeavors successfully with respect to the domains of which they are repre-
sentations.” (Longino, 2002, p. 119, my emphasis) 
The conclusion is that criteria for successful (scientific) knowledge creation are 
not a priori given but depend on aims and standards endorsed by the respective 
(scientific) community. Without scientific knowledge being linked back to its 
community, theories would be „abandoned to the rigors of sun and rain“. 
So far, we have seen that the social context is a crucial sphere of knowledge 
creation. The social context of a scientific community determines aims, stan-
dards, and background assumptions for the knowledge creation process. But a 
social epistemology goes beyond such a merely descriptive observation. It aims 
at explaining not only that the social is a central element, but also how it may 
operate as a „validating“  element and how it could determine the separation of 
knowledge from non-knowledge: 
„Like other grounds of knowledge, the social is also a source of error. Thus, to say, that 
the social aspect of cognitive practices is part of the ground of the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion is not yet to show how this is so.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 123) 
To ask for how the social distinguishes knowledge is to ask the question of 
normativity. To extend rationalistic epistemology with a social epistemology 
we have to develop a normativity for the social context of knowledge creation. 
This distinguishes a mere theory of knowledge creation from an epistemology. 
The latter, turned to its social dimension, requires social norms for social em-
bedded knowledge creation116.
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116  This terminology motivated our own terminological distinction between a theory of organiza-
tional knowledge (which focuses on the „epistemic attributes“  of organizations) and an organiza-
tional epistemology (which focuses on „epistemological criteria“  for organizational knowledge 
creation). 
7.4 Social norms for knowledge creation
A social epistemology cannot tell us which aims and standards a specific scien-
tific community should endorse since this lies in the responsibility of the com-
munity itself. Social epistemology rather may illuminate general criteria of so-
cial interaction by which a community creates knowledge according to its aims. 
To do so it is important to understand knowledge creation not only as embedded 
in a social context but also as a normative project. The latter has been endorsed 
by rationalistic epistemology which aims at defining logical, formal, and uni-
versal criteria to distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge. But these 
knowledge-validating criteria turned out to be problematic when exposed to the 
underdetermination problem. As a result, social epistemology suggests to rede-
fine justification and truth towards a framework which sees social processes as 
knowledge-validating processes. To do so, we have to overcome the individual-
istic stance of the rationalistic approach. Thus, knowledge creation is not only a 
logical process within individual, rational agents, but a socially embedded 
transformation from a subjective (individual) opinion, idea, or information to 
inter-subjective (collective) knowledge:
„Of course, Galileo and Newton and Darwin and Einstein were individuals of extraordi-
nary intellect, but what made their brilliant ideas knowledge were the processes of criti-
cal reception. (...) Idea or belief generation is not the same as knowledge production, 
which involves processes of validation (...)“ (Longino, 2002, p. 122, original emphasis) 
It requires more than the formulation of a new idea for something to become 
knowledge. It requires validation and critical evaluation within a social context 
in order to transform opinion to knowledge. Hence, individuals know only „to 
the extent they interact critically with others in cognitive communities“  (Long-
ino, 2002, p. 122). Hereby, knowledge has not only to be validated within ra-
tional rules of logic, but also within the social context of knowledge creation, 
i.e. by critical interaction in a community with specific aims and standards.
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According to Longino, the key to such a social epistemology is to understand 
scientific knowledge creation as critical discursive interaction:
„Critical discursive interactions are social processes of knowledge production. They 
determine what gets to remain in the (...) pool of information that counts as knowledge. 
Thus, a normative account of knowledge must rest on norms governing such interac-
tions. Criticism must be epistemologically effective - by helping a community to avoid 
falsehood and by helping to bring its accepted content into alignment with its cognitive 
goals and its cognitive standards. Effective critical interactions transform the subjective 
into the objective, not by canonizing one subjectivity over others, but by assuring that 
what is ratified as knowledge has survived criticism from multiple points of view.“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 129)
Longino defines four features of such a space of critical discursive interaction 
(Longino, 2002, p. 128ff.):
(1) Venues of criticism
(2) Uptake of criticism
(3) Public Standards
(4) Tempered Equality 
These four features form the basic enabling conditions of a knowledge creation 
space in which the transformation of content to knowledge is more likely to 
succeed. But only if the transformation is guided, i.e. constrained by two social 
epistemic norms: 
(A) Acceptability and 
(B) Confirmation
 
First, we will briefly examine the four enabling features of critical discursive 
interaction (chapter 7.5). Then we will discuss the constraining, main social 
epistemic norms „acceptability“  and „confirmation“  (chapter 7.6). After that we 
will focus on the importance of reflection upon those constraining norms (chap-
ter 7.7).  
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7.5 Enabling: Critical discursive interaction
7.5.1 Venues and uptake of criticism (1st & 2nd feature of critical discur-
sive interaction)
The social context of scientific knowledge production ought to provide space 
not only for distribution and presentation of new ideas, but also forums for 
these ideas to be criticized, scrutinized, and discussed. Procedures and mecha-
nism have to be given to make critical interaction as important as new knowl-
edge generation itself. Additionally, response, incorporation, and consideration 
of criticism has to be an integrative part of any scientific practice. Thinkers like 
Karl Popper or Thomas Kuhn argued that substantial scientific progress can 
only be initiated by critical debate and „falsification“  (Kuhn, 1970; Popper, 
2002). Without directly referring to critical rationalism (Popper) or the theory of 
scientific revolutions (Kuhn), also Longino’s account seems to be driven by the 
idea that knowledge production is never done from a tabula rasa but always 
emerges out of critical intellectual interaction with existing knowledge claims. 
Criticism and its uptake are then not only additional activities to „original“  re-
search but a necessary part of it.
Although it may seem obvious that science ought to be driven by open 
critical discourse, the mentioned conditions cannot be taken for granted in to-
days societies. Post-industrial institutions often work against these requirements 
because of (a) the limitation of space and time, (b) commerce and industrial in-
terests, and (c) due to aiming at only positive results (Longino, 2002, p. 129). 
This „marginalization of critical discourse“  poses a threat for scientific knowl-
edge creation and undermines open social interaction. Hence, the latter is not 
seen only as a description of existing knowledge creation environments but as 
normative criteria for the transformation of something (like beliefs, opinions, 
theories, content) into knowledge.  
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7.5.2 Public Standards (3rd feature of critical discursive interaction)
Critical interaction requires not only venues, but also a communicative common 
ground by which discussion, debate, and dialogue is possible: 
„Participants in a dialogue must share some referring terms, some principles of infer-
ence, and some values or aims to be served by the shared activity of discursive interac-
tion“ (Longino, 2002, p. 130). 
Which content counts as knowledge and which not ought not be determined by 
the „whim of individuals“  but by public standards to which members of the 
community are bound (or feel themselves bound). A community‘s standards are 
not arbitrarily given but linked back to the „overall cognitive aims“  and goals of 
the respective communities (Longino, 2002, p. 130f.). On the other hand, also 
standards themselves are to be open for critics and transformation (which will 
be discussed in chapter 7.7). 
7.5.3 Tempered Equality (4th feature of critical discursive interaction)
Critical discursive interaction is grounded in the possibility for knowledge to be 
reflected and created from multiple point of views. Hence, equal intellectual 
access („intellectual authority“) to knowledge sources and debate is essential. 
Social position, economic-, or political power must not be driving forces of 
critical dialogue. All relevant perspectives have to be represented to expose hy-
potheses to the „broadest range of criticism“  (Longino, 2002, p. 132). All „ex-
clusionary practices“  ought to be avoided, since marginalization of specific 
groups (e.g. women or members of racial minorities) is „not only a social injus-
tice, but a cognitive failure“; thus, exclusion is both a moral and an epistemo-
logical problem because it „reduces the critical resources of the community“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 132). Therefore, an additional normative criteria is that a 
community not only accepts or allows, but actively encourages and „culti-
vates“ the emergence of alternative critical perspectives. 
Although according to this account, everyone is invited to join the critical 
discourse of a community, one is not automatically included. Equality of intel-
lectual authority has to be restricted („tempered“) to the standards and aims of 
the respective community. As we will see below, compliance to cognitive stan-
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dards of a community is part of the acceptance process of knowledge creation. 
Hence, for a multi-perspective scientific discourse to emerge, standards should 
not only be enabling, i.e. „public“  and generally accessible; they should also be 
constraining in order to keep contributions, knowledge creation, and criticism 
in scope of the aims of the respective community.
Hitherto, we have followed Longino’s attempt to introduce enabling features of 
a knowledge creation space, envisioned as „critical discursive interaction“. This 
has not been a description of general features of existing discourses117. It rather 
is a prescription of how successful knowledge creation spaces ought to look 
like. Thus, on this level Longino’s account is already normative. But how are 
the presented features justified? 
The grounding of critical discursive interaction lies in the two characteris-
tics of knowledge which we have analyzed so far, i.e. (a) open-endedness (and 
its consequences like Gettier-cases or the underdetermination problem) and (b) 
normativity (and the quest for a distinctive, non-arbitrary definition of knowl-
edge). Because of (a), the social space of knowledge creation needs to be open 
and enabling: it needs to promote multiple views, provide transparent stan-
dards, equal access to the field, and so forth. Because of (b), the social space of 
knowledge creation needs to be normatively guided and constraining: it needs 
to promote critical views, provide transparent standards, and restrain („tem-
per“) access to the field. These constraining criteria of a social epistemology 
will be the topic in our next chapter. 
Note that altogether the features of critical discursive interaction work 
towards a normative distinction of knowledge. Thereby, the location of this dis-
tinction is not universal rationality. It is rather located within the social field of 
knowledge creation. In other words, the social is understood as a field of 
knowledge validation: not any content ought to become knowledge, but only 
content which has been exposed to critical interaction. Only after a new theory 
has been critically evaluated by multiple views, within an environment of equal 
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117 although there certainly are communities which fulfill many of the presented features (see, for 
instance, our organizational use-case in chapter 10).
access, a shared and public set of standards, and so forth, the theory has passed 
a (temporarily successful) transformation from content to knowledge. 
What we need to understand now is how a community is connected to 
critical discursive interaction. How do epistemic actors work towards knowl-
edge that is accepted and confirmed by their scientific community? 
7.6 Constraining: „Acceptability“ and „Confirmation“
As discussed in chapter 6, traditional normative accounts of epistemology are 
based on the concept of justified true belief. Longino retains the notion of justi-
fied true belief but extends and opens its meaning towards the social dimension 
and communitarian character of non-idealized, empirical subjects. Hence, in 
terms of social epistemology, „content“  (beliefs) has to be epistemically „ac-
ceptable“  (justified) and has to „confirm“  to the aims of the respective commu-
nity (it has to be true) in order to be knowledge. Let us now take a look at the 
two main substitutions, i.e. that from (1) justification to acceptability and that 
from (2) truth to confirmation. 
 First, justification is substituted by the notion of acceptability. For con-
tent to be justified it has not simply to follow universal logical rules. It rather 
has to be epistemically accepted, i.e. it has to comply with the standards and 
criteria endorsed by the respective community („C“). Content in order to be 
counted as knowledge has to „satisfy the standards adopted by C“  (Longino, 
2002, p. 138) and it has to be carried out in a context which meets the condi-
tions of critical discursive interaction. The difference to rational approaches is 
that acceptability is relativized to the standards of a specific community. 
Second, truth is substituted by the notion of confirmation. Unlike to what 
„truth“  mostly entails, confirmation requires not a 1:1 correspondence with an 
objective world. Although confirmation demands from scientific content to be 
about „objects“, the decision whether a specific content confirms to its intended 
object(s) or not is not bound to universal truth but contextualized to a commu-
nity („C“). Thus, content „confirms to its intended object(s)“  if it „sufficiently 
(...) enables members of C to carry out their projects with respect to that/those 
objects“  (Longino, 2002, p. 136). In the field of science such „projects“  usually 
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are experiments or predictions within specific domains (e.g. in empirical physi-
cal sciences). But such projects could also be the application to some practical 
purposes (e.g. in the engineering sciences). No matter what a specific commu-
nity intends to do with its produced knowledge, confirmation with the world 
means the application to a community‘s purposes. It means, that content „A“ 
conforms if „accepting A enables us to carry out our projects in the domain A is 
about“  (Longino, 2002, p. 137). The „projects“  of a community are of course 
contingent to the community‘s (explicitly or implicitly given) aims. The com-
munity of molecular physics does different things with its knowledge than 
computer scientists. A molecular physicist uses specific knowledge claims (e.g. 
the hypotheses of a specific reaction of a molecule under some specific circum-
stances) to predict outcomes of specific experiments, carried out with specific 
devices in specific settings. One aim of that community may be to successfully 
predict the outcomes of experiments on a molecular level. A computer security 
scientist, on the other hand, develops new knowledge, for instance, a new en-
cryption algorithm in order to be able to encrypt (and decrypt) data. One aim of 
that community may be to produce knowledge that successfully can be applied 
to enhance security within the domain of computer systems. In both cases, 
knowledge ought to enable the respective community to carry out actions to-
wards its aims. 
To conclude, acceptability refers to standards of a scientific community, 
confirmation to aims of a scientific community. The two norms constrain 
knowledge creation (a) to a common language within common standards and 
critical discussion (acceptability), and (b) to common aims, i.e. knowledge 
should allow a community to „pursue“  its „endeavors successfully“  (confirma-
tion). 
In Longino’s account, acceptability and confirmation are logically bound 
together because their foundation, i.e. standards and aims, are bound together, 
too (see figure 7.5). The logical interdependence of aims and standards was one 
outcome of our previous map analogy: remember that the purpose of the users 
of the map (the aims of a community) determined which accuracy and which 
mode of representation should be followed (the standards of a community). In 
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fact, first there is „a set of cognitive goals, and of practical ends“  which regulate 
„cognitive endeavours (and) constitutes a cognitive community out of a set of 
individuals“  (Longino, 2002, p. 145). This set of goals and practical ends then 
„specify criteria for satisfying theses goals, including methodological proce-
dures, tolerable error limits, as well as substantive assumptions about the do-
mains under investigation that must be preserved in any model or theory of 
them.“  (Longino, 2002, p. 145). Because standards and aims are bound to-
gether, also the two norms acceptability and confirmation are jointly inter-
related. To conclude, in order to become knowledge, content needs to be ac-
cepted (it has to comply with standards of the community) and confirmed (it has 
to comply with the aims of a community).
Figure 7.5: Socialized normative criteria of knowledge creation
Acceptability and confirmation are normatively118 dependent on their communi-
ty‘s aims  and standards but also on the principles of critical discursive interac-
tion. A scientific community has to align knowledge creation with its aims 
(confirmation) and standards (acceptance) and to embed it into a space charac-
terized by venues and uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered 
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Socialized normative criteria of knowledge creation 
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118 to be „normatively“  dependent  means no mechanical determination, but to be in a situation of 
epistemic responsibility; here, responsibility is the obligation to confirm and accept knowledge 
aligned towards aims and standards of the community. Of course actors can do otherwise. How-
ever, from our normative viewpoint, they „should“ (or „ought“) not. The reason for this is  epis-
temic. It is based on the idea of knowledge as a non-arbitrary (yet open-ended) concept.  
equality. In this way knowledge is bound to normative criteria, as well as it is 
open to plurality and provisionality. It is open, because its substantive and 
shared standards are contingent to communities and their aims, which can 
change (see chapter 7.7). It is normative, because knowledge creation (as well 
as the creation of aims and standards themselves) emerges within social, inter-
active settings, which are bound to acceptability and confirmation. Hereby, the 
defined features of critical discursive interaction (criticism, public standards, 
equality) are the principles and guiding norms which are in general valid for all 
cognitive communities. This general claim is possible without falling back to 
substantive metaphysical universality because the presented normative discur-
sive criteria are no substantive but formal criteria. They do not substantially de-
termine which standards and criteria ought to be in place (this is task of the 
community). They rather guide the form of social interaction in which knowl-
edge ought to be created (Longino, 2002, p. 148)119. 
The presented non-dichotomized, social epistemological approach connected 
open-endedness (and underdetermination) of knowledge with normativity. 
Thus, it may give valuable input for our inquiry. It may provide an epistemo-
logical framework for specifying features of successful knowledge creation en-
vironments. In the last chapters we outlined the main features of such an envi-
ronment: knowledge creation ought to be embedded in an (1) enabling space of 
critical discursive interaction, and (2) in an constraining space of aims and 
standards „regulat(ing) the discourse in their respective communities“  (Long-
ino, 1997, p. 29). Figure 7.6 illustrates (a simplified version of) this two-fold 
process of enabling and constraining:
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119 For the crucial difference between substance and form, as well as its meaning for the discus-
sions about relativism, constructivism, and postmodernism see (Seirafi, 2007, 2010).
Figure 7.6: Enabling and constraining the knowledge creation environment according to social 
epistemology
7.7 Reflecting: double looped knowledge creation
As already mentioned, not only produced knowledge but also involved aims 
and standards have a provisional character and are open to change. Hence, also 
the reconciliation of a community‘s aims and standards is a knowledge creation 
process and therefore subject to epistemological reflection. 
We may distinguish between two levels of knowledge creation. First, 
there is  „common“  knowledge creation, i.e. the venue of knowledge creation 
within a communities aims and standards. On the other hand, there is a second 
level which is about the creation (or redesign) of the aims and standards them-
selves. And as history of science shows, it is the shifts and reconstructions of 
the fundamental groundings and assumptions of a scientific discipline (i.e. 
changes at the second level) leading to major and most substantive progress. 
To distinguish these two levels of discourse, constructivist inspired theo-
ries about knowledge and learning have distinguished two „loops“  of knowl-
edge creation. As already discussed in chapter 4.2, single loop learning happens 
within a paradigm whereby a second loop learning changes the paradigm itself 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978). These ideas from theories of (organizational) learning 
can be adapted to any knowledge creation activity (Peschl, 2007):  
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Figure 7.7: Single and double loop knowledge creation (Peschl, 2007, p. 120)
As also already outlined in chapter 4.2, the model of double-loop learning cor-
relates with ideas from philosophy science, where, for instance, Thomas Kuhn 
makes the distinction between „puzzle solving“  and „paradigm shifts“  (Kuhn, 
1970; Peschl, 2003, p. 120). Thus, a holistic social epistemology has to empha-
size the fact that also background assumptions, standards, and aims (and not 
only single knowledge claims and hypotheses) are open to contingency and 
change. 
From our social epistemological viewpoint, we deal with two knowledge 
creation discourses (figure 7.8). At a first-order discourse the knowledge crea-
tion process is about confirmation and acceptability of knowledge claims. This 
first-order discourse is bound to aims and standards of the respective commu-
nity and to the formal requirements of critical discursive interaction. But of 
course also these aims and standards are to be open to change and development. 
Hence, scientific (and in consequence also organizational) communities ought 
to scrutinize, modify, and (re-)create their second-order level of knowledge, too. 
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process of learning by downloading, an alter-
native notion of knowledge is employed in
single-loop learning: a shift from understand-
ing knowledge as an object towards under-
standing knowledge as process has occurred in
this approach (e.g., Glanville 1998; Pask 1976;
Scott 2001).
This procedure is structur lly equivalent
to the processes of knowledge acquisition and
th ory formation as can be found in the natu-
ral sciences. More specifically, single-loop
learning describes the process of what Kuhn
refers to as “puzzle solving” (Kuhn 1970): it is
a process of learning and adaptation within a
chosen (scientific) paradigm. In other words,
the more or less consciously chosen premises
and assumptions predetermine a space of pos-
sible “solutions,” theories, knowledge and the
learner has only to explore (in the sense of
making explicit) this pre-structured knowl-
edge space.
This learning strategy tries to go beyond
the behavioral level (see Table 2) and to
develop knowledge about the dynamics and
the functioning of the observed phenome-
non. This is achieved by constructing mecha-
nisms (= knowledge) that “explain” the
observed behavioral patterns by generating
them (e.g., in the form of concrete predic-
tions, algorithms, etc.). That is what hap-
pened on a superficial level in the case study in
section 3.
4.2.3 I troducing reflection s a learning strat-
egy. Single-loop learning clearly has some
limitations, such as its rather conservative
character (implying a low chance of acquiring
radically new knowledge), its limitation to a
predefined learning/concept space, primacy
of projection, lack of reflection, etc. As has
been shown in the context of the discussion of
“Ba” (see 2.2), it is necessary to provide a well-
orchestrated pattern of constraints so that a
deep understanding and profound change
can be achieved in knowledge work. In order
to overcome some of the limitations of single-
loop learning, an extension is introduced: a
second feedback loop is introduced which
realizes a kind of meta-learning strategy. This
learning paradigm is referred to as double-
loop learning. It is also known as “two-cycle
learning model” (cf. Rescher 1977;
Scott 2001) extending Kolb’s (1984) model
with a second loop (the inner loop is referred
to as “how-loop/knowledge” and the external
outer loop as “why loop/knowledge”).
This second (outer) feedback loop takes
into consideration that any kind of knowl-
edge is always based on assumptions, pre-
mises, or a paradigm (Kuhn 1970). In general,
knowledge always has to be seen as being
embedded in and pre-structured by a partic-
ular framework of reference. Knowledge
receives its meaning and structures from this
framework of reference. Thus, understanding
of a phenomenon can only be reached if this
framework is taken into account because it
provides the context and the “semantic infra-
structure/background.” This framework of
reference plays a key role in the process of
learning as it determines the structure of the
space of potential knowledge and gives mean-
ing to its basic dimensions. The role of the
framework of reference is never made explicit
in the context of single-loop learning. It seems
that this framework of reference is stable; due
to this seeming constancy it is a kind of “blind
spot” in our thinking, perception, and under-
standing. This implies that we do not nor-
mally have a conscious experience of these
premises, assumptions, etc. on which our
thinking is implicitly based. Taking a closer
look reveals, however, that this framework of
reference is not as stable as it seems.
The double-loop learning strategy takes this
potential for changes in the framework of ref-
erence into consideration by introducing a
second feedback loop (see Figure 3; cf. “why-
loop”; e.g., Rescher 1977; Scott 2001). This is
implies that a completely new dynamic
becomes possible in the whole process of
learning and knowledge creation: each modi-
fication in the set of premises or in the frame-
work of reference causes a radical change in
the structure, dimensions, dynamics, etc. of
the space of knowledge. By that process, a new
space of knowledge opens up so that com-
pletely new and different theories, knowledge,
interpretation patterns, perspectives, etc.
about the phenomenon under investigation
become possible. In the context of science, this
process can be compared to what Kuhn refers
to as a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1970).
The role of reflection. The method applied to
this process is basically the technique of
reflection (e.g., Bohm 1996; Depraz, Varela et
al. 2003; Rodgers 2002; Rogers 2001;
Scharmer 2002; and many others). It is a
process of radically questioning and changing
the premises and studying their implications
Figure 3: Double-loop learning: single-loop learning is extended by a second external learning 
loop that is responsible for the dynamics of the framework of reference.
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Figure 7.8: First and second order discourse from a social epistemological viewpoint
Also this second level ought to be bound to normative criteria of critical discur-
sive interaction (Longino, 2002, p. 136f.)120. Longino concludes that any scien-
tific community should be aware of (and reflective upon) its deeper and more 
fundamental level of background assumptions, ontological commitments, stan-
dards, and aims. A proper knowledge creation environment should provide 
critical discursive interaction, not only for its stock of knowledge, but also for 
the (re-)construction of its aims and standards (Longino, 2002, p. 134f.). 
This third normative implication of „reflection“  completes our view on a 
social epistemology. Hence, in our developed terms, we may conclude the three 
StandardsAims
AcceptabilityConfirmation
1st order discourse
2nd order discourse
critical
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120  Otherwise, our account of social epistemology would leave this important second level of 
knowledge creation without  any normativity. From a critical point of  view, one then could object 
that  if  we fail in providing normative criteria for that second level, we ultimately would be exposed 
to relativism. This is because we grounded our normative criteria on elements (aims and stan-
dards) which were themselves not bound to any norms. Hence, the argument would conclude, in 
the end there is no rock bottom on which the whole approach lies upon. 
! In fact, we do not have clearly defined aims and standards while evaluating aims and 
standards,  but this does not mean that there are absolutely no general guiding aims or stan-
dards available (we will deal with this in chapter 9.5).  Furthermore, the normative criteria of dis-
cursive interaction are formal criteria for any knowledge creation environment and not fully de-
pendent on underlying aims and standards (we will also explicate that argument in chapter 9.5). 
norms (1) enabling, (2) constraining and (3) reflecting121 in following graphical 
summary:
     Figure 7.9: Core norms of social epistemology: enabling, constraining, and reflecting
7.8 Excursus: local & general epistemology
Before summarizing this chapter, let us shortly locate social epistemology 
within the philosophical discourse. 
 According to Longino, social epistemology represents a general episte-
mology. It is a topic of philosophy and covers the hitherto mentioned general 
conditions of knowledge (like critical discursive interaction as well as the pair 
of acceptability and confirmation). But it does not discuss concrete epistemo-
logical criteria which are in place in scientific practice (unless in examples and 
use-cases). These are in the hands of the concrete local communities. Longino 
proposes a kind of division of labor: on one hand, specific aims and standards 
are to be (re-)defined in the respective communities (e.g. molecular physics or 
computer science). On the other hand, general epistemological conditions - like, 
for instance, critical discursive interaction or knowledge as justified true belief - 
are topics of philosophy. Both types of reflection and knowledge creation are 
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121  These three terms are not used by Longino. They are our own expression and systematiza-
tion of  her social epistemology. A systematization which we are going to reuse in the shift to or-
ganizations in chapter 9. 
subject to criticism and change, whereas one type is „local“, as the other is 
„general“. 
Note the circular characteristic of „general“  philosophical epistemology, 
i.e. that the creation of general criteria of knowledge is itself subject to these 
criteria. Strictly speaking, to change a general knowledge condition, like e.g. 
acceptability, that very condition has to be in place. In its most paradox implica-
tion, the refutation of a general concept is only possible on basis of that general 
concept: for instance, the refutation of acceptability has itself to be accepted. 
This „performative self-contradiction“  is a classical problem of philosophical 
reflection. Authors like Karl-Otto Apel or Jürgen Habermas have referred to it 
as a reason why some very general concepts of knowledge and communication 
cannot be subject to any contingency but are fixed and possess necessary truth 
(Apel, 1988; Habermas, 1984). A general concept is „ultimately justified“ 122, 
the argument goes, if an opponent who disagrees to it must hereby necessarily 
rely on it123. 
Longino, on the other hand, suggests a more modest approach: philoso-
phy and (social) epistemology discuss the possible meanings of general con-
cepts like knowledge, its social nature, its criteria, and so forth. The grounding 
of this discussion is not some ultimate, un-disagreeable ground, but a „shared 
sense of what knowledge is“  (Longino, 2002, p. 174). As such, epistemology is 
similar to any other scientific endeavor and open to criticism and change, even 
with regard to its basic concepts, standards, and aims124. 
What distinguishes general epistemology from local epistemology is the 
larger scope of the former: general epistemology discusses knowledge as a 
meaningful concept, local epistemologies discuss what counts as knowledge 
within their own specific fields: 
211
122 authors translation; original quote: „letztbegründet“
123  E.g. the law of the excluded middle:  Apel or Habermas would say that to refute this law one 
would have to apply it.  Hence, to them, it  is „ultimate“ (or „transcendental“) because it is neces-
sarily at the bottom of any knowledge claim.   
124  Longino’s criteria of critical discursive interaction are themselves partly based on Habermas’ 
notion of „communicative action“.  Especially  the conditions of tempered equality and open critical 
dialogue is related to Habermas „consensus theory“. However, the difference lies in the fact that 
Longino’s introduced norms are criteria for „legitimate consensus“ rather than criteria for „truth“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 131).
„The argument I have offered (...)  depends on an analysis of the relation between cogni-
tive aspirations and cognitive resources and on an intuitive distinction between knowl-
edge and opinion that I take to be shared. To the extent the intuition is shared and cor-
rectly articulated in the conditions, the analysis specifies in normative terms the meaning 
of a normative concept. Those who reject the conditions have a different concept of 
knowledge, or perhaps, a concept of something else. So, there is a sense in which even 
the general conditions are local, just less local than particular norms adopted in particu-
lar communities in conformity with the general conditions.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 174)
7.9 Summary: social epistemology bridging the dichotomy be-
tween rational and social  
The interconnected notions of acceptability and confirmation relativize knowl-
edge to communities. But unlike common relativism, the contextualization to 
communities is not fully arbitrary because it is guided by critical discursive in-
teraction. This connects the notion of knowledge with social dynamics without 
rejecting the traditional normative definition of justified true belief. The latter is 
rather reformulated to accepted confirmed content. Equipped with the norma-
tive criteria described above, the presented social epistemological account is 
neither skeptical nor relativistic. Compared to the two dichotomized ends of 
„rational“  and „social“  approaches, the introduced approach has crucial advan-
tages: as the rational approach is non-relativistic at the price of being non-
socialized („individualistic“), and as the social approach is socialized and plu-
ralistic at the price of relativism, Longino‘s „non-dichotomizers way“  claims to 
be socialized and non-relativistic:
Knowledge 
as...
Rational approach 
(„Philosopher“)
Social approach 
(„Sociologist“)
„The Non-
dichotomizers way“
Knowing Non-Relativism Relativism Non-Relativism
Knowledge-
production
Individualism Non-
Individualism
Non-Individualism
Content Monism Non-Monism Non-Monism
Figure 7.10: Different approaches to „knowledge“, according to (Longino, 2002, p. 77ff.)
212
Longino’s account contextualizes knowledge creation to its social embedded-
ness without loosing a core idea of western epistemology, which is normativity. 
This avoids the relativistic trap of social approaches:    
„These definitions do relativize the various concepts of knowledge to communities, but 
those communities must themselves satisfy certain conditions in order that the cognitive 
activities occurring within them qualify as knowledge or as knowledge-producing. (...) 
(F)rom a non-dichotomizing perspective that accepts plurality and provisionality as fea-
tures of the knowledge of empirical subjects, contextuality is the nonrelativist position“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 138) 
To conclude, social epistemology - as outlined in this part of our inquiry - pro-
vides normative criteria for the social context of knowledge production125. This 
distinguishes it from the „social approach“  mentioned above which abandons 
normative criteria in favor of the social context. But social epistemology also is 
distinguished from the „rational approach“  which abandons the social context in 
favor of normative criteria. Therefore, Longino does neither fully agree to the 
descriptive-empirical project (the social approach), nor to the rationalistic epis-
temological project (rational approach). Her social epistemology rather tries to 
connect normativity from the rational approach with the social stance of the so-
cial approach.  
7.10 The shift to non-scientific contexts
7.10.1 „Every group is among other things a cognitive community“
Longino’s reflections clearly revolve around scientific knowledge. This is con-
firmed by the examples introduced which - almost without exception - illustrate 
use-cases from science. But this does not imply that the outlined social episte-
mology is solely restricted to scientific knowledge:
„The concept of epistemic acceptability and that of confirmation (...) can be brought to-
gether to provide definitions of knowledge in each of the senses of knowledge distin-
guished (KS: as „knowing“, i.e. as belief, as „knowledge production“, i.e. as justifica-
tion, and as „content“, i.e. as truth). One can think of these definitions as applying only 
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125  Henceforth, „social epistemology“  will be used in a narrow sense, i.e. it will refer to the out-
lined approach of Helen Longino. In its broader sense, „social epistemology“ subsumes different 
philosophical approaches which try to take the social context of knowledge creation into account 
(Fuller, 1996; Goldman, 2009).
to scientific knowledge, if one takes the restrictive view of the arguments for sociality, or 
as applicable to knowledge generally, if one takes the unrestricted view of those argu-
ments.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 136)
Is it legitimate to take the „unrestricted“  view? It is, if we generally understand 
communities also as knowledge communities. Everything said in our previous 
remarks about social epistemology is generally applicable to any community 
that is explicitly or implicitly involved in knowledge creation and application. 
Science appears as the main addressee of (social) epistemology, only because 
from all social fields it is the one, which is most explicitly dedicated to knowl-
edge creation. It is the field which directly is organized towards the production 
of knowledge as its main purpose. But professionalized scientific communities 
have no „monopoly“  on knowledge production (Luhmann, 1995, p. 30). Sci-
ence is not the only field in which communities are devoted to the creation and 
application of knowledge. In contrary, it seems that any organized group of 
people is constituted by knowledge producers and/or users: 
„Given that every group organized for some purpose, where for governance or self-
governance (from nation to village), mutual protection, production of goods, exchange 
of goods, provision of services, the expression of religious devotion, the appreciation of 
beauty, or the advancement of learning, must base its activities in representations of its 
universe of action, every group or society is among other things a cognitive community.“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 146, my emphasis)
Science is the community which is directly committed to the production of 
knowledge as its central aim. But it is only the top of the iceberg, since knowl-
edge creation and application are issues for any „group organized for some pur-
pose“. And our hitherto outlined epistemological reflections about the idea and 
(normative) criteria of knowledge, critical discursive interaction, acceptability, 
or confirmation, are philosophical reflections on a very fundamental level. The 
concepts both of rationalistic and social epistemology are too general to restrict 
them only to science. Social epistemology understands knowledge creation as 
dependent on socialized aims and standards of a community. This is why it 
ought to be theoretically relevant for non-scientific communities as well: 
„Some communities are more narrowly focused on knowledge production, whereas oth-
ers use knowledge as a tool or instrument for the satisfaction of practical ends. I am as-
suming that even those groups least actively engaged in the production of knowledge 
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required for the realization of their ends nevertheless adhere to a set of standards deter-
mining what will count as knowledge for them.“ (Longino, 2002, p. 146)    
Social epistemology is not restricted to communities that are „narrowly focused 
on knowledge production“ but open for any community that uses knowledge as 
„a tool or instrument for the satisfaction of practical ends“. Of course, if we 
compare knowledge in organizations (or engineering sciences) to „pure“  scien-
tific communities, then there is a difference: the justification process of non-
scientific knowledge is mostly bound to practical validation. Hence, if organ-
izational (or any other „applicable“) knowledge fails to comply with social 
normative criteria, this „becomes apparent in the frustration of action based on 
that purported knowledge“  (Longino, 2002, p. 146), i.e. applied knowledge is 
constrained to successful action. But is this not also the case for „pure“  scien-
tific knowledge? Our claim will be that there is no substantial divergence be-
tween a community that uses knowledge to, for instance, accomplish specific 
experiments and a community which, for instance, uses knowledge to accom-
plish specific tasks in organizations. False knowledge in physics may lead to 
unsuccessful predictions in experiments, just as false knowledge in organiza-
tions may lead to unsuccessful actions (or also simply to wrong predictions e.g. 
in foresight analysis). In our social epistemological view all these activities are 
subsumed under aims and standards of a community, hence integrated into the 
normative criteria of acceptability, confirmation, and critical discursive interac-
tion. 
7.10.2 The shift to organizations
Social epistemology began with the finding that underdetermination of theory 
can only be understood when taking aims and background assumptions of a 
community into consideration. This is why acceptance and confirmation of 
knowledge were bound to aims, standards, and background assumptions of the 
respective scientific community. This then lead to the conclusion that „we rate 
the adequacy of theories and models by their power to enable us to pursue our 
endeavors successfully“  (Longino, 2002, p. 119). Therefore, social epistemol-
ogy may be relevant for knowledge creation of any community which „success-
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ful endeavors“  are dependent on knowledge. We saw this already within science 
itself: there are scientific communities whose knowledge validation processes 
demand successful predictions of  outcomes within experimental settings (e.g. 
molecular chemistry), whereby other disciplines demand successful practical 
application (e.g. engineering sciences). Similarly, non-scientific communities 
like formal organizations depend on organizational knowledge to successfully 
carry out their actions.
For an open, „nonrestricted“  social epistemology the differences between 
formal sciences, engineering sciences, and organizations, are only gradual. As 
they all are dependent on knowledge to „pursue their endeavors successfully“, 
they all are sensitive to epistemological reflection. There is no reason why 
norms of knowledge creation should not be applicable to organizations. But to 
do so, we need to understand the organization as a knowledge community with 
an epistemological issue in its core. In part I we have already mentioned that 
organizations are based on knowledge and that problems of organizations 
should also be tackled as epistemological problems. What is needed now is to 
interconnect the knowledge-based view on organizations, as developed in part I, 
with social epistemology, as presented in part II. This will help us to move from 
a theory of knowledge in organizations to an organizational epistemology.  
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Part III - ORGANIZATIONAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY
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Chapter 8: The normative issue at organizational 
knowledge
8.1 Knowledge as cornerstone of organizational practice
In Part I we analyzed the organization as a social field which epistemic and on-
tological distinctions correlate to a certain extent. According to our analysis, 
knowledge is not only a cognitive epistemic state or content of individuals but 
also ontologically manifested in different levels of the organization: knowledge 
appears as objective representations in files, computer systems, or brains, as 
inter-subjective meaning, and finally as a relation to the practice of the organi-
zation. Hence, organizational knowledge is not only epistemically but also onto-
logically significant. 
Subsequently, we defined knowledge as a circular organizational concept 
which both creates the organization, and is being created by the organization. In 
this „strong sense“, organizational knowledge is composed of concepts which 
allow organizations and their actors to draw distinctions in order to understand 
the world as well as to act in it. Corresponding to the triadic structure of repre-
sentation, meaning, and practice, different types of knowledge were identified 
at different levels. For instance, „propositional“  knowledge is manifest more on 
the representational level, whereby „narrative“  knowledge is situated deeper on 
the level of daily practice. Propositional knowledge is ultimately structured as 
discrete instructional form („if-then“), encoded into instructions, routines, 
handbooks, and so forth. Narrative knowledge is structured more as an analogy 
(„as-if“) and encoded into stories, best practices, and so forth. Of course, propo-
sitional knowledge is to be translated to practice in order to become significant. 
And also narrative knowledge can be translated to explicit representational 
form, for instance, in order to become more accessible.
8.2 The epistemic gap and underdetermination at the core of 
the organization
Despite their differences, both types (propositional and narrative knowledge) 
turned out to be forms of organizational knowledge. And they both have in 
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common to be claims towards the organizational practice. They are created - no 
matter if deliberately or more implicitly - in order to be applied to a potential 
diversity of cases within a heterogenous organizational reality. In chapters 3 and 
4 we explored creation and application of knowledge and learned that knowl-
edge and practice do not simply overlap but - to a certain extent - stand in oppo-
sition. Of course, knowledge emerges out of organizational practice (namely, 
when problems and perturbations occur). But this does not imply that knowl-
edge is practice. Thus, organizational knowledge is not the same as practice, it 
is rather (fundamentally) related to practice. This is an important distinction 
since knowledge is always - in varying degrees - abstracted and generalized 
from what it is about126. To conclude: knowledge permeates the subjective and 
inter-subjective world of organizational actors, but there permanently remains a 
gap between knowledge and its object. Let us take a look at this gap and its 
relevance to organizations.
The philosopher Steve Fuller identifies two different epistemological traditions. 
He distinguishes between knowledge as spatio-temporal content (which he calls 
„materialism“) and knowledge as abstract entity (which he calls „platonism“) 
(Fuller, 1996)127. One sees knowledge as a spirit-like, transcendent, and non-
empirical concept, the other as an embedded, material, and empirical (arte)fact. 
In knowledge management literature this dichotomy has been discussed as 
„cognitive“  versus „embodied“  approaches (Patriotta, 2003, chapter 2), as „ex-
plicit“  versus „implicit“  knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, chapter 3; 
Nonaka, et al., 2008, chapters 1 & 2), or as „propositional“  versus „narrative“ 
knowledge (Tsoukas, 2005a). The differentiation and dichotomy between „ra-
tional“  and „social“  approaches has also been present at many locations in our 
inquiry so far, like at the discussions about organizational structure (chapter 
1.2), at organizational knowledge (chapters 2, 3, 4), as well as at epistemology 
(part II). Now, some knowledge management authors (as we saw in part I) have 
been criticizing the traditional („platonistic“) view of knowledge as a „view 
220
126  Which makes possible Gettier cases (chapter 6) as well as the underdetermination problem 
(chapter 7).
127 see also (Fuller, 2002, 2006)
from nowhere“  and as too abstract for coping with the complex environment of 
organizations. This is why Nonaka & Takeuchi extend their view to „implicit“ 
knowledge, why Tsoukas introduced „narrative“  knowledge, and why Patriotta 
included „embodied“  approaches in his analysis. The overall message is that 
organizational knowledge cannot be isolated from concrete organizational ac-
tion. Knowledge and action („practice“) are inevitably bound together and in-
terrelated. 
But this should not conceal the inner structure of knowledge, which ulti-
mately is based on transcendence, abstraction, and generality. It should not con-
ceal the fact that knowledge is always directed towards something which is not 
that knowledge itself. It is always structured as a referential relation between 
knowledge (as a claim) and its subsumed particularities. For instance, the 
knowledge claim that „water boils at 100°C“  refers to entities (or processes) 
outside the knowledge claim itself. It refers to all potential particular entities of 
„water“. The knowledge claim subsumes specific particularities - in this case all 
potential occurrences of „water“  - and predicts specific behavior (that is boils as 
100°C). 
The gap between a knowledge claim and the specific particularities it re-
fers to is inescapable. Not only because hypotheses derived out of the empirical 
world can never fully be verified („induction problem“), but also because theo-
ries cannot be unequivocally determined by data („underdetermination prob-
lem“). Both problems are rooted in the potential open-endedness and ambiguity 
of knowledge. Knowledge claims as generalized concepts cannot cover (or an-
ticipate) all its possible particularities. And this is the case for organizational 
knowledge, too. If an actor creates new organizational knowledge (e.g. a new 
proposition, routine, narrative, best practice, etc.) then there are certain degrees 
of freedom in doing so. There is not a definitive „best“  solution which „fits“ 
best to the given practice. There are of course „working“  solutions, but with no 
lifetime guarantee: just as in scientific knowledge, also organizational knowl-
edge always faces possible falsification. Since there is no unequivocal connec-
tion from practice to knowledge, also organizational knowledge is exposed to 
the underdetermination problem: new organizational knowledge claims are not 
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entirely determined by the practice it is related to, just like (as we saw in chap-
ter 7) new scientific knowledge is not entirely determined by the particular data 
it refers to.   
If we want to understand this epistemic gap at organizations, then we 
have to repeat one of our assumptions, i.e. that knowledge is rather a relation 
than a self-sufficient entity. That if knowledge would not point to something 
external, it would only point to itself. It would be exclusively self-referential. 
And although self-referring knowledge claims are possible (and may be very 
interesting for philosophers; e.g. the claim „This sentence is not true.“), in most 
cases knowledge refers to something other that itself, i.e. to its particularities128. 
Note that the ability to be true or false at all requires a certain distance between 
knowledge and its particulars, between the claim and its field of reference, be-
tween theory and observation, between organizational knowledge and organiza-
tional practice. Knowledge is characterized by - to use the phenomenological 
term - „intentionality“, i.e. knowledge is always knowledge about something.  
This is the case even for implicit, processual knowledge which as „know-
how“  has been distinguished from „know-that“  (Ryle, 1949). Knowing-how „to 
ride a bike“  is a claim towards all situations of bike riding. It claims that in 
these situations the actor is able to ride a bike, instead of, for example, falling 
from the bike, or instead of riding on something else. Also „tacit“  knowledge is 
structured as validity claim and hence stands agains particular situations or 
events. If we count competencies, abilities, or skills as knowledge we have to 
permit some degree of generality and transcendence. „Bike-riding“  as know-
how is an implicit knowledge claim which says that its actor is basically able to 
ride any (at least a - for that actor - usual) bike. Hence, we can (conceptually) 
differentiate between implicit knowledge (the skill or competency) and the real 
world occurrences of its application129. The former is a generalized concept 
(bike-riding) standing agains the latter as its particulars (all the possible spatio-
temporal events where riding a bike is possible). And even if I restrict („contex-
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128 This is true even for self-referential claims, because we cannot understand such a claim with-
out saying something like that „it points to itself“, i.e.  without (at least syntactically) separating the 
knowledge claim from what it refers to. 
129 Although the way in which such knowledge is falsified can be different from falsifying a scien-
tific proposition.
tualize“) knowledge, if I e.g. claim to be able to ride only that specific bike of 
type X, nonetheless many different situations of riding this specific bike of type 
X are possible. Also here, even if we do not refer to „all“  possible particulari-
ties, we refer to „all of something“ (Schauer, 1991; Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 78)130.
Also Tsoukas supplemental types of organizational knowledge, i.e. „pro-
positional“  and „narrative“  knowledge, are at all times in tension to their appli-
cation context. As we have concluded in chapter 3, narrative knowledge does 
not „solve“  the problem of a the gap, although it may be „closer“  and more 
„contextualized“ to the day-to-day world of organizational actors:
Figure. 8.1: Organizational knowledge (no matter in which form) is situated within the epistemic 
gap 
At all our epistemological reflections - on the rationalistic, social, and organiza-
tional level - this epistemic gap emerged: between justification and truth (ra-
tionalistic epistemology), between theory and observation (social scientific 
Rules
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130  If there were no gap between implicit knowledge and practice, then Schreyögg and Geiger 
would be right in proposing that tacit knowledge cannot be falsified (Schreyögg & Geiger, 2002).  
epistemology), and between knowledge and practice (organizational epistemol-
ogy)131.
Again, the correlation of epistemic and ontological structure of the organization 
(chapter 2.1) did neither entail that knowledge equals practice, nor that „knowl-
edge is action“. This became more evident while looking at the application 
(chapter 3), as well as at the creation (chapter 4) of knowledge in organizations. 
As open-ended concept, knowledge cannot be unequivocally applied to organ-
izational practice. There is also no clear-cut method in how new knowledge is 
created out of practice. Despite a whole bulk of rationalistic (knowledge) man-
agement literature, there are no fully reliable rational rules determining how 
knowledge is to be created or appwlied. Organizational knowledge is located in 
an underdetermination problem due to a structural (i.e. logical) gap between 
knowledge and organizational reality, i.e. its practice. 
In part II we showed that this gap is grounded in the concept of knowl-
edge itself which is trapped within a tension between justification and truth 
(where the gap was evident as the Gettier problem), just as in the sciences be-
tween theory and observations (where the gap was evident as the underdetermi-
nation problem), and, just as in organizations, between knowledge and practice 
(where the gap was evident at the application and creation of knowledge). 
8.3 The normative epistemological reaction to the gap
Although knowledge creation always is a contingent and open event, our epis-
temological reflections pointed out that it needs more for something to be 
knowledge than just to be beliefs, content, or distinctions. This is verified by 
our intuitions: just to believe something does not make it true, nor does it auto-
matically make it accepted by others. Hence, there has to be a process for a 
mere („subjective“) knowledge claim to become accepted and used („objec-
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131  Strictly speaking, we should in almost all cases talk about „knowledge claims“  instead of 
„knowledge“. „Knowledge“ in its pure rationalistic sense would mark a „justified and true knowl-
edge claim“, i.e. knowledge which already has been justified. From our social epistemological 
viewpoint,  knowledge is a knowledge claim which had been accepted and verified within a com-
munity. Within an organization, knowledge is a knowledge claim which has been applied and 
integrated to practice.  
tive“) knowledge. To understand this transformation as a social process was one 
task of social epistemology. The other was to define, which validation processes 
knowledge claims have to go through to be accepted and confirmed within the 
respective community (chapter 7), and which normative criteria ought to guide 
such processes.  
These normative criteria may be of relevance also for our inquiry, since (as 
chapter 5 showed) there is a need for normative distinctiveness also in the field 
of organizational studies. There is a need, because existing approaches are 
mainly driven by the aim to describe organizational knowledge. This descrip-
tive view asks questions like: what are the different types and forms of knowl-
edge in organizations? How can they be categorized and what are the differ-
ences? How is creation and application of knowledge connected to actions and 
to the structure of the organization? How are we able to empirically explore dif-
ferent types of organizational knowledge? Such descriptive view tries to iden-
tify epistemic attributes of the organization. In part I we found - on multiple 
levels - answers to the asked questions above. We learned that knowledge in 
organizations is distributed on three dimensions, i.e. as representation, meaning, 
and practice. We explored typifications of organizational knowledge like ex-
plicit vs. implicit, propositional vs. narrative, and so forth. We made the general 
statement that knowledge enables organizations to make distinctions in order to 
construct their world, to give meaning to its objects, and to carry out action. In 
this „strong sense“, knowledge creates, orders, and „organizes“  the organiza-
tion. Knowledge creation was described as an open process emerging out of 
organizational practice. Through legitimization and acceptance processes 
knowledge is being established and institutionalized in the organization - it is 
being translated to ontologically effective routines or narratives, into guiding 
blueprints, implicit skills, and common sense. Again, this is a „descriptive“ 
view about the different forms of organizational knowledge, how it is being 
transformed from one state to another, and how it is related to organizational 
practice. 
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A normative view has to be located slightly different. It tries to formulate crite-
ria for qualifying something to become knowledge: we do not only want 
knowledge to make distinctions, we want knowledge to make right distinctions. 
Thus, the main challenge for an organizational epistemology is to provide 
grounded criteria for defining what qualifies an organizational social context as 
knowledge-producing. I.e. how ought organizational distinctions become organ-
izational knowledge rather than staying mere distinctions. It is this search for 
epistemological criteria (the „normative view“  / „organizational epistemol-
ogy“) which goes beyond the search for mere epistemic attributes (the „descrip-
tive view“ / „theory of organizational knowledge“). 
The normative view, i.e. an organizational epistemology, is driven by the 
aim to define and develop normative criteria for organizational knowledge crea-
tion. Hereby, it has to be seen not as substituting but rather as supplementing 
the theory of organizational knowledge presented in part I. 
Part II and its discussion about normative criteria of the social field of knowl-
edge creation provides concepts which we want to use in this part III of our in-
quiry. In part II we saw how the descriptive approach of scientific studies (ANT, 
constructivist approaches) was supplemented by a normative social epistemol-
ogy (chapter 7). Now, why not try to supplement the descriptive approaches of 
organizational knowledge with an organizational epistemology? Why not try to 
apply the developed general epistemological criteria for social fields of knowl-
edge creation to the field of organizational knowledge creation?   
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Chapter 9: Epistemological criteria for 
organizational knowledge
9.1 Locating epistemology in organizations
To make normative elements useful for an organizational epistemology we need 
to explore the implications of social epistemology for organizations. Doing so is 
both possible and eligible since we have already shown that non-dichotomized 
social epistemology is generally applicable to any knowledge-based community 
(see chapter 7.10).
First, we have to answer the question where social epistemological norms 
could be located within the organization. In part I we have seen that organiza-
tions create knowledge (like propositions and narratives) as distinctions on the 
levels of representations (at the syntactic dimension), meaning (at the semantic 
dimension), and as a relation to action (at the pragmatic dimension). We have 
also seen that knowledge creation is a transformative process in three steps: (1) 
knowledge creation is triggered by events like problems, breakdowns, or other 
perturbances within organizational practice. Then (2) new distinctions are cre-
ated, for instance, a new solution, a modified routine, a new best-practice or 
narrative, and so forth. Finally, (3) these new distinctions become part of the 
stock of organizational knowledge; or not. It is this creation as transformation 
(or non-transformation) from „subjective to objective“  - from mere distinction 
to knowledge - where epistemological norms have to be located: 
Figure 9.1: localizing organizational epistemology
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It also is here where a normative approach (as organizational epistemology) of-
fers new contributions compared to a descriptive approach (as theory of organ-
izational knowledge). The latter (the descriptive approach) simply says that the 
transformation is a social process, for example, within an actor-network; the 
former (the normative approach) says the same, but additionally provides crite-
ria which aim at guiding the transformation process towards bringing forth suc-
cessful knowledge creation. 
To opt for social epistemology as groundwork for an organizational epis-
temology has two general implications:  
(1) Unlike „social dichotomizers“  (chapter 7.1.1), we do not say that knowledge 
is anything that allows to make distinctions. Knowledge rather ought to be 
qualified by specific criteria and its creation guided by specific norms. 
(2) Unlike the „rational dichotomizers“  (chapter 7.1.2), social epistemology 
suggests criteria for the social environment of the knowledge translation 
process. 
Hence, if we understand organizational practice based on knowledge and accept 
the solution provided by social epistemology, then an organizational epistemol-
ogy is both (1) normative and (2) social. Then an organizational epistemology 
pursues the objective to normatively guide organizations in designing their so-
cial knowledge creation environments. But what are actually the implications 
from shifting social epistemology to organizations? 
The following sub-chapters try to reformulate the normative implications of so-
cial epistemology on the field of organizations. This reformulation will be based 
on the social epistemological requirements (a) to enable critical discursive in-
teraction, (b) to constrain knowledge towards acceptance and confirmation with 
regard to aims and standards, and (c) to repeatedly reflect upon these aims and 
standards. The results of the upcoming chapters are normatively laden and will 
be defined as „guidelines“  for organizations (and, more specifically, as guide-
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lines for knowledge management). The upcoming chapter 10 will then discuss 
these guidelines along an extensive use-case.   
9.2 First guideline: enable!
The transformation process from mere content to knowledge ought to be em-
bedded in a space of critical discursive interaction. This was one central norma-
tive concept of social epistemology. Therefore, one guideline for organizations 
is to make open and critical discursive interaction possible on all levels of 
knowledge creation. In other words: organizations ought to provide spaces of 
critical discursive interaction if they aim at facilitating successful knowledge 
creation (Peschl, 2003).   
One basic characteristic of such discursive interaction is openness. As we saw 
in our analysis of knowledge (chapters 6 and 7) underdetermination and open-
endedness call for a variety of enabling factors within the knowledge creation 
environment: plurality of actors participating in the knowledge creation dis-
course; equal access of participants to needed information and standards; multi-
ple views; and critical interaction from many different perspectives. That these 
factors facilitate knowledge creation is due to the open nature of knowledge 
which we found both in our discussions about organizational knowledge (part I) 
as well as in knowledge in general (part II). Hence, knowledge management132 
ought to incorporate these normative values in order to enable organizational 
actors to participate in an open knowledge creation process. Let us discuss, in 
more detail, what it means for an organization to provide an open and enabling 
knowledge creation environment.
9.2.1 Inclusion
One initial step of such enablement is that the general task of knowledge-
creation can be assigned to a wide range of organizational actors, and that it is 
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132  by „knowledge management“ we henceforth subsume all organizational measures which 
strive at providing successful knowledge creation environments, i.e.  knowledge management 
from our point of view ought to implement  our here developed organizational epistemological 
guidelines.
not necessarily restricted to a limited group of individuals. This is one guideline 
which can be derived from the norm of „tempered equality“  defined by social 
epistemology (chapter 7). There we said that „critical discursive interaction“ 
requires to include as many views as possible and to avoid „exclusionary prac-
tices“. 
Contrary to scientific communities, in organizations many actors may not 
even know that they are potential sources of knowledge creation. This is why 
knowledge management should assist organizational actors to develop epis-
temic awareness and to actively engage in knowledge creation. This is impor-
tant because the domain of knowledge creation and innovation is often ascribed 
exclusively to „research & development“  (R&D) departments, to management, 
or in general to higher educated people. Of course, R&D people are more likely 
to come up with new ideas simply because it is an explicit part of their role de-
scription. And of course, managers do, since it is one of their defined tasks to 
improve processes. But other organizational members, which directly are in-
volved to what is happening „on the ground“, may have different and fresh per-
spectives at their disposal which are not given to R&D or managers offices. 
What a shift worker on the assembly line notices, or a retails person in the store 
sees, may provide important input for knowledge creation. Our use-case below 
(chapter 10) will show that also perspectives offered by organizationally 
„lower“ positions should be taken into consideration. 
Note that this is not an ethical issue: we do not say that separating 
„higher“  from „lower“  class employees is unfair or unjust (although this may be 
the case) but that it is epistemologically ineffective. This corresponds to our 
previous finding that the exclusion of specific groups is not only a „social injus-
tice, but a cognitive failure (because it) reduces the critical resources of the 
community“ (Longino, 2002, p. 132). 
Hence, one enabling guideline is to extend the „critical resources“  of the 
organization and to include a variety of potential knowledge producers. This 
ought to be done by creating awareness as well as by providing processes 
through which organizational actors can participate in knowledge creation ac-
tivities. One measure may be to evaluate and revise job descriptions as well as 
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to offer support (like workshops and further education) for organizational actors 
to get used to new tasks133.  
9.2.2 Critical multi-perspectivity
To multiply the sources of knowledge creation does not mean to give assembly 
workers a desk in the R&D department134. It rather means that actors on all hi-
erarchies and functions are engaged in critically evaluating given knowledge 
and creating new knowledge from their specific point of view. That they under-
stand routines, narratives, blueprints, rules, orders, etc. as a stock of knowledge 
(i.e. that they develop epistemic awareness) which is not simply given but con-
testable, not fixed but changeable, not always right but falsify-able. This is why 
we should talk about critical multi-perspectivity: given knowledge should not 
only be applied but also scrutinized, it should be understood as open-ended and 
contingent. Rationalized or socialized organizational concepts are to be appre-
hended as organizational knowledge and are also to be seen as black boxes 
which can be opened and reconfigured. 
Note that measures for enabling „multiple perspectives“  not only have to 
try to involve as many different organizational actors as possible (i.e. to widen 
the „critical resources“  of knowledge creation). It also means to encourage ac-
tors to adopt different standpoints and to take multiple possible perspectives 
into consideration. Our upcoming use-case (chapter 10) will present different 
examples for how to implement multi-perspectivity. Furthermore it will show 
that organizations which are committed to critical reflection from multiple per-
spectives are more flexible towards change, and that they are, by most meas-
ures, more successful. 
According to this reformulation of the norms of „venues for“  and „uptake 
of criticism“ (chapter 7.5.1), organizations ought not only to allow but to en-
courage participation in knowledge evaluation and creation. Furthermore, or-
ganizations have to provide an environment where outcomes actually are taken 
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133 See also the suggested measures in the upcoming sub-chapter „critical multi-perspectivity“.
134 Although measures like „job rotation“ (Cunningham, Dawes, & Bennett, 2004, section 3.6) or 
„job complexes“ (Albert,  2004, chapter 6) may be effective steps in opening and enabling multi-
ple perspectives. 
up and forwarded to processes of organizational change. Measures in enabling 
such a critical multi-perspectivity range from the general task of establishing a 
culture of openness, error-tolerance, and active articulation, down to activities 
like setting up improvement-feedback mechanisms135. 
9.2.3 Transparent Standards
Just as in any scientific community also organizational knowledge creation has 
to be guided and constrained by aims and standards. This implies to provide 
knowledge producers with  effective access to information about which aims 
and standards apply. This issue was addressed by social epistemology in calling 
for „public standards“  as an important criterium for critical discursive interac-
tion (chapter 7.5.3). 
The upcoming chapter 9.3 we will reformulate (scientific) aims and stan-
dards to organizational goals (what is the purpose of the created knowledge? 
how is it related to the goals of the organization?) and structures (in which way 
ought knowledge creation to be performed?). And we will define these goals 
and structures as constraining factors of organizational knowledge creation. For 
the moment, we are more interested in the enabling character of standards, i.e. 
that they (how ever they look like in detail) are transparently available for 
knowledge producers. In the case of organizations we may would not go so far 
and generally demand „public“  access to all internal standards136. But even if 
successful organizational standards (like goals and structure) not always can be 
„public“  they at least could (and should) be transparent and accessible to all 
potential organizational actors of knowledge creation. 
9.2.4 Summary: critical discursive interaction at organizations
We have reformulated the social epistemological features of critical discursive 
interaction for organizations:  
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135  One well known best-practice is  Toyotas activities in integrating the workforce to continuous 
improvement  and adaption processes on a broad range (Liker & Meier,  2005; May, 2007; Rother, 
2009). 
136 Although there are examples (as well as general reasons) which demonstrate the advantages 
of opening organizations internal processes and intellectual assets to the broad public (Tapscott, 
Williams, & Dierlamm, 2007).
Figure 9.2: Guidelines for critical social interaction in social & organizational epistemology
Our upcoming use-case will shed more light on how organizations which fol-
low the norms of inclusion, critical multi-perspectivity, and transparent stan-
dards thrive and generate successful results. However, our epistemological 
norms are not grounded by some use-cases where they happened to be success-
ful. They are linked back to the general characteristics of knowledge itself, i.e. 
to underdetermination and openness. They are linked back to the insight that 
knowledge creation is open-ended and cannot be determined by universal de-
ductive mechanisms, i.e. that rationalistic epistemology fails (see part II). Re-
member the important conclusion of the underdetermination problem: that theo-
ries go beyond the mere accumulation of data, i.e. that they are flexible in how 
to relate and explain data. And we should also remember that for social episte-
mology, this flexibility and open-endedness did not terminate in relativism but 
in norms demanding social knowledge construction environments to be critical 
and open in order to produce a wide range of possible results. Hence, enabling 
is not an epistemic norm because it always guarantees true knowledge. It is an 
epistemic norm because it forces the organizational space to actively take the 
open-ended character of knowledge into consideration. And only in doing so, an 
organization may become a place of successful knowledge creation. 
Of course, critical openness and multi-perspectivity is only a first step. 
Only to enable a wide range of actors to create knowledge is not enough be-
cause this does not yet tell us something about upon which criteria (and gener-
ally how) to separate knowledge from non-knowledge. Strictly speaking, „ena-
bling“  only produces distinctions, not already knowledge. This leads to our sec-
ond guideline.  
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9.3 Second guideline: constrain!   
Our first guideline opened the range of possible knowledge contributions by 
including multiple actors and perspectives. But to multiply perspectives not 
automatically multiplies knowledge. It „only“  increases possible approaches, 
suggestions, critics, and ideas (in a word: organizational distinctions) which still 
have to be transformed to accepted and confirmed knowledge. A successful 
knowledge creation environment, if it does not want to fall back to arbitrariness 
and relativism, has not only to produce data or information but to provide con-
straining processes of acceptability and confirmation, in order to produce 
knowledge. It has to provide processes which not only allow the new to emerge 
but also which also determine „what gets to remain in the (...) pool of informa-
tion that counts as knowledge.“  (Longino, 2002, p. 129). It has not only to en-
able but also to constrain137. To constrain is essential because, from a normative 
viewpoint, knowledge ought not to be any belief, or any content, or any distinc-
tion but ought to be qualified by its adherence to epistemological criteria.
In part II philosophical concepts were outlined which provided such epis-
temological criteria for constraining knowledge creation. We became familiar 
with two general philosophical approaches: rationalistic epistemology and so-
cial epistemology. Rationalistic epistemology claimed knowledge to be „justi-
fied true belief“  and to be based on universal definitions for justification and 
truth. Social epistemology shifted these criteria of knowledge validation to the 
social practice of knowledge creation. Social epistemological criteria where 
characterized by open knowledge creation and critical discursive interaction but 
at the same time also by acceptance and confirmation mechanisms. Hence, 
knowledge ought not to be any content produced in an open environment but to 
be „accepted confirmed content“  (chapter 7.5.4). Hereby, the terms „accep-
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137 This became clear already in chapter 7.5.3 while discussing the issue of „tempered equality“. 
On one hand the norm of „equality“  called for a plurality of participants. But only in a „tempered“ 
way, i.e.  not at any price. We said that everyone is invited but not automatically included as an 
accepted part  in criticizing and creating knowledge. This ought also to be the case at organiza-
tions: actors who want to be an eligible part of  knowledge creation need to bring (or need to be 
equipped with) prerequisites to be able both to understand existing knowledge as well as to be 
able to be understood when bringing up  critique and suggestions. Again in Longino’s words: 
„Participants in a dialogue must share some referring terms,  some principles of inference, and 
some values or aims to be served by the shared activity of discursive interaction“ (Longino, 
2002, p. 130).
tance“  and „confirmation“  were not founded in rationalistic universality (like 
„justification“  and „truth“) but instead related to aims and standards of the re-
spective epistemic community138:  
Figure 9.3: First shift: from rationalistic to social epistemology
9.3.1 From content to distinction
Basically, organizational epistemology is a variation (or subset) of social epis-
temology. Thus, we will focus on the slight shifts from social to organizational 
epistemology. 
One difference between social epistemology and our organizational adap-
tion of it is based on our reflections from part I. There we interpreted the „con-
tent“  of organizational knowledge more generally as „distinctions“. The advan-
tage of talking about „distinctions“  is that it includes anything which allows to 
make a difference, to understand, and/or to act in the world (see chapter 2). This 
includes not only written or other sign-based content, but also (re-)told stories, 
best practices, as well as different types of „tacit“  knowledge. Hence, we can 
reformulate „content“  as „distinction“. But what about acceptance & confirma-
tion?
 
Generally we can say that since „every group or society is among other things a 
cognitive community“  (Longino, 2002, p. 146) the constraining criteria we are 
looking for can be aligned with the social epistemological terms of acceptabil-
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138 Of  course,  this was already prevalent in Longino’s call for an open space of „critical discursive 
interaction“:  especially the norms of „tempered equality“  and „public standards“  (in our field of 
organizations:  „inclusion“  and „transparent standards“) were marked by the fact  that a discourse 
is not fully arbitrary but bound to specific aims and standards.
ity and confirmation. However, we do not deal with „scientific“  but with „or-
ganizational“  communities. Thus, it is important to understand what we mean 
with „standards“ (guiding acceptability) and „aims“  (guiding confirmation) 
within the context of organizations. What are the corresponding organizational 
counterparts of scientific aims and standards? 
I would suggest to refer to how we defined organizations in chapter 1, i.e. 
as goals and as structure. There we saw that a collective gains the status of an 
organization if its activity is structured towards goals. Hence, any knowledge 
creation ought to be within, or at least related to those structures and goals. 
Consequently, we may define the following: if organizational distinctions (1) 
want to be accepted they need to be within the scope of the organizational 
structure. And if they (2) want to be confirmed they need to be aligned with or-
ganizational goals (at least with parts of them). Hereby, we have to distinguish 
between goals and structure of the domain in which knowledge is created (i.e. 
the „existing“  goals and structures; e.g. for which patients a nurse is responsi-
ble), and goals and structure of the knowledge creation process itself (e.g. the 
way how a diagnosis has to be entered to the IT system).
9.3.2 Acceptance & Confirmation: Constraining the domain of knowledge 
creation
Distinctions should be related to what makes sense within the organizational 
routines, habits, communication paths, and so forth, in order to enable useful 
action. For example, the nurse needs to create knowledge about specific pa-
tients; or the retail assistant (see chapter 10) needs to create sales orders only of 
available products, and, say, by considering an actual nationwide sales cam-
paign. Again: knowledge creation ought to be directed towards goals and along 
structures of the organization139. Just as the particulars of scientific knowledge 
(data), also the particulars of organizational knowledge (practice) allow high 
flexibility and open-endedness in regard to the outcome of knowledge creation. 
Therefore, organizational actors need guidance and support in order to not only 
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139  This is even the case if  a part of the structure of the organization is being created (e.g. if a 
new routine is designed). Also in this  case the new routine has to be coherent to existing rou-
tines.   
create distinctions but to create useful knowledge. This guidance should be pro-
vided by the knowledge creation environment. 
Remember, again, our example of the nurse in the hospital (chapter 1.3.3). 
In order to facilitate and create useful knowledge she needed not only multiple 
perspectives and an open environment. In contrary, the main challenge was how 
to cope with the radical open-endedness of chaotic and equivocal „circum-
stances“  (J. R. Taylor & Van Every, 2000, p. 275; Weick, et al., 2005, p. 409). 
Both the evaluation of given knowledge (e.g. reading values from measuring 
devices) as well as the creation of new knowledge (e.g. making a diagnosis) 
were constrained and guided by organizational factors. Her activities were 
bound to goals (care for patients health, not for gardening) as well as to struc-
ture (report to the right supervisor in the right language) of the respective or-
ganizational field. Thus, her distinction-making (which served as basis for her 
actions) resulted in knowledge only by being aligned with organizational goals 
(confirmation) as well as with organizational structure (acceptance).
How exactly actors are facilitated to take goals and structure into consid-
eration for their knowledge creation activities is very dependent on the type of 
knowledge that is being created (and on the type of actors involved). The gen-
eral measure for this is to provide appropriate communication of goals and 
structure. The presented use-case in chapter 10 will give some examples how 
this can be done within an extensive meeting- and communication culture. 
9.3.3 Acceptance & Confirmation: Constraining knowledge creation itself 
But also the knowledge creation process itself needs to be structured. For ex-
ample, a sales assistant not only fantasizes a sales hypothesis in his/her brain 
but has to be provided with routines and technology to actually formulate, enter, 
and issue new sales orders (see chapter 10). Similar, the nurse needs organiza-
tional structured routines and input instruments to properly store and communi-
cate new generated knowledge, like that of a new diagnosis. 
Hence, when designing new knowledge creation spaces, not only existing goals 
and structures ought to constrain. In many cases the organization has to develop 
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new standards, procedures, and goals in order to set up new ways in creating 
knowledge. This is the case especially for new groups of actors who do not un-
derstand themselves as „knowledge“  producers. If an organization wants to 
open and extend the range of knowledge producers, then it also needs to extend 
its goals and structures. For example, if sales employees in retail stores ought to 
become knowledge producers (like to develop and verify sales hypotheses140) 
they need to be provided with specific goals (when is a sales hypothesis suc-
cessful? why is it important for my work to produce successful sales hypotheses 
and orders?) and structures (how do I enter a sales hypothesis? which process 
determines successful sales results?). To conclude, if actors ought to produce 
knowledge, the creation process itself has to become organizational. The crea-
tion process has to be reflected in the goals and structures of the organization. 
In other words: we simply should not forget that also organizational knowledge 
creation has to be organized.
Let us summarize: if we connect the social epistemological criteria „accep-
tance“  with organizational structure, and that of „confirmation“ with organiza-
tional goals, then the constraining definition of organizational epistemology can 
be formulated as „accepted confirmed distinction“: 
Figure 9.4: Second shift: from social to organizational epistemology
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140 see our use-case in chapter 10
9.3.4 The interplay between enabling and constraining
Figure 9.5 summarizes the enabling and constraining factors of organizational 
knowledge creation: our first guideline requires measures which widen the 
range of distinctions, whereby the second guideline narrows it down to the spe-
cific organizational context:  
Figure 9.5: Enabling and constraining factors at organizational knowledge creation
Knowledge creation is a twofold process which ought to take place both within 
an enabling environment (due to the open-endedness and contingent character 
of knowledge) and within a constraining environment (due to the normative 
character of knowledge). This means that only the working together of both en-
ables a fruitful space of knowledge creation. Knowledge management ought to 
carefully and permanently perform tradeoffs between the two principles as well 
as to be aware of the indispensability of both of them.
The interplay between enabling and constraining was prevalent at Longino’s 
definition of critical discursive interaction. There we learned that the constrain-
ing activities of confirmation and acceptability have to be carried out in the 
enabling environment of a critical discursive interaction:
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Figure 9.6: Social epistemological criteria of knowledge creation
According to our so previous reformulations, also organizational knowledge 
creation ought to be embedded in a space of critical discursive interaction 
which integrates enabling and constraining features. Figure 9.7 illustrates this 
shift from social to organizational epistemology: 
Figure 9.7: Organizational epistemological criteria of knowledge creation
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9.4 Third guideline: reflect! 
We said that organizational knowledge creation ought to be constrained by 
goals and structures of the organization. One advantage of this was to avoid ar-
bitrariness and relativism. But what if these constraining factors, i.e. goals and 
structure, themselves are the subject of evaluation and (re-)creation activities? 
We have already discussed examples of organizational knowledge crea-
tion where this is the case. For instance, at the design of the car-factory blue-
print (chapter 4.4) basic goals and structures were at stake: the whole paradigm 
of car manufacturing was modified and redesigned. Hence, the blueprint was 
not a piece of knowledge created within guiding goals and structures, but itself 
was a new version of goals and structures. In such cases there actually may be 
no meta-structure left (i.e. no guiding goals and structures), simply because it is 
exactly this meta-structure which is being created. Such knowledge creation on 
a meta-level is the subject of our third (and last) guideline of organizational 
epistemology. 
This third guideline becomes relevant at the moment we understand 
knowledge creation not only as an activity bound to constraining factors of a 
given (scientific or organizational) structure, but also as a reflective process 
which is able to critically evaluate and (re-)design that structure itself. Hence, 
there is an additional field of knowledge creation which is situated on a higher 
(„second loop“) level. „Reflect“  then means to not only critically evaluate and 
create knowledge but also the criteria which constrain knowledge creation. For 
organizations this implies to put effort in providing an environment that pro-
duces awareness as well as processes to enable actors to rethink and to critically 
scrutinize the organization‘s core goals and deeper structures. This step is cru-
cial because, as we know from the double-loop learning implications on organi-
zations (chapter 4.2), some perturbances in practice cannot substantially be 
solved in a single-loop. Organizations ought to enable actors to produce knowl-
edge both within (single-loop) as well as beyond (double-loop) given goals and 
structures.   
This situation is similar to that of a scientific community which is not 
only critically creating new knowledge but also its standards on which its 
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knowledge creation is based on. If the latter is the case, the activity progresses 
from mere „puzzle solving“  to a „revolution“  (Kuhn, 1970). We then leave our 
„frame of reference“  and question its basic assumptions. At this point we see 
that „open-endedness“  is not only restricted to knowledge content itself but also 
involves its guiding aims and standards. As we saw in chapter 7.7 and 7.8, a 
reflective scientific community has to be aware of the fact that not only its stock 
of knowledge but also its aims and standards are possibly subject to change and 
may be (re-)constructed (Longino, 2002, p. 134f.). 
To handle such „paradigm shifts“  is an important task for organizations, 
too. It can even become a vital feature, especially in cases where the organiza-
tion cannot appropriately react to internal or external changes within its given 
goals and structures. If in such a situation the organization is not ready for radi-
cal reflection and restructuring, it is exposed to potential dysfunctionality or 
even disintegration. 
The second guideline of constraining (after the first guideline of ena-
bling) was driven by the fact that organizational knowledge creation is bound to 
goals and structures of the organization. Now, the third guideline is about to 
reflect upon on these goals and structures and to make them subject to critical 
evaluation and redesign. It is what we, in our discussion about social episte-
mology, called „second order discourse“ (chapter 7.7). 
9.4.1 Does reflection lead to relativism?
But what about the normative and non-relativist stance of our approach if crite-
ria of knowledge creation are themselves subject to a knowledge creation proc-
ess? Which constraining criteria are in place here if, unlike to the second step of 
„constraining“, goals or structures cannot be provided since they themselves are 
at stake? If we cannot come up with any criteria, would we not fall back to rela-
tivism and loose the normative spin of our organizational epistemology? 
In fact, in such cases we reach the limits of any epistemology which tries 
to come up with substantive normative criteria. We enter a space of openness 
where it becomes hard to find any guidelines. Of course we are not totally help-
less: if not inside the organization itself, guiding constrains may be found in its 
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wider ecosystem141; or through reflecting on the deeper, more implicit goals of 
the organization and its actors. But this step of reflection is fully open in the 
sense that there may be no anticipation or definitive constraining factors at all. 
In the phase of „reflection“, openness returns in its most radical form: some-
thing totally new and unexpected may emerge which is not bound to any fram-
ing goals or structures. 
Hence, we cannot formulate any substantive constraints or criteria any-
more. The only normative criteria left are those connected to the openness of 
knowledge, i.e. those calling for an open and critical space of discursive inter-
action. This ultimately leads back to from where we started: to the guideline of 
enabling142. Like a scientific community which is redefining its substantial con-
strains of standards and aims (chapter 7.7) also organizational actors - in such a 
reflective stage - can only refer to formal normative criteria of „critical discur-
sive interaction“. This implies that in the phase of „reflection“  the only norma-
tive guidelines an organizational epistemology may provide are again the values 
expressed in chapter 9.2 („enabling“). And in fact, if we face radical openness, 
i.e. if we are totally lacking constraining („governing“) variables, knowledge 
creation should at least be as open as possible. Thus, it should be based on 
norms like critical multi-perspectivity and inclusion143. Openness, it seems, 
then is the only normative element of our third guideline. The features of criti-
cal discursive interaction are the only available principles and guiding norms 
which are left. These guiding norms do not determine the substance of knowl-
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141  like e.g. in the Fiat car factory (chapter 4.4), where the constraints of the fordist paradigm 
collapsed. Here the only left  footing was based on new post-fordist concepts found outside of the 
organization, but within the ecosystem of the automotive sector (especially in Japan) - this loose 
set of new concepts provided a wider framework for the new blueprint.
142  This is also a reason for illustrating our three guidelines as circle (see below in figure 9.9). 
Reflection, as knowledge creation process, always requires enabling and consequently also 
constraining which in the end may again trigger reflection (see chapter 9.5).
143  This is confirmed by the observed creation of the car factory blueprint (chapter 4.4) where 
Fiat  transcended the old fordist paradigm and entered a new frame of reference. The success of 
this  knowledge creation process was linked to the fact  that the outcome was a result of „a variety 
of options available“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 183) and contingent to a diversity of factors as well as 
actors with different viewpoints „from conservative to progressive“.
edge but rather guide the form of social interaction in which knowledge creation 
is taking place144.
Critics may state that ultimately this is a return to relativism. The argument of a 
universalistic (or rationalistic) philosopher could be that due to the openness of 
the third guideline („reflect“) the second guideline („constrain“) looses its non-
relativistic direction, since the constraining factors (goals and structures) are 
relativized. The counter-argument would conclude that our approach does not 
offer a reasonable normative foundation. If we needed to restrict the first step of 
„enabling“  with the second of „constraining“, then why should we not restrict 
the third (open-ended) step of „reflection“  as well? This objection has even 
been our own line of argument: for instance, when concluding the first 
enabling-guideline we said that „openness alone is not enough“  and that multi-
plying distinction-making does not multiply knowledge creation. That was why 
we moved on to the second guideline, i.e. to constrain knowledge creation to-
wards goals and structures. But this step seems not possible within the process 
of radical reflection. Within the latter there are no founding goals and no struc-
tures available for knowledge creation anymore, simply because they are the 
very objects of the creation process. Hence, there can be no criteria of accep-
tance or confirmation, and consequently no normative underpinnings. 
We should be aware that this hypothetical critique deals in absolutes. In 
real world environments there is not that clear cut position. In fact, there are 
almost no cases in which all goals and all structures of an organization are at 
stake at the same time. Thus, a totally radical reflection is very unlikely145. Even 
fundamental change processes usually are not happening in a totally fluid envi-
ronment. For instance, the Fiat knowledge creation case was driven by radical 
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144 see chapter 7.7 and (Longino, 2002, p. 148)
145  This does not mean that organizational actors should not temporarily  switch to a mode of 
radical reflection. To „let go“ from all constraining structures and to transcend the given - e.g. 
within the social technology of presencing (Scharmer, 2009) - is a powerful method for getting 
connected to new ideas and inspiration. But such a radical reflection is always only temporarily 
and ultimately  part of  the enabling-process. When it gets back to turn results of such radical re-
flection processes to concrete organizational knowledge, we again are confronted with questions 
of normative criteria, i.e. we are confronted with the task to align our new ideas („distinctions“) 
with organizational goals and structure.  
reflection upon (and change of) fundamental principles of automobile manu-
facturing. But this did not happen in a vacuum. Not all given goals were at 
stake. In contrary, given goals like that of producing at a low price yet at a high 
quality, or that of to produce as efficiently as the Japanese competitors, made 
the whole knowledge creation process necessary in the first place (chapter 4.4). 
These goals were guiding criteria for the reorganization and knowledge creation 
process. Thus, the Fiat case demonstrates that general goals or structures of an 
organization can be in a pending state, while others are not. The latter then - to 
a certain extent - can be used as constraining principles and criteria. 
Concluding in a more epistemological language, our position does not 
follow the foundationalist conception of knowledge, i.e. knowledge being 
based on some basic, taken for granted, principles. This would make these prin-
ciples inaccessible to critical reflection, i.e. to a normatively guided evaluation 
and creation process. Knowledge creation (even on a reflective level) rather 
ought to be coherent with other available principles. These principles (in or-
ganizations: goals and structures) are connected rather as a network than as a 
hierarchy. If we are not to change all principles at the same time, then it is pos-
sible to understand the creation of new principles (or the modification of exist-
ing ones) as a process which still is normatively guided, namely by the un-
changed principles146. 
The third guideline does not lead to radical relativism which undermines 
any normative perspective. „Reflection“ just reminds organizations that the 
constraining factors of knowledge creation processes are not carved into stone. 
While the second guideline highlighted the fact that creation of organizational 
knowledge has to be connected with organizational goals and structures, the 
third guideline accentuated that those constraints ultimately are contingent, thus 
should be accessible by critical organizational reflection. This means to accept 
the norm of to constrain knowledge creation (second guideline) but also to be 
ready to reflect upon the criteria which constrain knowledge creation (third 
guideline). The third guideline, so to speak, constrains constraining, which is 
nothing else than to invoke new knowledge creation processes on a higher 
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146  Therefore, our position would epistemologically  be categorized rather as „coherentism“  than 
as „foundationalism“ (see chapter 6.2.2).
level. This may sound like a merely theoretical dialectic statement but it is more 
than that. It points out a crucial requirement for todays organizations: to perma-
nently (or at least periodically) scrutinize and reflect guiding principles, goals, 
and structures. This view does correspond with what we learned about knowl-
edge creation in social epistemology, i.e. that critical knowledge creation within 
standards and aims also involves to critically evaluate the aims and standards 
themselves on a „second order discourse“  (chapter 7.7). It also corresponds 
with one general finding of organizational studies, i.e. that organizations which 
are capable of such reflection are more likely to cope with a changing environ-
ment (Høyrup, 2004). 
9.4.2 Measures of reflection
A general measure in order to allow reflection is to shape an appropriate organ-
izational culture which encourages and rewards critical reflection (Argyris, 
2010; Burke, 2008; Marsick, 1988; Schein, 1992) and which generally nurtures 
diversity and open mindedness (Flood & Romm, 1996). More specific activities 
may be found in social technologies like „dialogue“  (Bohm, 2000; Schein, 
1993) or „presencing“ (Scharmer, 2009). 
But measures for „reflection“  are not only to be located in the sphere of 
awareness and motivation of individual actors (see e.g. Bolman & Deal, 1991). 
The organizational structure itself has to be reflective, i.e. organizational rou-
tines and workflows have to be reflective. In other words, besides the usual or-
ganizational routines which realize the organization‘s goals there is also de-
mand for „second-level-routines“  which are dedicated to critical reflection on, 
and possible change of these goals and „first-level-routines“. In classical man-
agement literature this idea was taken up, for instance, by Peter Drucker who 
introduced the (originally Asian) concept of „kaizen“, i.e. continuous self-
improvement (Drucker, 1992b; 1993, p. 92). „Kaizen“  urges organizations to be 
structured in a way which both allows and stimulates change, even of its basic 
principles. This reflection on change needs to be incorporated in the routines of 
the organization, not only into the minds of the actors. Therefore, F.B. Simon 
states that to establish an „intelligent organization“  what is needed are „routines 
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guiding the modification of routines“  (F. B. Simon, 2007, p. 65)147. Such rou-
tines ought to provide recurring mechanisms which (1) periodically trigger re-
flective activities of actors at the level of a second-order discourse. They (2) 
also ought to provide channels for these reflections to take effect and to have 
impact on concrete change measures.
9.5 Summary
In shifting normative criteria of knowledge creation from social epistemology 
to the field of organizations we outlined a preliminary conception of an organ-
izational epistemology. We applied principles of social epistemology (part II) to 
our understanding of organizational knowledge (part I). Hereby, we were sup-
plementing the collection of epistemic attributes of organizations (provided by 
organizational studies) by epistemological criteria (provided by philosophy). 
These normative criteria were reformulated as „guidelines“  for successful 
spaces of organizational knowledge creation.  
The first guideline is to enable organizational knowledge creation, i.e. to 
provide an open space of critical interaction. This implies to include as many 
contributing actors as possible, to incorporate multiple views, and to provide 
(and, where necessary, create new) transparent standards. „Enabling“  is rooted 
in the open-ended and pluralistic character of knowledge. 
The second guideline is to constrain organizational knowledge creation, 
i.e. to regulate transformation from distinctions to knowledge. According to this 
guideline, knowledge creation needs to be aligned with organizational struc-
tures and standards as well as with organizational goals since not any distinc-
tion may be useful for the organization to „pursue its endeavors successfully“. 
Therefore, within knowledge creation environments, actors have to have access 
to the organization‘s goals; they have to be able to dive into philosophy, values, 
and aims of the organization. The same is true for organizational structure: new 
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147 authors translation - full citation context:  „Eine wesentliche Funktion von Führung ist es daher, 
regelmäßig für die Reflexion der Qualität des Wissens und Nicht-Wissens der Organisation (...) 
zu sorgen,  sowohl die Notwendigkeit  des Erhalts als auch der Veränderung von Strukturen zu 
beurteilen und gegebenenfalls über zu vollziehende Umbauten von Prozessen zu entscheiden. 
Um eine „intelligente Organisation“ zu etablieren, bedarf  es der Routinen zur Veränderung von 
Routinen“ (F. B. Simon, 2007, p. 65)
created ideas, routines, rules, best-practices, narratives, etc. ought to be oriented 
towards the specific organizational context they have been created for. „Con-
straining“ is rooted in the normative character of knowledge. 
The third guideline is to reflect upon the constraining goals and structures, 
i.e. to be aware about their contingent character as well as about the general 
possibility to (re-)create underlying organizational principles. Organizations 
need not only to be prepared for a „revolution“  but also to actively and continu-
ously reflect upon possible changes of its goals and structures. „Reflecting“  is 
based on the contextualized  character of knowledge as well as it is based 
(again) on open-endedness which reenters the knowledge creation process on a 
second level. 
This completes our view and allows a graphical summary similar to our 
summary of social epistemology (see figure 7.9). To enable, to constrain, and to 
reflect can be depicted as supplementing processes which allow the transforma-
tion from organizational distinctions to organizational knowledge:
Figure 9.8: The three transformative guidelines of organizational knowledge creation
All three guidelines are jointly interrelated and can be interpreted as circular 
process. This process may be used as a template for evaluating existing and/or 
designing new organizational knowledge creation environments. Enabling 
opens a space of multiple distinction-making, whereby constraining aligns it to 
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organizational principles. Within reflection these principles may be modified 
which again influences further enabling and constraining processes:  
Figure 9.9: Guidelines of organizational knowledge creation as circular process
constrain
reflect
enable
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Chapter 10: Organizational Epistemology applied: 
Seven-Eleven Japan
10.1 Description Use-Case
10.1.1 The company
Seven Eleven Japan (SEJ) is one of the most successful convenience retailers in 
the world. Founded in Japan 1974 as a subsidiary of the „American Southland 
Inc.“  (later „Seven-Eleven Inc.“) it became the largest retailer in the country 
with more than 12.000 stores nationwide, generating a profit-to-sales ration 
twice as high as its competitors (Chopra, 2003; Kunitomo, 1997; Nonaka, et al., 
2008, p. 138ff.). One pillar of its success is the specific way SEJ deals with or-
ganizational knowledge. Its (knowledge) management strategy has been ex-
ported to other Seven-Eleven franchise networks in 15 countries, and became a 
famous best-practice within both industry and research148. 
10.1.2 Item-by-Item Management  
It is obvious that one main challenge of convenience stores lies in the ongoing 
decision making about which products to offer and which not. This is even 
more pressing for SEJ since the relatively small store sizes allow only a small 
selection of the whole SEJ assortment to be sold at one individual store. The 
question then is how to adapt each store to its local market, i.e. how to avoid 
„dead“  items (vs. „live“  items), and how to avoid opportunity costs (costs 
which occur through not offering products customers are looking for). To deal 
with these challenges SEJ decided to change the centralistic character of item-
management and to delegate decisions on ordering (and canceling) items as 
much as possible to the individual stores. Therefore, SEJ came up with the 
measure to intensively include store staff in the item-management. Sales em-
ployees are „on the spot“  and have face-to-face contact with customers. This 
gives them valuable insights to local markets. Furthermore, they themselves 
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148 Especially its information technology infrastructure made SEJ a well-known use-case in man-
agement  schools  and literature (Bensaou & Earl, 1998; Chopra, 2003; Ishikawa & Nejo, 1998; 
Nonaka, Reinmoeller, & Senoo, 1998). 
are, in most cases, part of the local community. Toshifumi Suzuki, chairman of 
SEJ, says: 
„I only have two eyes. There are several tens of thousands part-time workers at Seven-
Eleven Japan stores. If anyone can make judgements on their own, we will have quite a 
few pairs of eyes.“ (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 142).
This is why all SEJ store employees are encouraged to sense the local market 
and to utilize their experiences with customers in order to detect sales opportu-
nities and to perform item orders. Additionally to their „here-now“  experiences 
on-the-spot, sales employees are provided by SEJ with up-to-date information 
about sales figures, local events, weather, and so forth. With all this input, or-
ganizational actors at stores are empowered to create hypotheses about future 
sales development and to conduct according orders. These hypotheses are then 
tested and verified by sales figures, whereby results of this verification influence 
further decisions: 
Figure 10.1: Knowledge creation at Seven-Eleven Japan
This knowledge creation process is done on a day-to-day basis and heavily sup-
ported by information technology. Each store is equipped with a „point-of-sale 
system“ (POS) which is connected to the overall SEJ network. One main fea-
ture of POS is to track and to digitally manage sales activities. This allows store 
staff to gather information about sales development of their products and assists 
them in their hypotheses making. The system is also used to actually execute 
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the item orders, and later on to verify whether expected sales were realized or 
not. Hence, POS is not only input-oriented, allowing stores to enter their hy-
potheses and orders, but also output-oriented, allowing to track the success of 
the item-orders. 
Furthermore, the POS terminal is a multi medial device providing its us-
ers with real time information about a broad range of topics like (new) product 
information, SEJ campaigns, weather reports, and (local) events. Hence, POS is 
both an ordering system, as well as a valuable source of information guiding 
local item-management149. 
Figure 10.2 concludes the multiple sources of information store staff may 
access. Sources are not only available via the POS system but also provided by 
face-to-face communication with „field counselors“  from the SEJ headquarter 
(see next sub-chapter 10.1.3), and by the daily tacit experience at the shops.    
Figure 10.2: Multiple sources of information enabling organizational knowledge creation 
Nonaka & Takeuchi (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 138ff.) present a case from SEJ 
where store staff combined information from the POS system about an upcom-
ing local festival with their own experience of similar events. They created hy-
potheses about increasing demand on beer and fast food, and consequently con-
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149  This is, of course, a simplified description. The POS system consists of different intercon-
nected devices like bar-code scanners,  POS registers, graphic terminals, and a store computer 
(Chopra, 2003, p. 5f.). 
ducted orders of these items via the POS system. Subsequently, POS tracked the 
sales numbers of these products and in fact verified a significant increase during 
the specific period. 
Another example is provided by a success-story from a store in the center 
of Tokyo. Here, staff members experienced increasing demand of salads, espe-
cially from white-collar women during lunch time. This was also partly verified 
by POS data. From POS information the staff furthermore detected a small in-
crease of sales in the evening. By interpreting this data, as well as by taking ex-
periences from customer-interaction into consideration, the hypothesis was cre-
ated that some women in the evening buy in advance in order to avoid long 
waiting queues at lunch time on the next day. The reaction of store staff was to 
order higher amounts of salads in the morning and to advertise this at the store. 
The created hypothesis was based on the assumption that more (and even new) 
customers may be attracted, if they would get the possibility to avoid waiting 
queues at lunch time. And in fact, sales in the morning (as well as in total) in-
creased and generated additional revenue which was also verified by the POS 
system. 
10.1.3 Meetings culture
Support for item-by-item management is not only provided by the POS system 
but also by so called „Field Counselors“  (FCs). The latter are SEJ employees 
who consult and guide store managers. Each FC is responsible for a couple of 
stores which s/he visits twice a week. FCs are the main connection and com-
munication channel between SEJ‘s head office and more than 12.000 stores. 
FCs provide stores with information about new products and campaigns but 
also constantly check and update SEJ philosophy, values, standards, and the 
compliance to prescribed procedures and routines. 
At SEJ, direct face-to-face communication is generally in favor of other 
communication means. This is true not only for the communication between 
FCs and stores („store meetings“) but also between SEJ management and FCs 
(„FC meetings“). At weekly „FC meetings“  all nationwide FCs and the SEJ 
management team meet at the head office. This large meeting, where around 
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1.600 people come together, is one central event of face-to-face, interactive 
knowledge sharing and communication. Here not only management communi-
cates company values, aims, standards, new products, and campaigns. The FC 
meeting is also a venue for sharing experiences and insights which FCs bring 
into the summit from their interaction with the stores. Selected success stories 
(like that of the salad sales) are presented and shared, with the expectation to 
nurture similar successful item-management activities in other stores. With the 
impression of that meeting, FCs - at the same day - return to their region and 
disseminate the acquired information, instructions, and success stories during 
store meetings. 
10.2 The theory of organizational knowledge applied to the 
SEJ use-case
Until now it should have become clear that the success of item-to-item man-
agement at SEJ is not simply because of the (high level and innovative) IT in-
frastructure. It is because the organization treats (and designs) the activity of 
item-management as a knowledge creation process. Furthermore, SEJ provides 
an epistemologically enhanced environment for knowledge creation, i.e. it is 
carrying out and implementing the guidelines of enabling, constraining, and 
reflecting150. Hence, SEJ is a proper use-case for our purposes. It both is inter-
esting from the view of organizational knowledge, as well as from the view of 
organizational epistemology. Let us start our discussion by interpreting the use-
case through our first theoretical toolkit of organizational knowledge from part 
I. 
10.2.1 Item-management as distinction-making on three levels 
In SEJ, knowledge is explicitly seen as the basis for organizational action. In 
this case, constructing hypotheses is the basis for conducting item orders. Ac-
cording to our strong sense of organizational knowledge (chapter 2), knowledge 
enables organizational actors (store staff) to make distinctions in order to per-
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150  Of course, the use-case has no direct  connection to our organizational epistemology. How-
ever, it  serves as a best practice since it implicitly fulfills most of the guidelines of our organiza-
tional epistemology developed so far. It therefore is an optimal use-case to exemplify the devel-
oped guidelines from chapter 9.
form action (to make orders). Store staff is involved in the creation and applica-
tion of several forms of knowledge at different levels of distinction making:
 Figure 10.3: The triadic structure of organizational knowledge applied to item-management of 
Seven-Eleven Japan
Many of these distinctions are encoded and further processes (largely by the 
POS system) in a representational form. And as formal organization, of course 
all activities are embedded in formal routines within goals and standards. But 
only interpretation of these distinctions and their connection to meaningful ac-
tion makes them usable for organizational practice. Only contextualization to 
local circumstances, performed by organizational actors, allows successful hy-
potheses building. Of course, to detect specific patterns which emerged from 
the past can be done simply by copying raw sales data from the POS system. 
But to determine „what will sell in the future depends largely on intuitive un-
derstanding of the market, based on accumulated tacit knowledge“  (Nonaka, et 
al., 2008, p. 143). This is why the „here-now“  experience of store staff is that 
important, and why decisions should not be fully determined by some sales ex-
ecutives in the headquarter. Interaction and dialogue with customers at the 
„point of sale“, i.e. at the store, is one crucial pillar of SEJ‘s success. But just as 
interaction with customers „on-the-spot“, also interaction with other organiza-
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tional actors, like colleagues and FCs, turned out to be essential for understand-
ing and hypotheses making. 
This „socialized“  knowledge is crucial. And so is „rationalized“  knowl-
edge from the POS system and from formal working routines. Both together 
allow store staff to „continue to create hypotheses based on an ability to under-
stand the essential meaning of consumer behavior and the phenomena affecting 
it“ (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 143). 
10.2.2 Creating and applying organizational knowledge at SEJ
Within our approach from part I we could understand all enumerated 
rationalized and socialized distinctions as organizational knowledge. As 
knowledge that is created in and applied to an organizational practice by organ-
izational actors. 
Sales staff first create hypotheses by combining  „socialized“  concepts - 
like the intuitive sense for markets, experiences with customers, and communi-
cation within FC meetings - with the more „rationalized“  data from the POS 
information system and with the procedural knowledge of given formal item-
management routines. This activity results in hypotheses for further sale oppor-
tunities (or the prevention of sale losses) which are communicated to the item 
order system. But to generate an order (or more precisely, to let the POS gener-
ate an order) out of a newly created hypothesis is nothing else than to apply a 
new piece of organizational knowledge151. Thus, creation and combination of 
knowledge turns to effective organizational action only when it is applied to 
organizational practice. Here we can also locate the gap between knowledge 
and practice (see figure 10.4). It is a gap not only because of our terminological 
distinction. It is a gap because a situation (or problem) in practice cannot be 
unequivocally related to a stock of successful knowledge. And it is also a gap 
because it never is certain if application of knowledge to its practice will be 
successful. The reason for that has been explicated in our reflections on knowl-
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151  Strictly speaking, not  only the newly created hypothesis is applied, but also all other men-
tioned knowledge items which guide the organizational activity  of ordering items (like formal SEJ 
item-management routines,  best-practices from FC meetings, tacit knowledge about customers, 
etc.). 
edge: underdetermination and open-endedness imply an unescapable gap be-
tween knowledge and its particulars.     
Figure 10.4: Rationalized & socialized organizational knowledge at Seven-Eleven Japan 
10.2.3 Looped knowledge creation & application
For sure, application of organizational knowledge is not the end of the knowl-
edge creation process. Application results in changes in practice. These changes 
have to be interpreted, verified, tested, and so forth. And also here the SEJ 
items-management workflow plays an important role since the POS system not 
only serves as an ordering service but helps employees to test their hypotheses 
against real customer behavior. And since there is a gap between knowledge 
and practice, it always may be that knowledge-application turns out to be un-
successful152, which would initiate a new knowledge creation process:   
„if a gap is found to exist between the newly acquired knowledge and the reality, a new 
spiral of knowledge creation is triggered.“ (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 151). 
Thus, corresponding to our theoretical claims in part I, SEJ shows that knowl-
edge creation and application are interchanging events revolving around the 
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152  In fact, an entirely fixed set of organizational knowledge is theoretically impossible,  like, for 
instance, no scientific theory will ever be freed from possible falsification.   
gap between knowledge and practice. The gap is the moving force which con-
tinuously initiates new attempts of knowledge creation. 
  Figure 10.5: Knowledge creation and application at Seven-Eleven Japan
Note that this process of knowledge creation also demonstrates the tension be-
tween being and becoming (chapter 4.3.2). Until the actual order occurs, the 
knowledge process is open and not fully predictable - the result is non-
determinable. Knowledge is in a fluctuating state of becoming. But as soon as 
the hypothesis is being created and the order generated, knowledge transforms 
to being. It is black-boxed and as such a possible source of operationalized or-
ganizational action. But of course only temporarily. And only as far as the hy-
potheses works and triggers expected sales153. If a hypothesis is not performing 
well anymore, then this is noticed in the testing/verification phase (see figure 
10.1). In such a case the black-box has to be reopened, and new hypotheses 
building, i.e. new knowledge creation has to be performed. 
10.3 Organizational Epistemology applied to SEJ use-case
The SEJ use-case is not only interesting as being interpretable by our first theo-
retical toolkit, i.e. by a theory of organizational knowledge. It is especially in-
teresting because SEJ has designed an organizational knowledge creation envi-
ronment which largely seems to comply with the normative implications of 
knowledge. Hence, we will apply our second theoretical toolkit in order to see 
how its normative guidelines are realized at SEJ.
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153 all of this presupposes that the SEJ workflow is fully implemented, i.e.  that sales development 
is continuously checked, and that significant difference between predictions and reality triggers 
measures. 
Let us repeat: our normative reading says that knowledge is not to be seen as 
any distinction which allows action. Instead, while creating knowledge, organi-
zations should make efforts to create the right distinctions allowing right action 
according to goals and structures of the organization. Here, the philosophical 
approach of social epistemology turned out to serve as suitable groundwork 
since it (1) connects the idea of knowledge to successful social action, as well 
as (2) it develops criteria for the social space of knowledge creation. By shift-
ing the outcomes of social epistemology to organizations in chapter 9, we were 
able to formulate three guidelines of organizational epistemology: enable, con-
strain and reflect. 
Now, we will explicate the normative-epistemological character of the 
SEJ use-case in understanding the item-management workflow through the lens 
of these three guidelines.    
10.3.1 „Enabling“ at SEJ
That SEJ provides an enabling knowledge creation environment can already be 
seen in the way how the company treats not only management or R&D employ-
ees, but also sales employees as important knowledge creating actors. 
Inclusion 
SEJ‘s first measure towards a pluralistic and open knowledge creation envi-
ronment is to include store staff in creating important organizational knowledge 
assets like sales hypotheses and item orders. According to SEJ‘s philosophy, 
sales hypotheses are created not upon the CEOs „two eyes“  only, but by contri-
butions of potentially all store employees within their daily practice. This 
causes a transformation from a usual top-down leadership to a model of „dis-
tributed leadership“: 
„change is not achieved by a charismatic leader, but through a collective knowledge-
creating process, where leadership is distributed.“ (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 142). 
From our point of view, the reason for this is epistemological. The nature of 
knowledge (open-endedness and underdetermination) requires creation proc-
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esses to be not only mechanical reasoning-processes but to be designed as so-
cially embedded and pluralistic. We should remember the social epistemologi-
cal line of our argument: as knowledge is open-ended and cannot be validated 
by rational methods alone, critical social interaction needs to fill (or to cover) 
that gap. This is done within a discourse of different actors offering different 
views on the subject matter. Such a multiplicity of different views is required to 
avoid knowledge creation to be determined by the „whim of individuals“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 130f.). 
To let local sales employees participate in knowledge creation, follows 
another social epistemological insight, namely that knowledge is not universal 
but bound to local communities: one and the same sales hypothesis may be 
„true“  in Tokyo but not in a rural area. Thus, from our organizational epistemo-
logical view, what SEJ calls „distributed leadership“  is nothing else than the 
inclusive multiplication of different knowledge creation actors. At SEJ such 
inclusion-strategy builds the indispensable first step for maximizing critical dis-
cursive interaction in order to open a pluralistic space of knowledge creation.
Critical Multi-Perspectivity
To increase multiple viewpoints is not only achieved by encouraging different 
actors to create knowledge but also by enabling these persons to take different 
views. The latter aims at a space of multi-perspectivity for each sales person in 
order to facilitate successful hypotheses building. To enable such multi-
perspectivity at the level of store staff, SEJ sets up two main measures. 
First, SEJ designs the knowledge creation environment as a multi-
channeled information flow. Hypotheses making is supported by information 
provided by the POS system: sales trends, weather forecasts, local and global 
events, SEJ campaigns, product information, and so forth. Furthermore, experi-
ence with local community and customers, as well as face-to-face communica-
tion with FCs, is seen as valuable input in order to generate a multi-perspective 
view. Figure 10.2 already offered an overview on the multiple perspectives 
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which are used to evaluate the situation and to conduct knowledge creation at 
SEJ‘s item-management:
Figure 10.2: Multiple sources of information enabling organizational knowledge creation 
Second, SEJ encourages its sales employees to create their hypotheses not only 
from their personal standpoint but from other possible views, too. This is 
achieved by prompting them to consciously incorporate multiple possible cus-
tomer perspectives. The idea behind this measure is to „think as customers, in-
stead of thinking for customers“  (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 144). According to 
SEJ instructions, sales employees have to create their critical hypotheses based 
on (a) the perspective of an average customer, (b) the perspective of an average 
family, and (c) the perspective of a close friend. This aims at „suspend(ing) 
judgements based on preconceptions and past experiences“  (Nonaka, et al., 
2008, p. 144):
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Figure 10.6: Multi-perspectivity at Seven-Eleven Japan
Here again we can see that these measures, introduced to enable multiple stand-
points and perspectives, are not chosen because diversity has a value in itself. 
They are chosen because they „suspend judgements based on preconceptions“, 
i.e. the more participating actors the higher the probability to keep the quest to-
wards knowledge critical and to avoid idiosyncratic stagnation. 
Multi-perspectivity combined with the principle of inclusion154 enable an open 
and critical space which puts knowledge creation to its social context and which 
multiplies both perspectives of actors and possible knowledge outcomes. To 
conclude, it should be part of any knowledge management strategy to enable 
such space for critical discursive interaction. Based on our shifting of social 
epistemological groundings to organizations, this means to implement the 
guidelines of inclusion and multi-perspectivity. 
But from the social epistemological discussion we also know that in order 
to allow this to happen, transparent standards are needed to further guide the 
knowledge creation process. 
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154  which ultimately is nothing than another form of multi-perspectivity, because to include as 
many actors as possible is to multiply the perspectives taken.
Transparent Standards
As SEJ is a formal organization, also knowledge creation is - to a certain extent 
- a structured activity, i.e. also knowledge creation is „organized“. There are 
standardized routines which regulate how to retrieve information from the POS 
system, how to input, test, and verify hypotheses. There are also standards 
which help to specify when a hypothesis turned out to be working, and when 
not. Other standards are located on higher levels, revolving around general SEJ 
values and goals. 
At SEJ, all these standards are transparent in the sense that they are con-
tinuously communicated through all hierarchies of the organization. Both high 
level standards (like general SEJ values) as well as those specifically governing 
item-management are part of the communication-flow from management to 
FCs, and from FCs to store staff. Transparency here not only means that stan-
dards are accessible, but also that they actually reach organizational actors (e.g. 
sales employees) and play a role in daily organizational action (e.g. within the 
item-management workflow). 
This feature of critical knowledge creation is important, because it gives 
knowledge creation a direction. It shows that even an open environment needs 
constraining guidelines in order to produce knowledge in a normative sense. 
Therefore, the feature of transparent standards leads directly to the second 
guideline of „constraining“. 
10.3.2 „Constraining“ at SEJ
During the step of enabling a wide spectrum of possible outcomes was opened. 
But, as we said in chapter 9.3, multiplying perspectives does not automatically 
multiply knowledge. With Helen Longino we could ask: how does SEJ provide 
an environment which not only allows the new to emerge but also determines 
„what gets to remain in the (...) pool of information that counts as knowledge.“ 
(Longino, 2002, p. 129)? How is the separation between knowledge and non-
knowledge, between successful and unsuccessful knowledge, between mere dis-
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tinction and knowledge regulated? Which measures does SEJ take to qualify the 
organizational environment for knowledge-production? How is SEJ‘s item-
management guiding the transformation from the „subjective“ to the „objec-
tive“?
 
At SEJ, the main process towards epistemological constraining is the 
hypothesis-cycle itself. The fact that subjective distinction-making is embedded 
in a hypothesis-verification circle (figure 10.1) strongly indicates a normatively 
oriented way of dealing with knowledge creation. Our first defined step of ena-
bling was directed towards allowing sales employees to „understand the essen-
tial nature of the particular situation in which (a product) sells or does not sell“ 
(Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 143). All the propositional, representational, narrative, 
and tacit input provided by the SEJ environment, combined with the guiding 
instructions of actively considering different perspectives, were directed to-
wards developing an understanding of the situation in order to generate sales 
hypotheses, i.e. to generate knowledge claims towards future sales. The features 
of inclusion and multi-perspectivity were all about to maximize and multiply 
organizational distinctions.
But this is not the final result of the knowledge creation process. Knowl-
edge is not merely a subjective distinction. Knowledge is connected to truth (for 
rationalistic epistemology) and/or to aims of a community (for social and or-
ganizational epistemology). At SEJ the emergence of a new subjective hypothe-
sis - by an individual organizational actor - is essential and indispensable, but 
not enough. Hypothesis creation is only the first step, since the hereby created 
„subjective insights“  need to be „verified objectively through hypothesis build-
ing and testing“  (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 144). Just like rationalistic epistemol-
ogy differentiates between belief and knowledge, and social epistemology be-
tween content and knowledge, at SEJ a hypothesis first is an organizational dis-
tinction which has to survive critical discursive interaction and verification in 
order to become organizational knowledge. And it is the aim of SEJ (as it 
should be for any knowledge-sensitive organization) to design an environment 
which fosters not only the emergence of distinctions but especially that of 
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knowledge. This constraining task of SEJ‘s items-management is realized 
within the hypothesis-circle. 
But how should we understand the latter within our organizational epis-
temological approach? To answer that question we need to track the two con-
straining mechanisms of organizational epistemology i.e. confirmation (con-
straining knowledge towards organizational goals) and acceptance (constrain-
ing knowledge towards organizational structure). 
 
Confirmation: constraining knowledge creation towards 
organizational goals
In chapter 9 we concluded that - like at any other knowledge creation activity - 
it is needed to define what is means for something to be knowledge. One tradi-
tional (and intuitive) answer is that knowledge has to be „true“. But part II re-
vealed that the criteria of „truth“  alone is not a viable aim for knowledge be-
cause it simply is far too abstract: 
if „all one wants is (...)  truth, why not count the number of bottle caps one can lay down 
between Los Angeles and San Diego or between Minneapolis and St. Louis?“  (Longino, 
2002, p. 176) 
This forced us to to connect knowledge creation not with some universal idea of 
truth but with specific aims of specific communities (chapter 7). It turned out 
that criteria of knowledge creation need to be contextualized to the aims of a 
community, just as a good map depends on for whom and for which purposes 
the map is meant to serve. The implication for organizational knowledge was to 
connect knowledge-creating activities to aims and goals of the organization 
(chapter 9.3). But to which goals is knowledge creation contextualized at SEJ? 
First, on a very general level, the knowledge creation environment is connected 
with basic SEJ values and philosophy. This is achieved by disseminating four 
basic rules (and their more detailed descriptions) throughout the organization, 
especially into the store environment: 
„Offer the freshest products,
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Never run out of stock,
Provide friendly service,
Keep stores clean and bright.“ (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 149)
All organizational action has to (directly or indirectly) be dedicated to these ba-
sic goals. This is of course also true for knowledge creation: general goals guide 
and constrain knowledge creation, i.e. they (co-)determine how hypotheses 
should look like. For instance, criteria for selecting which product to order 
ought not only to be the price (or margin) but also freshness („offer the freshest 
products“). Furthermore, a new order hypothesis should prefer products which 
can be handled easily without making a mess („keep stores clean and bright“). 
Or, the quantity of orders should be determined by taking a possible out-of-
stock situation into account („never run out of stock“). 
Hence, we are not only dealing with knowledge (hypotheses) as a source 
of organizational action (item ordering). We are dealing with distinction-making 
which has to be constrained to basic goals of the social context in which knowl-
edge creation is embedded in. In this case: the goals of SEJ. Thus, it is a central 
aim of successful knowledge management to permeate the knowledge creation 
space with these goals (at SEJ, this dissemination of goals is implemented via a 
specific meeting-culture which will be discussed above).
Second, at a more concrete level, there are specific goals for sales work. Here, 
one main goal is to „reduce opportunity costs“, i.e. costs which occur through 
not offering products customers are looking for. 
At a more local level, sales employees have to take sales targets into con-
sideration when making their decisions. They also have to implement SEJ cam-
paigns. An important aspect here is that these more concrete goals very much 
depend on local circumstances. SEJ is a large franchise system with thousands 
of stores spread around the whole country. Hence, there are not only global tar-
gets and campaigns, but also local ones. Even single stores are able to rollout 
own campaigns. Thus, concrete goals of campaigns, which have to be taken 
into consideration for making orders, are not globally the same for all knowl-
edge creating actors. This is a typical example for the local embeddedness of 
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knowledge creation criteria: the SEJ knowledge creation environment is split to 
various „local epistemologies“  within local communities (see chapter 7.8). This 
implies to provide channels and venues for both global organizational goals as 
well as for local ones. 
But how does SEJ manage to incorporate its goals to the knowledge creation 
environment? First of all, there is awareness at SEJ that these (both general and 
specific) goals are important factors to which knowledge creation has to be 
aligned (i.e. „constrained“) to. Therefore, the store environment is constantly 
connected with both general as well as with more specific goals. The organiza-
tion puts significant efforts to let knowledge about goals spread across the thou-
sands of (fluctuating) store employees, between store managers and FCs, be-
tween FCs and SEJ‘s general management, and so forth. This communication is 
realized by textual or other representational form, for instance, via written in-
structions, or information on POS terminals. It is furthermore communicated 
via intense and thorough face-to-face interaction at different hierarchical levels 
of the organization (see chapter 10.1.3). 
One venue of this face-to-face communication is the „FC meeting“  with 
all FCs and with SEJ management attending. These extensive summits not only 
deal with actual campaigns. They also provide an intense and deep communica-
tion platform where participants share success stories and thematize the funda-
mental way of thinking and the philosophy of the organization155. According to 
Nonaka et al., this creates a „most important place for mutual understanding“ 
(Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 147).
Another important venue is the communication between FCs and stores 
(owners and employees) taking place at „store meetings“. Each FC is responsi-
ble for 8-10 stores and visits each of them twice a week. The FC offers advice 
about ordering, company policies, sales campaigns, and new products. S/he 
teaches sales techniques and provides overall support. During the face-to-face 
meetings on the spot the FC also introduces best practices by communicating 
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155 We need to critically remark that  these meetings seem to be based on a top-down character, 
i.e.  communication is  mainly directed from the management (chairman) down to the approxi-
mately 1.600 FCs attending. See the upcoming chapter 10.3.3 for further critical discussion on 
this issue.
success stories. In our terms, the FC continuously evaluates and updates both 
organizations goals and organizational structure, thus constraining the knowl-
edge creation environment. 
Figure 10.7: The two most important venues of goal communication at SEJ: FC meetings and 
store meetings
!
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! organizational structure
As formal organization, SEJ not only provides goals but also a structure di-
rected towards the fulfillment of these goals. This has already been highlighted 
at the discussion of the feature of „transparent standards“. Creation of new 
knowledge is not performed fully arbitrary but has to occur within organiza-
tionally structured paths, especially along the workflows of the POS system.
First, the content of an order is constrained to which products are avail-
able, or how many of these products can be ordered. Similar to our nurse (see 
chapter 1.3.3) should be dealing with health issues of her patients, also at SEJ 
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only those products may be part of item ordering which actually are avail-
able156.    
Second, the way how to enter a hypothesis into the system, how to make a 
new order, or how to check the effects of a recently made order, is standardized 
and constrained. This constraining of knowledge creation is not only because 
SEJ is an organization (and as such structured). The reason is also epistemo-
logical: if there would be no structure for creating and evaluating hypotheses, 
then the standards by which hypotheses are to be evaluated would be arbitrarily 
set up by any actor individually. Hence, there would be no shared ground on 
which it would be possible to accept a hypothesis. The method of accepting a 
sales hypothesis would then depend on the idiosyncratic and subjective evalua-
tion of individuals, instead on a common organizational structure. 
What makes SEJ’s item-management so special is not that it is structured, 
but that it is specifically structured as a knowledge creation activity. Item-
management is seen not only as organizational activity of individuals. It is seen 
as knowledge creation, structured as acceptance-process within the routines of 
hypothesis generation and verification. Just like our nurse, who needed to orient 
her knowledge creation to given structures of the hospital (see chapter 1.3.3), 
also SEJ employees cannot (and should not) ignore provided organizational 
structures. 
Acceptance and Confirmation: turning distinctions to 
successful knowledge 
Confirmation and acceptance are realized via organizational goals and organiza-
tional structures, thus constraining knowledge creation. This creates an envi-
ronment in which distinction-making is not only enabled but also normatively 
constrained. Constrained towards standards upon which a critical discourse can 
accept (or not accept) and confirm (or not confirm) knowledge claims. At SEJ‘s 
item-ordering process, knowledge creation is both embedded in acceptance 
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156  Of course,  one could bring in the idea to allow employees to make new suggestions for not 
yet existing products. But this also would have to happen in a structured way.   
processes (especially via the hypothesis verification structure) as well as in 
confirmation processes (especially via the connection to goals). 
Figure 10.8 summarizes that SEJ not only enables an open space to let 
actors construct knowledge claims (hypotheses) within a wide range of perspec-
tives but also constrains that creation towards organizational goals and struc-
tures.
Figure 10.8: The organizational epistemological guidelines of enabling and constraining at 
Seven-Eleven Japan 
The combination of enabling and constraining provides an organizational envi-
ronment which nurtures knowledge creation in our normative epistemological 
sense. It of course not guarantees the results always to be „true“, nor does it al-
low the organization to separate true from false knowledge (or knowledge from 
mere distinctions) with full certainty. But the implementation of enabling and 
constraining guidelines shapes an environment where creation of organizational 
distinctions is geared towards our normative understanding of knowledge. The 
organizational field of SEJ is configured in a way which guides knowledge cre-
ating actors towards the (from our point of view) more holistic concept of 
knowledge, i.e. a concept of knowledge which is normatively laden (in contrast 
to the undifferentiated descriptive view which sees knowledge as anything that 
allows action, and/or as any practically related distinction). 
knowledge
hypothesis
hypothesis
hypothesis
inclusion

Integration of 
store staff into the 
knowledge creation process
goals

•  SEJ values & philosophy
•  reduce opportunity costs
•  the 4 basic rules
 structure

•  routines & standards of
•  POS workflow
•  hypothesis acceptance

multi-
     perspectivity

•  Multiple sources 
•  POS information
•  here-now-
experience
•  social 
interaction / 
meetings
•  Multiple perspectives 
•  Average customer
•  Average family
•  Close friend
270
SEJ‘s extraordinary success in regard to knowledge management (and beyond) 
is not sufficiently explained because of its fancy IT structures (Nonaka, et al., 
2008, p. 143). It is because SEJ manages to design an environment which main 
attributes are tuned to the main features of a normative concept of knowledge. 
The understanding of the latter is based on social epistemology, i.e. on the (in 
our view) most comprehensive philosophical reflection on knowledge. The SEJ 
use-case shows that to base the design of an organizational knowledge creation 
environment on the social epistemological understanding of knowledge, i.e. to 
base the design on „critical discursive interaction“  („enabling“) and on a com-
munities aims and standards („constraining“), leads to positive results. Not only 
in terms of a philosophical understanding of knowledge but also in terms of or-
ganizational success.
10.3.3 „Reflecting“ at SEJ
Because our normative epistemological point of view was based on the idea that 
not any organizational distinction inherently is qualified as organizational 
knowledge, we introduced the second guideline of „constraining“. Distinction-
making then not automatically results in knowledge but initially is only a 
knowledge claim (like a sales hypothesis). In order to reach the status of knowl-
edge, a claim has to be accepted and confirmed. 
As we saw at SEJ, constraining is realized by aligning knowledge crea-
tion with organizational routines like the hypothesis-cycle and POS system as 
well as with global and local SEJ goals and objectives. But are these guiding 
principles permanently scrutinized and reflected? Is there awareness about the 
fact that critical knowledge creation also involves to evaluate the aims (goals) 
and standards (structures / routines) themselves on a „second order discourse“?
First, let us consider what „reflection“  would mean within SEJ item-
management and how it could look like. Then we will evaluate whether this is 
actually happening at SEJ. 
Reflection would demand a space where both (a) the workflow of the 
knowledge creation process (i.e. what we called „structure“) as well as (2) the 
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driving objectives, values, and vision (i.e. what we called „goals“) can be criti-
cally scrutinized and questioned. A second-order (or second-loop) discourse 
ought to be situated at a meta-level, transcending every-day‘s knowledge crea-
tion. An appropriate place for this to happen would probably be the communi-
cation spaces we discussed in 10.3.2, i.e. the „FC meeting“  and the „store meet-
ing“. According to our third guideline, these meetings seem suitable for reflec-
tion, because they not only cover the knowledge creation process itself but also 
the goals and structures it is based on.
Figure 10.9: FC- and store-meetings as possible reflection spaces at Seven-Eleven Japan 
Unfortunately, at this meta-level of reflection, SEJ seems to turn away from the 
ideas of „mutual“  understanding and „distributed“  leadership. When it is about 
the basic goals, values, or the standardized workflows in which the hypothesis-
cycle is embedded, a classical, hierarchical top-down paradigm seems to be in 
place. It looks like that both FC meetings and store meetings are rather about to 
guarantee effective transfer of SEJ values to the employees, than to critically 
evaluate these principles. On one hand, the way how the POS workflow is 
structured and which values lie behind it is thematized and is part of face-to-
face communication within the meetings. But on the other hand, principles are 
thematized only as something that is given and should be taken for granted. In 
fact, constraining factors like goals and structures are treated rather as some-
thing that should be internalized than something that should be criticized. At FC 
Organizational 
Knowledge
sales hypotheses
Organizational 
Practice
item orders, sales 
development
applicationContext
SEJ vision, driving 
objectives, POS 
workflow
background
2nd or-
der discourse
1st order discourse 
(2) constraining
(1) enabling
(3) reflecting
@ FC meetings
@ store meetings
272
meetings the chairman endlessly repeats the „fundamental way of thinking“ and 
the philosophy of SEJ. But not in order to be critically evaluated. The purpose 
rather is to be internalized by the FCs (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 147). The FCs, 
in turn, bring these principles to their store meetings with no other aim than to 
further deliver the goals defined by management to store employees. 
Neither at the communication space between management and FCs, nor at 
the flow between FCs and stores, there seems to be a purposeful reflection on 
basic goals or structure. Creation and evaluation of these guiding principles 
seem to be restricted to management and experts at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy. Hence, although SEJ was a best practice at the guidelines of enabling 
and constraining, at the guideline of reflection there seems to be need for im-
provement. 
Both FCs and sales employees would be valuable sources for evaluating 
given routines and goals, because they perform (and/or observe) them day-by-
day within local circumstances. Thus, an opportunity to improve knowledge 
creation at SEJ’s item-management would be to distribute reflection and to pro-
vide feedback channels from both store staff to FCs, as well as from FCs to SEJ 
headquarters157. Such second-order discourse would prepare the organization to 
be ready for coping with future challenges, since improvement, continuous 
change, and adaption of the basic principles would be subject to critical discur-
sive interaction. It would allow to enable an open and critical discourse not only 
about how to successfully create valuable knowledge within the hypothesis-
cycle, but also about the hypothesis-cycle itself, as well as about its structures 
and goals. It would establish an „intelligent organization“ with „routines guid-
ing the modification of routines“ (F. B. Simon, 2007, p. 65).
10.4. Summary and future research
SEJ turned out to be an interesting use-case with regard to almost all guidelines 
of our organizational epistemology. SEJ showed how to understand and design 
an organizational activity as knowledge creation activity. To create new knowl-
273
157  Remember that this channel already exists: FCs bring in best-practices from their stores to 
the general FC meeting (chapter 10.1.3). However, this is located at  the first-level discourse. And 
there seems to be no equivalent feedback at the second-order level. 
edge claims (sales hypotheses) served as organizational distinction which en-
abled organizational action (item orders). 
In a first step, we analyzed how SEJ designed the items-management en-
vironment as a knowledge creation environment, via providing an enabling 
space. Knowledge creation (the construction of knowledge claims as sales hy-
potheses) was not restricted to management or white collar experts but dele-
gated to all store employees. Besides this inclusion, SEJ sales employees were 
enabled to develop critical multi-perspectivity: (a) they were provided with 
multiple input, like, sales developments, weather forecasts, planned local 
events, product and campaign information, experience with customers, best 
practices, and so forth; (b) they have been prompted to take multiple possible 
customer viewpoints into consideration. Together with continuous access to 
transparent standards, like the organizations main goals, SEJ manages to allow 
thousands of actors to participate in knowledge creation. 
In a second step the manifold outcomes of distinction-making (i.e. the 
making of sales hypothesis) was constrained to specific criteria. These con-
straining criteria aligned knowledge creation to the organizations goals and 
structure. 
Unfortunately SEJ seemed not to take any specific measures in order to 
(in a third step) reflect on these goals and structure. With such a second-order 
discourse in place, the items-management environment would be able to more 
dynamically cope with fundamental changes occurring both outside and within 
the organization. 
274
Chapter 11: Summary - A new vocabulary for a 
normative theory of organizational knowledge
11.1 Organizational Knowledge
11.1.1 The origin of organizing
Our inquiry began with the attempt to philosophically describe the deeper 
source of organizations. We claimed that to organize is a mode to cope with the 
radical openness of human existence. As several philosophical positions have 
pointed out, humans do not simply deal with a pre-given world of readymade, 
external objects. In contrary, human perception initially faces a chaotic envi-
ronment of „manifoldness“. What knowing subjects face is an unordered flux of 
chaos which has to be arranged, structured, organized, and made sense of. It is 
the internal system of human understanding, the concepts and processes used 
which enable us to construct distinctions and to distinguish „things“  in the 
world. This general position was located at early thinkers like Immanuel Kant, 
as well as at philosophical anthropology, existentialism, or constructivism 
(chapter 1.3). We summarized that the „conditio humana“, i.e. the radical open-
ness of human existence, makes is necessary to make distinctions and to create 
meaning. A radical openness which forces us to become active designers of our-
selves, our world, and our actions. As „thrown beings“  (Heidegger, 1927/1962) 
we are obliged to participate in the permanent and never-ending „domestication 
of being“  (Sloterdijk, 2001). How our world and our actions look like is heavily 
dependent on how we deal with that openness we encounter, i.e. which concepts 
we use - and how we use them - to „synthesize“  the given „manifoldness“ 
(Kant, 1781/2003). 
Similarly, the organizational theorist Karl Weick claims that the core of 
organizing lies in „sensemaking“  (Weick, 1995a, 1995b). The construction 
process of sensemaking begins with „chaos“, i.e. with an „infinite stream of 
events and inputs that surround any organizational actor“  (Weick, et al., 2005, 
p. 411). Then actual sensemaking sets in as „labeling and categorizing to stabi-
lize the streaming of experience“  (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 411). Organizations act 
in an environment characterized by radical uncertainty and complexity (Tsou-
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kas, 2005b). They cope both with a hypercomplex external context (changing 
markets, political constraints, social culture, or emerging technologies) as well 
as with internal complexity (heterogeneous individuals and collective human 
actors). This situation forces organizations to develop mechanisms (which we 
called „concepts“) to reduce uncertainty and to bring order to the chaos of the 
world. Such sense- and distinction-making is prevalent at all stages of human 
existence: from the subjective sphere of individuals all the way up to the macro 
scale of society as a whole. Organizations play an important part in the middle 
of these dynamics (Kneer, 2001; Luhmann, 1975). And as organizations they 
are „sensemaking“ devices which - on a collective level, mediated by individu-
als - enable the creation of order out of chaos. Organizations enable to make 
distinctions and to act, to temporarily escape the senselessness and radical 
openness of human existence.
11.1.2 Organizational concepts: „rationalized“ & „socialized“
We concluded that an organization is a collective device of distinction- and 
sense-making, a source of world-construction. But which concepts do organiza-
tions use to engage in such distinction-making? Here, we consulted the disci-
pline of organizational studies which offers two general types of such 
distinction-making concepts: „rationalized“ and „socialized“ concepts. 
Organizational scholars who introduced „rationalized“  concepts were in-
spired by the idea of enlightenment, i.e. that reason and rationality are main ve-
hicles in ordering the world. According to the rationalized paradigm, organiza-
tions are seen as formally structured institutions shaped by concepts like hierar-
chy, roles, rules (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 11), bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), „scien-
tific management“ (F. W. Taylor, 1998 [1911]), and so forth158. 
This approach of organizational studies was criticized as being too narrow 
(Quinn, 1988)159. Critics argued that to understand the full range of organiza-
tional behavior other concepts have to be taken into consideration. Concepts 
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158 Other proponents of this paradigm have pointed out the rational structuration of  organizations 
(Fayol, 1949) and the whole idea of rationalistic management as rational control over organiza-
tional activities (e.g. Gulick & Urwick, 1969) .
159  We also mentioned early  critical objections considering „uncertainty“ (Knight,  2006) and 
„bounded rationality“ (H. A. Simon, 1991, 1997). 
which focus on organizations not only as formal institutions but also as social 
practices. Practices which cannot be fully put into rationalized patterns or ab-
stract frames. We coined these other concepts „socialized“  and mentioned ap-
proaches which emphasize informal structures (Schreyögg, 2008, p. 47), com-
munities (Brown & Duguid, 1991), culture (Dietrich, 2001; Schein, 1992; 
Smircich, 1983), power (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, 2003), emotions (Ashka-
nasy, et al., 2000; Forgas & George, 2001), or narratives (Orr, 1996). They sup-
plement rationalistic approaches, allowing a more holistic picture of the struc-
turing of organizations.
One of our examples was taken from a field study at a hospital (Weick, et 
al., 2005) and may illuminate the idea of organizational concepts described so 
far. The field study describes organizational activities of a nurse whose actions 
are embedded in a set of rationalized and socialized organizational concepts she 
uses to bring order to the chaotic environment she faces at the hospital. From 
the „million things that go on“ (Weick, et al., 2005, p. 411) she has to distin-
guish between the important and the non-important, between which things she 
turns her attention to and which not, between what she does and what not. This 
distinction-making is not guided by her own private faculties alone but signifi-
cantly by organizational concepts: the field study describes how she had to in-
ternalize and use given organizational rules, roles, or predefined paths of com-
munication and hierarchy („rationalized concepts“) in order to perform useful 
action. It also describes how she had to dwell into the specific culture at the 
hospital as well as how she had to get acquainted with specific language spoken 
and informal codes used („socialized concepts“). By looking at the nurse use-
case we were able to see that both „rationalistic“  (rules, roles, hierarchy) as well 
as „socialized“  (culture, narratives) concepts contribute to the formation of or-
ganizational action.
11.1.3 Organizational knowledge: „rationalized“ & „socialized“
The next step of our inquiry was to show how the driving force behind these 
organizational concepts is organizational knowledge. Our readings of organiza-
tional knowledge literature (and knowledge management literature) in chapter 2 
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prepared the ground for an understanding of organizational knowledge as 
something which enables organizational actors to make distinctions and to act. 
Also here we distinguished between „rationalized“  and „socialized“  attempts, 
namely as „propositional“  and „narrative“  organizational knowledge respec-
tively (Tsoukas, 2005a). Chapter 3 focused on definitions and examples of these 
two types of knowledge as well as their application to organizational practice. 
Propositional knowledge appears as formal rules, roles, and routines 
which ought to be applied by organizational actors. These mostly explicitly 
formalized categories form a „stock of knowledge“  (Berger & Luckmann, 
1969) which shape the subjective distinctions of actors as well as the objective, 
„institutionalized“  structure of the organization. From such a view, coordinated 
activity is possible because „individuals draw and act upon a corpus of gener-
alizations in the form of generic rules produced by the organization“  (Tsoukas 
& Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979). Hence, organizational knowledge can be seen as 
„theory“  (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980) which has to be applied to or-
ganizational „practice“. Similar to a scientific theory also organizational knowl-
edge (as propositions) subsumes heterogenous particulars under generalized 
concepts.
Narrative knowledge, on the other hand, provides a form which allows to 
condense, retain, and distribute contextualized, practical knowledge throughout 
the organization (Tsoukas, 2005a)160. Narratives are centered around relevant 
events of organizational practice, manifested in stories, anecdotes, best-, or 
worst-practices. Although not constructed as rules, narratives are very powerful 
in guiding organizational action (Orr, 1996; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 
980ff.). This is because they are more flexible since they solve problems not by 
following exact rules („if-then“  logic) but by re-contextualizing former occur-
rences to an actual situation („as-if“ logic).
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160  but also e.g. (Boland & Tenkasi, 1993; Czarniawska, 1997; Geiger,  2006; Orr, 1996; 
Schreyögg & Geiger, 2005) 
Figure 11.1: „Organizational concepts“ as basic elements of organizations
11.1.4 Organizational distinction making: representation, meaning, and 
action
Besides the dualism of propositional and narrative knowledge we added another 
important set of terms to our theoretical toolkit. 
First, we suggested a „strong view“  on knowledge in chapter 2, starting 
with readings from sociological theory. Hereby, we said that knowledge gener-
ally constitutes the epistemological dimension of a social field because it en-
ables actors to make distinctions in order to understand their world and to act in 
it (Bourdieu, 1986; Giddens, 2008). This opened up the possibility of a „strong“ 
knowledge-based view which sees knowledge not only as a „commodity“  or 
„resource“ but as a founding element of any social field.
Then, we defined organizations as social fields in which knowledge as 
distinction-making is active on three levels: representation, meaning, and ac-
tion. These three levels of distinction-making were derived from a connection 
of the knowledge management triad „data-information-knowledge“  (Boisot, 
1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Probst, et al., 2002) with semiotics (Morris, 
1946; Peirce, 1913; Saussure, 1959). Organizational distinction-making can be 
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located in representations (the syntactic dimension; encoded artifacts like e.g. 
text, instructions, computer data), in meaning (the semantic dimension), and in 
relation to action (the pragmatic dimension). These three levels are transitional 
facets on a continuum. A continuum which is marked by the scope of contextu-
alization of distinction making, and where also the two types of organizational 
knowledge, i.e. propositional and narrative knowledge, can be located (see fig-
ure 11.2). Thus, we receive an interrelated set of terms which can be used as 
template to analyze knowledge in organizations:
Figure 11.2: Levels of distinction-making and types of organizational knowledge161
Propositions tend more to be discovered in explicit form at the level of repre-
sentations, whereby narratives are more grounded in everyday‘s action. How-
ever, both forms of knowledge also operate on the other levels: propositional 
knowledge is taken up by actors as meaning and then connected to action; and 
narratives can be explicated to representations, e.g. as written best-practices.
In our example from the hospital, the organization offers syntactical dis-
tinctions on the level of representation, i.e. official instructions about behavior, 
responsibilities of nurses, their hierarchical position, command- and 
communication-lines (but also narratives are present on the level of representa-
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161 inspired by (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 976)
tion, e.g. as best-practices-reports, or as noteworthy stories of former patient 
treatments stored in the collective memory of hospital employees). On a seman-
tical level nurses create inter-subjectively shared distinctions which make sense 
of those representations and their possible relation to practice. Finally, nurses 
relate these meanings to their specific context in order to perform action (the 
pragmatic level). 
Figure 11.2 also indicates that we should put emphasis not only on the 
differences, but also on the similarities between propositions and narratives. 
Both types of knowledge enable organizational actors to draw distinctions and 
to make sense of the chaotic flux of their world; both types appear as represen-
tations, meaning, and relation to action, and allow to temporarily bring order to 
chaos. Just as propositional knowledge, also narratives may be seen as „a way 
of appropriating order from disorder and therefore can be connected to dynam-
ics of knowledge creation“ (Patriotta, 2003, p. 193).
11.1.5 Organizational knowledge creation
The last part in order to complete our understanding of „organizational knowl-
edge“  was to take an closer look at knowledge creation. Chapter 4 showed that 
knowledge is not a rigid stock but a continuously reconstructable flow. Similar 
to scientific knowledge creation, it is the experience of new phenomena and 
problems which let knowledge creation emerge. Organizations create new 
knowledge as they adapt to a changing (internal and external) environment. 
This happens when existing (propositional or narrative) knowledge is not suffi-
cient, i.e. when the organization encounters problems which cannot be solved 
with the currently available stock of knowledge. Such „perturbations“  trigger 
the creation of new solutions (Patriotta, 2003, p. 183) and adapt rationalized 
and/or socialized knowledge to the new situation. We interpreted such knowl-
edge creation processes as learning processes within „single“  and „double“ 
loops (Argyris, 1976, 1977; Argyris & Schön, 1978).
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Figure 11.3: Organizational knowledge creation (and application), according to the models of 
„knowledge cycle“ (Patriotta, 2003) and „organizational learning“ (Argyris & Schön, 1978)
Using the vocabulary of the „techno-science-approach“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 43), 
we described knowledge-creation as embedded in complex „actor-networks“ 
(Callon, 1986; Latour, 1983, 2007; Law, 1992). We interpreted field studies 
conducted by Gerardo Patriotta (Patriotta, 2003) and concluded that knowledge 
creation is an open and controversial process („becoming“) which results in 
temporarily stable outcomes („being“) like, e.g. instructional blueprints (propo-
sitional knowledge) or guiding stories (narrative knowledge). As „black boxes“ 
they become part of the applicable organizational knowledge stock since they 
have been „translated“  to a settled, accepted, and stable state. Knowledge then 
is „utilized“  and „institutionalized“  as it gets more and more integrated into 
daily practice. In this state, knowledge can be understood as applicable black-
box which blurs and hides the internal mechanisms, its history, and its contin-
gent character. Of course, the stable character is only temporarily given. At the 
moment black-boxes have to be reopened (e.g. due to breakdowns in practice) 
the next contingent knowledge creation process is triggered. 
11.1.6 The constitutional gap of organizational knowledge creation
The open-ended and contingent character of knowledge creation revealed a 
general gap between knowledge and organizational practice. It revealed a ten-
sion between the situation in practice and the knowledge which finally is cre-
ated. Problems in practice may trigger knowledge-creation but do not fully de-
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termine its outcome. Knowledge-creation is an open-ended process of becoming 
which is heavily contextualized and dependent on heterogenous actors, back-
ground assumptions, and so forth. This was already prevalent in chapter 3, 
where we examined the application of organizational knowledge. There we saw 
that propositional knowledge (as rules, routines, roles, or other distinctions) op-
erates with generalized categories which have to be applied to the concrete or-
ganizational practice. Those categories are concepts located in a fundamental 
tension („gap“) to its particular context of application, because how actors ap-
ply a category may vary from actor to actor, from situation to situation. This 
was indicated by the Wittgensteinian insight that in general the content of a rule 
does not determine its use (Barnes, 1995, p. 55; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, 
p. 980f.; Wittgenstein, 1953/2006). The use is up to the interpretation and con-
textualization of organizational actors who ultimately have to bridge the gap 
between knowledge and practice. Organizational knowledge does not determine 
how it is interpreted and practically applied because of the intrinsically open-
ended and ambiguous nature of knowledge itself (a claim which was later veri-
fied in our philosophical-epistemological reflections). This is why we stated that 
the application of organizational knowledge is underdetermined by its proposi-
tional content. A general epistemological gap separates knowledge and its ap-
plication. 
Narrative knowledge, on the other hand, does not close that gap. Though 
non-abstract and contextualized, narratives are „templates“  (Patriotta, 2003, p. 
164) and part of the available stock of organizational knowledge. Narratives 
„help to conserve and mediate individual experiences and can be used as back-
ground knowledge when experiencing novel situations.“  (Rögnvaldur, 2006, p. 
348). Hence, narrative knowledge, just as propositional knowledge, is intended 
to be a reusable concept which ought to enable actors to cope with future situa-
tions. From this point of view narratives are „dynamically“ generalized con-
cepts (Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 83) and, similar to propositional knowledge,  counter-
parting heterogenous practice. They do not not eliminate underdetermination, 
but offer another way in dealing with it; they use „analogy“  instead of  „iden-
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tity“: or, as mentioned before, more an „as-if“  logic instead of an „if-then“  logic 
(Tsoukas & Hatch, 2005).
In chapter 4 the epistemological gap more clearly came to light. Maybe because 
we examined the knowledge process from the other direction, i.e. not from 
knowledge to practice („application“) but from practice to knowledge („crea-
tion“). Unlike from the other direction, we did not start from the open-
endedness of knowledge and its relation (application) to practice. We started 
from the organizational practice, from where knowledge creation is triggered 
(e.g. through perturbations or breakdowns) as a controversial and open-ended 
process. From the viewpoint of creation there is a gap between knowledge and 
practice because the construction process emerging out of the practice does not 
follow a predetermined path. Knowledge-creation and its outcome is open to a 
contingent set of possibilities. Possibilities which are blurred and finally hidden 
in organizational concepts as „black boxes“. This reveals another dimension of 
what we called the „underdetermination problem“ 162 in organizations. It stems 
from the fact that the situation which triggers knowledge creation cannot alone 
determine which solution is the definitive one. Just as application of knowledge 
was no trivial execution of rules, also creation of knowledge is an open process. 
Problems in practice may trigger knowledge-creation but do not fully determine 
its outcome163.  
To conclude, organizational knowledge as distinctions (at the levels of 
representation, meaning, and action) is not 1:1 interlocked with concrete organ-
izational practice. This view was supported by the characteristics of knowledge 
application in chapter 3. It was also supported by our discussions on knowledge 
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162  A term taken from epistemology and philosophy of science (Duhem, 1954; Longino, 2002) 
and which played an important role for the development of an „organizational epistemology“  in 
part III of this inquiry.  
163  Some authors explain this  by referring to the „equivocality of  action“, i.e. that we have to fo-
cus on the processual and controversial character of knowledge because organizing is consti-
tuted by action, and action is per se equivocal and in permanent flux (Cooper, 1998; Patriotta, 
2003, p.  200ff.).  But our attempt showed that equivocality of knowledge is rooted deeper,  i.e.  in 
the concept of knowledge itself  (part  II);  not  only „action-knowledge“  but knowledge in general 
remains in a permanent tension (or „gap“) between abstract and concrete, between theory and 
data,  between generalizations and particularities,  between organizational distinctions and organ-
izational practice.
creation in chapter 4. The result of knowledge creation is not simply the objec-
tively best practical solution of a problem in practice, but is open to contin-
gency and plurality. How the final shape of the blueprint looks like, or how a 
story becomes „noteworthy“  within the organization, is no mechanical selection 
process but a translation within complex actor-networks. Knowledge creation is 
embedded in a social environment with heterogenous actors and contextualized 
background assumptions. Therefore, just as the application of knowledge to 
practice is not fully determined by the knowledge‘s content (chapter 3), the 
creation of knowledge is not fully determined by practice (chapter 4).
11.1.7 Organizational Knowledge: a theoretical toolkit
In part I our attempt was to provide a theoretical framework (a theory of „or-
ganizational knowledge“) as a basic terminology which can be used to structure 
and interpret empirical field work, as well as to offer structuring- and 
analyzing-support for the „reflective practitioner“. 
Let us shortly conclude the basic terms of this theoretical toolkit: our 
framework understands organizational knowledge as a mode of distinction-
making on the three levels of representation, meaning, and action. A mode of 
distinction-making, ultimately driven by the radical openness of the human 
condition which makes it necessary to create distinctions in order to make sense 
of the world and to act in it. In organizations this is accomplished by the crea-
tion and application of knowledge which can be classified within a spectrum 
between „propositional“  and „narrative“. The former designates a formal and 
explicit level which can be found as official directives, rules, or roles. The latter 
designates an informal and more implicit level, which can be found as sedi-
mented memories, noteworthy situations, best-practices, or circulating stories. 
Both types of knowledge enable organizational actors to create distinctions on 
the three different levels of representation, meaning, and action. Furthermore, 
knowledge on all levels and of all types is situated in a tension (a „gap“) to the 
actual organizational practice. Problems, failures, breakdowns, „perturbances“, 
or other events which occur in organizational practice, may trigger  knowledge-
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creation loops whereby the existing stock of propositional or narrative knowl-
edge is adapted, renewed, or sometimes even totally revolutionized. 
Our inquiry not only defined this theoretical toolkit but also tried to apply 
it. For this we focused on a use-case from the Japanese company „Seven-
Eleven Japan“  (SEJ)164. Using terminology and concepts of the theory of „or-
ganizational knowledge“  from part I we interpreted the items-management 
process of SEJ in chapter 10.2. Item-management is an organizational process 
which determines which goods have to be ordered at which time to which store. 
There we saw that organizational knowledge (e.g. items-sales-data, or sales-
hypotheses) enables organizational actors (SEJ store staff) to make distinctions 
in order to perform action (to carry out item-orders). Organizational knowledge 
was described as representational data from the POS (point-of-sale) system, 
e.g. as product information, sales data, information about local events, weather 
reports, and so forth. On the level of meaning distinctions are made by the in-
terpretation of sales-data or customer behavior, and generally by the inter-
subjective combination of all data gathered via the item-management-system 
and face-to-face communication. Finally, these distinctions trigger concrete ac-
tion and are related to the practice of item-ordering at every one of the 12.000 
SEJ stores in Japan. 
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164 (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 138ff.)
 Figure 11.4: The triadic structure of organizational knowledge applied to item-management of 
Seven-Eleven Japan
We also detected both types of knowledge: formal, propositional knowledge 
(like e.g. sales data and instructions how to use the POS system) and narrative 
knowledge (like e.g. best practices communicated during meetings, or experi-
enced „here-now“  situations from interaction with customers „on the spot“). 
Also prevalent was a gap in which the process of knowledge-creation was lo-
cated. At SEJ the gap between knowledge and practice can be observed when 
new sales-hypotheses are generated which then result in item-orders. In our 
terms: when organizational knowledge (sales-hypotheses, together with all 
other distinctions related to it, like best practices, meeting-protocols, product 
information, etc.) is applied to it heterogenous (and open-ended) particulars, i.e. 
to organizational practice (see figure 11.5).
Representation
syntactic 
dimension
Meaning
semantic
dimension
Action
pragmatic 
dimension
scope of contextualization
Store 
Staff
POS 
data
Items-Listings
Hypotheses 
making
„Here-Now“ 
Experience
Meetings & 
Face-To-Face 
interaction
Ordering
Testing
Interpreting
Formal item-
management 
routines
287
Figure 11.5: Rationalized & socialized organizational knowledge at Seven-Eleven Japan
The gap appears within item-order activities since we never know if the knowl-
edge which led to the item-order will fulfill its expectations. We do not know 
how that piece of organizational knowledge will be applied to organizational 
practice and what effects it is going to determine. We do not know for certain if 
the items-order (and its backing sales-hypotheses) remains as relevant organiza-
tional distinction. But it is very likely that if a hypothesis is not performing the 
way it should, sooner or later the black-box will be re-opened and new hypothe-
ses building (i.e. new knowledge creation) has to be performed; then a „new 
spiral of knowledge creation is triggered“  (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 151). Crea-
tion and application are interchanging events revolving around the gap between 
knowledge and practice. The gap is the moving force which continuously initi-
ates new attempts of knowledge creation.
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11.2 Organizational Epistemology
11.2.1 Normative distinctiveness 
Our theoretical framework in part I described organizational knowledge crea-
tion (and application) as open-ended process which final shape is never prede-
termined. Similar to science, particularities (organizational practice) are sub-
sumed under generalizations (organizational knowledge). And, again as in sci-
ence, there is no ideal, unequivocal, or purely rational-determined way from 
particularity to generality. With this „underdetermination problem“ (at least im-
plicitly) in mind, organizational studies are motivated to reveal socially embed-
ded creation processes and to locate the involved factors which finally lead to 
institutionalized knowledge. This is, to open black boxes, to analyze their con-
tingent inner constitution, to trace their history, and to describe how they be-
came what they are. Such descriptive studies of the dynamics of organizational 
knowledge have been our main references so far. We have discussed not only 
theoretical terms but several field studies: at telephone call centers (Tsoukas & 
Vladimirou, 2001, p. 980ff.), car factories (Patriotta, 2003, chapters 4-7), or re-
tail stores (Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 138ff.). We have seen how these field studies 
attempt to empirically detect as well as to theoretically understand the making 
of black boxes, the creation of knowledge, and its application to organizational 
practice. 
Notice the consequence for our grounding concept of knowledge. In part I 
anything was coined „knowledge“  which fitted into our descriptive framework, 
e.g. propositions or narratives. But this understanding neglects a central feature 
of knowledge. A feature which has been discussed in western epistemology 
since Plato, and proposes to take a normative viewpoint on knowledge. A view-
point which has widely been ignored by organizational studies and knowledge 
management literature (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 2005). A viewpoint which 
understands knowledge as more than something that is created, applied, or 
transformed; which understands knowledge not only as a process or content, 
but as a claim: knowledge inherently claims to be valid (Adams, 2004, p. 228; 
Habermas, 1984; Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 83), it claims to be true vs. 
false, it claims to correspond to reality vs. being an illusion, it claims to be 
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knowledge vs. mere belief. In chapter 5 we backed this hypothesis by daily ex-
perience: to believe something (often) is something different from knowing it. 
This other view on knowledge opened a desideratum for our further in-
quiry. It introduced an attempt not only to examine knowledge as descriptive 
fact but to formulate normative criteria qualifying knowledge versus non-
knowledge. In other words, we do not only want knowledge to make distinc-
tions, we want knowledge to make right distinctions.  Therefore, in chapter 5 
we stated that if we seriously want to operate with the notion of „knowledge“ 
then we also need to be interested in what makes knowledge to be true, good, or 
useable. What makes it to be not a mere belief, not mere content, not a mere 
distinction? What interests us beyond epistemic attributes (what knowledge is; 
types and levels of the appearance of knowledge) are epistemological criteria 
(what knowledge ought to be; and by which criteria something is justified to be 
so). When we focus on the latter, in science we may ask: what should make a 
particular theory more appropriate than another? Or in organizations: what 
should qualify an organizational concept (propositions or narratives) in becom-
ing part of the stock of knowledge of an organization? Descriptive approaches 
would state (driven by the epistemological gap and the underdetermination 
problem) that this question cannot be answered a priori and is fully contingent 
to what is happening „on the ground“. All we can do is to observe knowledge 
formation-, utilization-, and institutionalization-processes, and their determin-
ing „real world“  factors. This descriptive view is a legitimate research program 
but, standing alone, only at the price of epistemic relativism. Knowledge is then 
anything put into place, no matter if by force, unreflected practice, accident, or 
luck. As long as some organizational concept provides distinctions for organiza-
tional actors it ipso facto is knowledge. From this descriptive approach we may 
interpret this or that as knowledge; we may interpret this or that knowledge 
leading to successful results at this or that organization; and we may even in-
duce some general findings. But we have no founded general criteria which 
would guide normative evaluation or practical design of knowledge creation 
environments. 
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In search for such criteria we came up with the hypothesis that philosophy 
(within its branch epistemology) may provide a basis for normative epistemo-
logical criteria for organizations; criteria which are not derived from some em-
pirical cases but founded in the notion of knowledge itself165. Notice how this 
foundation may not only be useful for philosophers but also for organizational 
scholars and practitioners who are interested in what makes good, or appropri-
ate knowledge, what makes the difference between „high“  and „low-quality“ 
knowledge (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 94). Hence, we have been interested 
not only in epistemic attributes of knowledge (the „descriptive view“  / „theory 
of organizational knowledge“, part I) but also in epistemological criteria (the 
„normative view“ / „organizational epistemology“, part III).
11.2.2 The return of philosophy in knowledge management: rationalistic 
and social epistemology
The link from a theory of organizational knowledge to an organizational epis-
temology may be bridged by the philosophical discourse of epistemology. The 
latter can be understood as a normative project which tries to formulate reason-
able conditions for something being knowledge versus being a mere belief (or 
something else). Hence, our hypothesis was that epistemological criteria devel-
oped for knowledge (in general) may also guide the definition of epistemologi-
cal criteria for organizational knowledge. 
In chapter 6 we coined the traditional attempt (which started with Plato 
and holds a strong tradition especially in the anglo-american philosophical dis-
cussion) „rationalistic epistemology“. It tries to provide rational and universal 
criteria to determine with certainty under which circumstances a belief is 
knowledge, or not (Steup, 2005). In short, it states that a belief has to be true 
and justified (Sosa, et al., 2000). Of course, there has been much discussion 
about what „truth“  and especially what „justification“  means. We gave a short 
overview of that discussion in chapter 6 but then turned to the so called „Gettier 
problem“  (Gettier, 1963). The latter basically shows that, no matter how some-
thing is being justified as true knowledge, there always remain cases where 
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165 See our first research question and hypothesis defined in chapter 5.4.
something by definition is both justified and true but still cannot be knowledge. 
We will not follow that argument here (for this see chapter 6.3) but we can 
summarize its consequences. One consequence was that a final definition of 
universal criteria of knowledge is problematic because knowledge always refers 
to a unequivocal meaning. That is because knowledge always - to a certain ex-
tent - is a generalization subsuming particularities: similar to organizational 
knowledge (chapter 2), also knowledge in general is related to a potentially 
open-ended plurality of its subsumed particulars (like e.g. in the famous 
knowledge claim that „all swans are white“166). Knowledge as generalized con-
cept always transcends - and is underdetermined by - its particulars. This is why 
all knowledge is open to „falsification“, but also why no list of universal-
rational criteria of knowledge can be complete (Zagzebski, 1994). Here we en-
countered a logical gap between justification and truth which marks a character-
istic of any knowledge claim. There alway remains a gap between a knowledge 
claim and its intended meaning, i.e. its particularities.  
Our analysis showed: it is both our world as well as our concepts about 
the world which are open-ended and dynamic (see chapter 6.4 and 6.6, as well 
as our reflections on the duality of organizational knowledge in chapter 3.2.3). 
The „inescapability“  of the Gettier problem demonstrated that also rationalistic 
epistemology cannot avoid the „open-endedness of concepts“ which we already 
discovered at organizational knowledge. But this also implies that normative-
rationalized criteria based on the traditional concept of „justified true belief“ 
cannot provide enough criteria to qualify successful knowledge creation. Re-
garding to, e.g., scientific content this means that rules of logic, rational reason-
ing, or its correspondence with reality, are not alone able to determine the dis-
tinction between (scientific) knowledge and non-knowledge (Duhem, 1954; 
Longino, 1990; 2002, p. 124ff.). 
In chapter 7 we discussed the work of Helen Longino who states that the 
above mentioned problems of rationalistic epistemology (the „rational ap-
proach“) lead to a reaction which neglects the possibility of an normative-
epistemological approach at all (Longino, 2002). This „social approach“  is 
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166 (Popper, 1959)
(similar to the discussed authors of organizational studies) driven by a descrip-
tive paradigm. Instead of defining an a priori normative concept of knowledge 
they focus on the social context of knowledge creation, i.e. observable, empiri-
cal, „real-world“  processes of knowledge production. These processes are not 
located in individualized cognitive agents, but rather in communities. Knowl-
edge then is created in institutions and groups, lead by various interests, aims, 
and goals (Barnes & Bloor, 2000; Collins, 1983; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour, 
1983). For the defenders of the social approach, rational or normative criteria 
have no privileged status because knowledge-production can be determined by 
any „processes or practices that succeed in fixing belief or in having some con-
tent accepted in some community“  (Longino, 2002, p. 84). But without any 
normative criteria the social approach can only tell us something about what is 
empirically observable in scientific communities.
Longino describes the relation between the „rational“  and the „social“  
approach as „dichotomy“: „rationalizers“  pursue a normative account but nar-
row their view in excluding the social context of knowledge creation; „socializ-
ers“  consider the social embeddedness of knowledge creation but exclude nor-
mativity (Longino, 2002, chapter 1). Longino‘s attempt is to unite both sides in 
order to retain the normative epistemological project but to do so within the so-
cial context of knowledge creation, i.e. to come up with a „social epistemol-
ogy“. According to Longino, not only rationalized but also social normative 
criteria are needed to guide knowledge creation processes. In other words, also 
the social can (and has to) be rational in regard to epistemic effectiveness. To 
„dissolve“  the dichotomy between the „rational“  and „social approach“  Long-
ino suggests to embrace the idea of the social construction of knowledge but to 
overcome its relativistic and merely descriptive stance. Connecting social con-
textualization of knowledge production (social approach) with epistemological 
normativity (rational approach) could turn epistemology into a „normative the-
ory of social knowledge“ (Longino, 2002, p. 122). 
This is basically done by understanding knowledge creation as necessar-
ily dependent on the purposes it ought to serve within a specific community; the 
analogy to map making (chapter 7.3) showed that the guidelines for creating a 
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good map are not driven by universal criteria - like accuracy, coherence, or em-
pirical correspondence - alone, but ought to be dependent on aims, purposes, 
and standards of the respective community which is going to use the map. The 
conclusion was that criteria for successful (scientific) knowledge creation are 
not a priori given but depend on aims and standards endorsed by the respective 
(scientific) community (Longino, 2002, p. 116). 
From a normative standpoint this entails that knowledge creation on its 
transformation from mere content (or in organizations: from a mere distinction) 
to inter-subjective, collective knowledge ought to be validated by community-
dependent criteria like aims and purposes of knowledge for that community. 
Longino suggests that this ought to be done within a space of „critical discur-
sive interaction“  marked by the features of  (1) venues and (2) uptake of criti-
cism, (3) public standards and (4) tempered equality (Longino, 2002, p. 128ff.). 
We subsumed these features as a normative guideline calling for an (a) enabling 
knowledge creation environment where new claims are critically reflected by 
multiple views, and open, transparent standards which allow equal access to the 
field. 
Furthermore, the features of such a critical discursive interaction also 
ought to be (b) constraining, since the social context of knowledge creation is 
understood as a field of knowledge validation: not any content ought to become 
knowledge, but only content which has been exposed to critical interaction 
within the „aims“  and „standards“  of the respective community. According to 
Longino knowledge is normatively constrained to content which confirms to 
aims, and which is accepted by standards of the respective community (Long-
ino, 2002, p. 135ff.). 
Besides being enabling and constraining, the social environment of 
knowledge creation also ought to be (c) reflecting: also constraining aims and 
standards are to be open to change and progress. This is significant because oth-
erwise there would be no channel for fundamental changes of a field. Crucial 
paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions would not have been possible without 
critical reflection of the general assumptions and structures of a cognitive com-
munity. Hence, scientific (and in consequence also organizational) communities 
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ought to scrutinize, modify, and (re-)create also their second-order level of 
knowledge, i.e. their standards and aims, their background assumptions, and 
ontological commitments. Thus, a proper knowledge creation environment 
should provide critical discursive interaction not only for its stock of knowledge 
but also for the reflection and (re-)construction of its aims and standards (Long-
ino, 2002, p. 134f.). 
Figure 11.6: Core norms of social epistemology: enabling, constraining, and reflecting
Our first research question (concerning an organizational epistemology) asked 
„how can a normative epistemological account for organizations be grounded 
and justified?“ (chapter 5.4). In part II we tried to prepare such a ground for 
knowledge creation for organizations by referring to the philosophical discus-
sion about a normative concept of knowledge, especially to the social epistemo-
logical account of Helen Longino. The latter reconciles the contradicting under-
standings within the philosophical discussions of knowledge, i.e. of (1) knowl-
edge as purely socially constructed, open-ended, and relative, and of (2) knowl-
edge as purely rationally constrained, and absolute. The integration of both 
views prepared a social-epistemological ground for our organizational episte-
mology.   
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11.2.3 Epistemological guidelines for organizational knowledge creation
In part I we learned how to describe knowledge creation at organizations, i.e. as 
distinction-making on different levels with different types of concepts. Then, in 
part III (based on the philosophical findings from part II) we prescribed values 
and features of the knowledge creation environment which was understood as a 
space of transformation from distinctions to knowledge (in its normative sense). 
To do so, we recontextualized the social epistemological guidelines of (1) ena-
bling, (2) constraining, and (3) reflecting to organizations in chapter 9.
The first resulting guideline was to enable an open space of knowledge crea-
tion. This was based on Helen Longinos concept of critical discursive interac-
tion. Hereby, the feature of „(tempered) equality“  was interpreted as „inclu-
sion“, i.e. as a call to extend the „critical resources“  of the organization and to 
include a variety of potential knowledge producers. This supports „critical 
multi-perspectivity“  which was derived from the social-epistemological fea-
tures „venues“  and „uptake of criticism“. According to „critical multi-
perspectivity“, organizations ought not only to allow but to encourage partici-
pation in knowledge evaluation and creation on a broad basis allowing multiple 
actors to enter the discourse. For this to happen in an „organized“  way, „trans-
parent“  (if not even „public“) standards and structures have to be defined. Only 
if organizational actors know how to enter and how to proceed within knowl-
edge creation, these actors are actually able to be part of critical discursive in-
teraction. 
The first guideline of „enabling“  was rooted in the open-ended and plural-
istic character of knowledge. 
The second guideline adapted the need for constraining knowledge creation. 
Not to universal norms, but to the specific aims („confirmation“) and standards 
(„acceptance“) of the respective knowledge creating community. This is impor-
tant because just as the particulars of scientific knowledge (data), also the par-
ticulars of organizational knowledge (practice) allow high flexibility and open-
endedness in regard to the outcome of knowledge creation. Therefore, organiza-
296
tional actors need guidance and support in order to not only create distinctions 
but to create useful knowledge. Hence, organizational distinctions need to be 
„accepted“  to be within the scope of the organizational structure, as well as they 
have to be „confirmed“ in order to be aligned with organizational goals167.
Figure 11.7: Guidelines for critical social interaction in rationalistic, social & organizational epis-
temology
Remember the example of the nurse in the hospital: what was important was 
not only to have multiple perspectives and an open environment. In contrary, 
the main challenge was how to constrain the open-endedness of her chaotic and 
equivocal surroundings (J. R. Taylor & Van Every, 2000, p. 275; Weick, et al., 
2005, p. 409). Her knowledge creation and application activities (e.g. process-
ing values from measuring devices, or making a diagnosis) had to be con-
strained and guided by organizational factors like goals (care for patients 
health, not for gardening) as well as to structure (report to the right supervisor 
in the right language) of the respective organizational field (see chapter 1.3.3). 
The second guideline of „constraining“  is rooted in the normative charac-
ter of knowledge.
The third guideline was about to reflect upon those goals and structures which 
were the constraining factors in the second guideline. Thus, this last guideline 
calls for to expose goals and structures to critical evaluation and potential redes-
ign. It is what we, in our discussion about social epistemology (chapter 7.7), 
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167  Notice, that this step  ultimately connects our general description of organizations, as „struc-
tured towards goals“  (from chapter 1) with the whole dynamics of  our organizational epistemol-
ogy.
called „second order discourse“  (Longino, 2002, p. 136f.) and in our discussion 
about organizational learning (chapter 4.2) „double loop learning“  (Argyris, 
1977; Argyris & Schön, 1978). For organizations this implies to put effort in 
providing an environment that produces awareness as well as processes to en-
able actors to rethink and to critically scrutinize the organization‘s core goals 
and deeper structures. This step is crucial because some perturbances and 
changes in practice cannot substantially be solved in the single-loop. Organiza-
tions ought to enable actors to produce knowledge both within (single-loop) as 
well as beyond (double-loop) given goals and structures. Hence, organizations 
need not only to be prepared for a „revolution“  but also to actively and continu-
ously reflect upon possible changes of its goals and structures. 
The third guideline of „reflecting“  was based on the contextualized char-
acter of knowledge as well as it was again based on open-endedness which re-
enters the knowledge creation process on a second level. 
Figure 11.8: The three transformative guidelines of organizational knowledge creation
Those guidelines presented a possible answer to the second research question 
defined in chapter 5.4: „Which normative criteria and guiding principles for 
organizational knowledge creation can be developed out of such a founda-
tion?“
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11.2.4 Organizational Epistemology: a theoretical toolkit
Just as „organizational knowledge“  (in part I) also our conception of an „organ-
izational epistemology“  attempts to serve as a theoretical framework and to 
provide a terminology which can be used for understanding real-world organi-
zations. Hereby, an „organizational epistemology“  is not only about to empiri-
cally describe an organization but to normatively evaluate it as a knowledge 
creation space. This does not mean that it neglects the possibility of describing 
organizations. In contrary, it is necessary to describe and grasp the appearances 
of knowledge in the organization (its „epistemic attributes“) in order to proceed 
to a normative evaluation (which applies „epistemological criteria“).  
The latter was demonstrated at the „Seven-Eleven Japan“ (SEJ) use-case 
in chapter 10.3 where we supplemented the descriptive results from the „organ-
izational knowledge“  framework (sales hypotheses are organizational distinc-
tions which enable organizational action) with the „organizational epistemol-
ogy“  framework (sales hypotheses are generated as knowledge claims and 
therefore ought to follow epistemological guidelines). Thus, we evaluated how 
SEJ designs its items-management environment towards a knowledge creation 
environment, measured by our epistemological guidelines enabling, constrain-
ing, and reflecting. 
First, we saw that knowledge creation (the construction of knowledge 
claims as sales hypotheses) is not restricted to management or white collar ex-
perts but delegated to all store employees. Besides this inclusion, SEJ sales em-
ployees are enabled to develop critical multi-perspectivity: (a) they are provided 
with multiple input, like, sales figures, weather forecasts, planned local events, 
product information, experiences with customers, best practices, and so forth; 
(b) they are being prompted to take multiple possible customer viewpoints into 
consideration. Together with continuous access to transparent standards, like the 
organizations main goals, SEJ encourages thousands of actors to participate in 
knowledge creation thus enabling a vast and open knowledge creation space 
(Nonaka, et al., 2008, p. 138ff.). 
Second, we pointed out that the manifold outcomes of distinction-making 
(i.e. the making of sales hypothesis and their following item-orders) were con-
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strained to specific acceptance processes (especially by the structured hypothe-
sis verification procedure) as well as to confirmation processes (via the connec-
tion to values and the firms philosophy, but also via more local goals, e.g., those 
of present sales campaigns).
Figure 11.9: The organizational epistemological guidelines of enabling and constraining at 
Seven-Eleven Japan
Concerning the third guideline we saw that SEJ seems not to take any specific 
measures in order to reflect on those goals and structures. With such a second-
order discourse in place, the items-management environment would be able to 
cope also with more fundamental problems. As possible improvement we sug-
gested to facilitate existing meetings as reflective spaces where given goals and 
structures intentionally could (and should) be opened to critical discussion.  
The application of our outlined „organizational epistemology“  to the SEJ 
use-case was our attempt to finally tackle the third and last research question 
defined in chapter 5.4: How can such guiding principles be applied to real 
world organizations? 
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11.3 Concluding reflections & future research
11.3.1 Philosophy, epistemology, and knowledge management
In the last months of his life Ludwig Wittgenstein was puzzled with the ques-
tion if and how something can be known with certainty (Wittgenstein, 1969). 
And although in his former works - especially in the „Philosophical Investiga-
tions“  (Wittgenstein, 1953/2006) - he relativized knowledge to social practice, 
in his last thoughts on „certainty“  he brought in the old distinction between be-
lief and knowledge: 
If someone believes something, we needn't always be able to answer the question 'why 
he believes it'; but if he knows something, then the question "how does he know?" must 
be capable of being answered.“ (Wittgenstein, 1969, §550, my emphasis)
It seems like Wittgenstein himself was struggling with the opposition between 
(1) knowledge as something that is constructed and embedded within a social 
practice (or, in his words, within „language games“) versus (2) knowledge as 
something that has to be justified and validated in order to be differentiated 
from mere belief. But this opposition is nothing else than the difference be-
tween the (1) „social“  and the (2) „rational“  approach (Longino, 2002, chapter 
1). Can the two approaches be connected? They can, if we find a way which 
acknowledges the social construction of knowledge but at the same time de-
fends its normative characteristic. To get there Longino suggests to understand 
the social itself as a „validating element“  (Longino, 2002, p. 122). I.e. to under-
stand the social context of knowledge creation as a justificatory practice guided 
by criteria and guidelines to which knowledge creating actors ought to be com-
mitted to. We systematized these guidelines and normative criteria as „ena-
bling“, „constraining“ and „reflecting“. 
From this viewpoint, philosophy claims to be able to provide guidelines 
for knowledge creation. Epistemology then is a prescriptive project which 
strives towards criteria and guidelines which are meant to be binding to those 
pursuing knowledge. Here lies the reason why philosophy can be fruitful also 
for the theory of organizational knowledge and „knowledge management“. This 
is because it comes up with a foundation to develop a normative framework for 
successful knowledge creation and application environments. A framework 
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which is not only based on some use-cases where some guidelines were induced 
but which is derived out of a concept of knowledge itself.
By introducing philosophy to the descriptive theory of organizational 
knowledge we have been able to provide guiding criteria for „reflective practi-
tioners“  as well as for evaluative researchers. From the beginning of this in-
quiry it has been our attempt to develop concepts which can be used both for 
researchers and practitioners. Hereby, the theoretical toolkit of „organizational 
knowledge“  (part I) presented a way of describing types and levels of organiza-
tional knowledge, its creation and application. By connecting these outcomes 
with a normative understanding of knowledge (drawing from philosophical 
epistemology) we were able to come up with a supplementing theoretical 
toolkit. This prescriptive „organizational epistemology“  (parts II & III) provides 
a framework (a second theoretical toolkit) which offers guidelines for the de-
sign of successful knowledge creation environments. Thus, the practitioner is 
not only able to understand and describe organizational knowledge but also re-
ceives a toolkit for critical evaluation and design of knowledge creation spaces. 
It is an irony: introducing a theoretical discourse from philosophy opened new 
possibilities to become practical. By consulting the philosophical discussion of 
epistemology we were able to boost the practical significance of our theory of 
organizational knowledge. The reason for that was the normative spin which 
entered with philosophy. A normative spin which (although for the moment 
only at a very abstract level) provides guidelines and assistance for real-world 
organizations. 
In other words, our inquiry tried to take philosophy seriously. Serious 
here means that we took seriously the claim of philosophy to be general. And if 
we claim generality for our philosophical reflections on knowledge, then we 
claim that these reflections have significance for all specific instantiations of 
knowledge, be it in the sciences or, as in our case, in organizations.  
Whether the presented applied epistemology in this inquiry was successful or 
not, has to be judged by others. However, I hope to have shown that it can be 
inspiring and fruitful for the discussion on „organizational knowledge“  and 
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„knowledge management“  to incorporate philosophical reflections about the 
nature of knowledge.
11.3.2 Suggestions for future research
!
! The „tacit dimension“
One suggestion for future research may be to open the presented approach to-
wards a type of knowledge which is specifically important for organizations: 
implicit (or „tacit“) knowledge. Although the latter has been part of our discus-
sions in chapter 2.3 (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka, et al., 2008), chapter 
3.2 (M. Polanyi, 1958, 1967), and in chapter 5.3 (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, 
2005), our inquiry focused on the two types „propositional“  and „narrative“ 
knowledge; both are explicable to the form of language and both could be de-
scribed as „templates“  or „concepts“  which stand in a certain relation, as a ten-
sion, or as a gap to organizational action and practice. „Tacit“  knowledge, on 
the other hand, by definition is action, i.e. is incorporated to the actors as skills 
or competencies. But if this is the case, how can tacit knowledge be validated, 
scrutinized, adapted, changed, and related to practice? How can it be part of a 
„critical discursive interaction“? According to Schreyögg and Geiger it cannot 
and therefore has to be excluded from the definition of organizational knowl-
edge (Schreyögg & Geiger, 1997, p. 83). But do we really have to go that far? 
To make tacit knowledge inter-subjectively exchangeable (and also discussable) 
may not be impossible. This has been indicated by Nonaka‘s & Takeuchi‘s con-
version process of „socialization“  which was about to communicate and share 
implicit knowledge: the master shows bread baking and the apprentice imitates, 
thus gradually acquiring tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1991, p. 98f.; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, p. 100ff.). It may also not be impossible to understand tacit 
knowledge as a validity claim which (just as propositions and narratives) is di-
rected towards organizational practice. This could lead to an understanding of 
tacit knowledge which always involves some kind of distance or abstraction 
from practice, making it open-ended, changeable, as well as contestable and 
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verifiable. Consider our example from chapter 5 (and then again in chapter 8): 
in saying that someone is capable of „bike-riding“  I do attribute tacit knowledge 
of bike-riding to that person. Although on a communicative meta-level, one 
may ask back: „Verify it! Is this person really capable of riding a bike?“. This 
would open a gap between knowledge (bike-riding as implicit knowledge of a 
person) and practice (the concrete event of this person riding a bike). The for-
mer would be a generalized concept (bike-riding) which stands opposed to the 
latter (its particulars, i.e. all the possible spatio-temporal events where riding a 
bike is possible). And even if I restrict („contextualize“) knowledge, if I e.g. 
claim to be able to ride only that specific bike of type X, nonetheless many dif-
ferent situations of riding this specific bike of type X are possible. Also here, 
even if we do not refer to „all“  possible particularities, we refer to „all of some-
thing“  (Schauer, 1991; Tsoukas, 2005a, p. 78). Future research could hook into 
the discussion of tacit knowledge in order to detect a relation, tension, or gap 
between knowledge and practice instead of simply identify knowledge with ac-
tion. This could help to „demystify“  the tacit dimension and to turn implicit 
knowledge to a de- and reconstructible black-box, to an organizational concept 
(like propositions or narratives) which can be reopened, critically scrutinized, 
and which can be part of critical discursive interaction.
The practical dimension
Chapter 10 tried to apply the theoretical concepts of our developed organiza-
tional epistemology to a specific use-case. Of course, this does not verify its 
borderless applicability to all possible practical cases. In contrary, it would be 
the aim of future research to connect the introduced organizational epistemo-
logical vocabulary to empirical organizational studies in order to explore the 
limits of our theoretical framework. Revealing these limits then could trigger 
further theoretical work in order to modify and/or extend the presented organ-
izational epistemology. This is especially important if we want our shift (from 
philosophy to organizations) to become a practically applicable toolkit. In chap-
ter 9 we gave only a first impression on what the guidelines of „enabling“, 
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„constraining“, and „reflecting“  could mean to organizations. Future conduct 
ought to carry out empirical research in real-life organizations in order to apply, 
verify, and, if necessary, to falsify our developed concepts168. Future research 
has to mutually supplement theoretical and empirical outcomes to refine and 
redefine our outlined criteria and guidelines for successful organizational 
knowledge creation.   
Though there remain open questions and further research this inquiry made a 
first step towards a normative framework of organizational knowledge which is 
based on a solid (social) epistemological grounding. This should be enough mo-
tivation for future work, both on an academic level (interpretation of empirical 
studies, further development of the theoretical framework) as well as on a prac-
tical level (evaluating and designing knowledge creation environments). 
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168 This means that our framework also is nothing else than a hypothesis, a piece of knowledge 
which stands against a wide practice of  possible application. Thus,  all discussed normative crite-
ria of knowledge also are valid for this inquiry. This makes the talk about knowledge (and epis-
temology) to a circular discussion, i.e. where the main subject  (knowledge) always possibly re-
enters  the discussion on a meta-level:  to claim something about knowledge itself is knowledge, 
hence a claim about itself.
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